In contrast to other European countries, councils for the judiciary (hereinafter: councils) are rare in Switzerland. Currently, there are seven councils, located in Geneva, Ticino, Jura, Fribourg, Neuchâtel, Valais, and Vaud. Councils are absent in the German-speaking part of Switzerland and remain relatively unknown. Moreover there is no federal level equivalent of a council. In Switzerland, councils are considered relatively new institutions with limited practical experience, and scholarly literature has paid little attention to them. Thus, there is a research gap regarding councils for the judiciary.

The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of councils for the judiciary in Switzerland, their functions, tasks, and the legal framework surrounding them, with a particular focus on councils in the cantons. This leads to four research questions addressed in the work:

What are the essential elements of councils for the judiciary?

What are the legal foundations regarding councils for the judiciary in Switzerland?

How are councils for the judiciary structured in Switzerland?

What are the advantages of implementing councils for the judiciary in Switzerland?

The project primarily employs a legal doctrinal approach. The examination of the topic relies on international law (treaties and soft law), constitutional law, as well as in-depth analysis of literature, regulations, and documents. In addition to the legal doctrinal approach, the results were validated through contact with cantonal councils for the judiciary in Switzerland.

This paper asks two interconnected questions, the first normative and the second empirical: First, should Israel establish a council for the judiciary? Second, does Israel in practice already has an informal council for the judiciary?

The administrative responsibility for running the courts became a highly contested issue in Israel in the first half of 2023, with the attempt of the government to take complete control over the selection of judges to all the courts. While the attempt at formal change to the basic law in the matter of judicial selection has failed, the government and the ruling coalition’s representatives continue to challenge the status quo in the management of the courts through other means (e.g., through questioning established managerial practices of the courts in parliamentary committees).

The governmental attempt to capture the courts has reinforced some already known problems in the protection of judicial independence in Israel, particularly from an institutional standpoint: too weak institutional checks on relatively strong governmental powers in court administration. Another problem in Israel is the foggy landscape of accountability over the administration of courts, with many actors taking part in running the courts. Particularly confusing in terms of accountability are informalities in court administration, as seen in the process of agencification of the Administration of Courts (a unit headed by the Director of Courts), and the complex roles played by the President of the Supreme Court and the presidents of all other courts. The informal roles of these actors have changed the formal lines of accountability established in law, in which the Minister of Justice and the President of the Supreme Court balance each other in many legal responsibilities over court administration, with the Director of Courts (answerable to and appointed by the Minister with the consent of the President of the Supreme court) charged with much of the day-to-day operation of the courts.

This paper argues that normatively speaking, there are advantages to establishing a council for the judiciary that would oversee most of the functions of court administration, leaving aside the issues of judicial selection, removal and discipline. In line with European standards, such a council would be composed of a majority of judges elected by their peers. It would be advantageous particularly from the point of view of increasing the protection of both collective and individual judicial independence, as well as clarifying and stabilizing lines of accountability over court administration. The clearer institutional landscape would also have advantages in terms of administrative efficiency. Yet there are risks and challenges in taking such a move. First, the socio-political background is unstable, and such a move entails a risk in a political capture of the courts. Second, as detailed in the paper, informally a council of sorts already exists, in the form of an informal sitting committee that includes the presidents of all the courts, and which unofficially decides upon policy in matters of court administration (some judges call this committee the Judiciary’s “board of directors”). In such an administrative and political landscape, it would be difficult to establish a new council that would manage to protect both collective and individual judicial independence as well as increase judicial accountability over court administration.

The European Union has added a new layer to protect the Union's budget when breaches of the rule of law principles affect or risk affecting the EU's financial interests. In the case of Hungary, the Council - on the proposal of the Commission - has imposed certain measures on the member state concerning the functioning of the judiciary. The Council's implementing decision is focused on two main aspects of the judicial organization: the connection between the central organs of court administration and the Kúria's (Supreme Court) independence.

The paper will investigate how the amendments to the Courts Organization and Administration Act have somewhat transformed the Hungarian concept of judicial administration by extending the powers of the National Judges' Council and enabling it to bring an action against the National Office for the Judiciary and several other administrative organs. Besides, it will highlight the sweeping changes in the Kúria's case assignment system. A crucial component of the modifications is the case allocation log, which serves as a tool for stakeholders to monitor if they are deprived of their natural judges. The paper will also demonstrate how the log provides an opportunity for researchers to obtain empirical data.