Why do citizens in segregated suburbs in Sweden turn to “alternative authorities” for support and services instead of the official local state? The problem of emerging “parallel societies” hollowing out legitimacy of the official state is increasingly discussed in the Swedish context, and although there seems to be a consensus on the seriousness of the problem, we don’t know how processes of trust building and legitimacy proceed between citizens and authorities or how alternative and official authorities relate to each other. According to state-building theories, “pockets of official state neglect” as in the Swedish case, should not exist in developed well-functioning welfare states (Tilly, 1992), as citizens are assumed to recognize and choose the “cleaner” version of authorities based on rational grounds (Rothstein 2021). Other scholars however, more anchored in the study of developing countries oppose any idea of the official state having a special stance and argue for studying citizens as anchored in various “arenas of authority”. This paper argues that both theories lack a more in-depth account of the processes of trust building in segregated areas in otherwise well-functioning societies. I use informant interviews with frontline workers in the local government, to explore this problem in a pilot study.

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) rank among the largest market players in both domestic economies and global markets and their importance increased in recent decades. In developed countries, this trend is a part of the functioning of a normal market economy as SOEs serve as an instrument to reduce market failures, particularly in the vital public service sectors. However, the existence of such companies may also lead to undue competitive advantages, as the case of some Chinese monopolies and certain Central and Eastern European countries in democratic backsliding shows. This study analyses this issue in the context of the relevant rules of the European Union (EU), and seeks to highlight the potential threats that state ownership may pose to competition in the EU internal market, and ultimately, to the effective provision of certain public services.

Governments acquire the majority of shares in companies for a variety of reasons. It is usually ensuring the uninterrupted provision of public services or the fulfilment of other tasks “for the public interest” (e. g. keeping alcohol consumption or gambling within limits) may also be accepted. However, state ownership justified on these grounds may also be used for the purpose of serving any particular (often protectionist) economic interests. As a result, the compliance of the operation of SOEs with EU internal market and competition rules is often questioned, and disputes of this kind are increasingly being brought before the competent EU institutions (i.e. the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union).

The hypothesis of the research, which also applies to the EU internal market in a global context, is that the greater the involvement of national governments as owners of companies, the greater the risk of a reduction in the intensity of competition, and hence the risk of a reduction in the quality of public services that can be provided, at least in part, under normal market conditions. This risk is even more serious in Member States (such as Hungary) where the democratic control of a given political regime is unsatisfactory and the necessary guarantees to ensure that state-owned enterprises do not gain undue market advantages are lacking. Moreover, in these countries this risk is exacerbated by the exceptional rules introduced in response to crises (emergency regulations, special taxes, etc.).

The study is based on a comparative legal and political analysis using qualitative and, in part, quantitative methods. The findings are derived from a statistical analysis of the ownership structure of state-owned public enterprises based on data from corporate databases and a primary analysis of the relevant case law of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union. We will also present a case study of Hungary, where there are serious problems with the provision of certain public services (such as waste collection, water supply or certain segments of public transport), some of which are linked to the lack of necessary guarantees regarding the operation of state-owned enterprises.

High administrative burdens push citizens and officials into relying on brokerage to simplify or bypass bureaucratic procedures (Lotta & Marques, 2020; Peeters, 2020). Still understudied in public administration literature, Brazilian despachantes are private street-level brokers who intermediate public services for a fee. They are strongly institutionalised, both as actors in public service systems and as a recognised profession (Bonelli, 2017; Brasil, 2021). Despachantes’ presence is strong even in basic public service provision, such as the welfare cash-based benefit systems provided by the Brazilian National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social – INSS).

To reduce administrative burden, INSS implemented digital self-services, provided mainly through a cell phone app (‘Meu INSS’), which became the main channel for interaction with the agency. The strengthening of remote service channels could be expected to reduce the need for intermediaries, both due to lower administrative burden, and to the weakening of connections between despachantes and street-level bureaucrats, the latter taken from behind the counter to ‘decision factories’ (Peeters, 2023). However, as elsewhere, digital self-services can create new burdens (Lloyd & Wivaldo, 2019; Rydén & De Andrade, 2023), increasing the need for intermediation.

This research asks whether the introduction of digital self-services reduced street-level brokerage of INSS welfare services in the Brazilian State of São Paulo. To answer the question, we rely, first, on the quantitative analysis of longitudinal INSS administrative data concerning benefit application channels (n = 415.373, 04.2019–03.2020). Second, we employ thematic analysis of open-ended survey questions concerning despachantes and digital self-services, answered by 167 INSS officials working in the State of São Paulo. São Paulo shows the strongest presence of INSS services intermediation among other Brazilian states.

Findings suggest that the introduction of digital self-services, instead of keeping street-level brokerage at bay, often made them invisible to the agency’s radar. The study thus provides relevant insights for administrative burden theories and proposes street-level brokers to be accounted for as actors in an unintended hybrid service governance system.

Policy entrepreneurship literature underscores the crucial role politicians play in effecting policy change. Given that Policy changes requiring political backing, the way in which policy entrepreneurs engage with these key stakeholders has been widely examined by scholars. What happens when no politicians are present when entrepreneurs seek change, however? Taking the "Roim Rachok" (“Looking Ahead”) Program run by former employees of the Israeli Defense Ministry as a case study, this research explores how policy entrepreneurs champion the inclusion of disabled individuals in governmental organizations without direct involvement on the part of politicians. The program focuses specifically on the inclusion of people with Autism, characterized by difficulties in interpersonal communication and understanding group dynamics, repetitive behaviors, and sensory processing disorders, into the IDF. Although still in its initial and preliminary stages, we have early indications suggesting that politicians were not directly involved in the policy change efforts spearheaded by the policy entrepreneurs. These preliminary indications raise two questions: First, what conditions lead to the absence of politicians' involvement in policy design?; and Second, do the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs differ in these cases compared to instances where politicians are involved? Adopting a qualitative method and gathering data primarily through in-depth interviews, I am interviewing various stakeholders involved in the program—policy entrepreneurs, former autistic soldiers recruited into the IDF through the program, their direct and indirect senior and junior commanders, Israel Defense Ministry officials who helped set up the program (e.g. former head of Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations, known as the Mossad), and program partners such as the rehabilitation department of the Israeli National Insurance Institute.