In line with the 2024 theme of democracy at the EGPA conference, we raise questions about agenda-setting processes and whether they show expertocratic and adhocratic tendencies.

Using the multiple streams framework (MSF) (Kingdon 1984) as our theoretical backdrop, we study the ‘coupling’ processes that took place in Covid-19 policy advisory systems, whereby policy entrepreneurs attempted to couple elements from the problem, policy and politics streams. We question the advocacy process undertaken by policy entrepreneurs. Specifically, we are interested in the processes through which these actors make arguments to couple the streams: ‘argumentative coupling’ (Blum 2018), and how and why expertise feeds (or not) into policy solutions.

In this paper, we contribute to the operationalization of argumentative coupling logics identified by Blum. Our research makes a conceptual, analytical contribution to public policy research by advancing the overlooked linkage between the three streams in the MSF under crisis conditions. We set out to identify enablers and impediments to arguments that use different coupling logics.

We choose to apply argumentative coupling to the crisis context, namely the Covid-19 pandemic. Policies adopted in crisis conditions tend to rely heavily on expert arguments due to the uncertainty and ambiguity that characterise emergencies. Policy decisions often need to be taken quickly and with a limited and changing evidence base.

We examine arguments crafted by experts to clarify the role of expertise in policy decisions. To further our understanding, we ask ourselves "which expert arguments succeed in influencing policy decisions, and which do not succeed?" Moreover, we also ask "why are certain expert arguments successful and not others?”

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Belgian policymakers established strict social distancing measures, also known as “lockdown measures”, to stem the spread of the virus. This analysis covers the period from March 2020 to March 2021, during which two containment phases were implemented (March to May 2020 and November 2020 to March 2021). Decisions taken during this period resulted from the activation and implementation of a federal crisis management structure, comprising various decision-making, coordinating and scientific advisory bodies. Based on an analysis of the evolution of the arguments and indicators used by experts in their recommendations (expert group reports and press conferences by Sciensano, SPF Santé publique and the National Crisis Centre), this paper shows that the epistemic and political context, the certification of experts and their field of expertise, as well as the shared beliefs between actors, played a major role in the selection of the set of lockdown measures that were enforced. It highlights the elements that directly influenced the government in their decision to confine the population, as well as their variation. The conclusions open the debate about the relevance of such ad hoc expert groups and the possible improvements of these advisory systems in order to better reflect the values and interests of larger groups among the population.

The growing role of consultants in the performance of core government work has led some to lament the effective emergence of “consultocracy” in modern states (Hood and Jackson 1991). This has opened up wider debates about the impact of such unelected actors on policy processes, the nature and capacities of public administrations and even on the democratic legitimacy of the state (Beveridge 2012, Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2014, Ylönen and Kuusela 2019). Ongoing issues relating to access to reliable data as well as the inherent opaqueness of consulting work have, however, made the empirical exploration of those dynamics challenging in most contexts.

The focus of existing research on the topic has been primarily on the work of consultants in the management of the state and public service delivery (e.g. Saint Martin 1998, Gunther et al. 2015). While those works are undoubtedly valuable, they tend to deal with technical and process-related support for the public sector, which has traditionally been seen as less controversial from a democratic and public administration standpoint (Marciano 2018). More problematic areas of consultant involvement have received much less attention. This includes notably their role in substantive policy planning and formulation, which has been considered by some a form of effective privatisation of core government functions (Vigoda-Gadot et al. 2014)

Furthermore, empirical research on the role of consultants has been limited to a small number of countries with strong affinity for the New Public Management philosophy and traditionally strong and well-resourced bureaucracies (e.g. Howlett and Migone 2013, Gunter et al. 2015, van den Berg et al., 2019, Marciano 2022). The ways those dynamics have played out in other administrative settings, especially those with traditionally weaker policy and administrative capacities and fewer resources have remained understudied.

The paper addresses both those gaps by examining the extent and nature of policy consulting in Bulgaria as well as the role played by consultants in the policy making process in the country. The study utilises an original dataset (n = 367) of public tenders for policy consulting work in Bulgaria in the period 2010-2023. This is complemented by in-depth qualitative data gathered through interviews with consultants, civil servants and other policy experts (n=14). The paper not only examines longitudinal trends in the extent and nature of policy consultants’ work in the country but also reflects on the role those actors play in the wide process of policy making by the state. The paper highlights the role of EU membership in both driving outsourcing (through its promotion of certain policy making practices) and facilitating it (through providing financial resources), while also drawing attention to the tension between drivers of (administrative) Europeanisation and existing public administration culture and capacities in Bulgaria.

Economic sanctions are measures restricting trade and finance with the aim to coerce the target state to change its policy to a desired direction. There have been economic sanctions against Russia since the unlawful annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, following Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the US, EU and UK have decided on and applied an unprecedented and accumulating package of sanctions against Russia. The 14th sanctions package was decided on in June 2024. Russia has responded to the sanctions with its own countermeasures, most of which are associated with energy. The process of dealing with sanctions has shown that the EU has remained united and has been able to do decisions quickly. The discussion towards the EU was flexible and Finland was well listened to during the preparation process. Finland has been agile and active in presenting ideas for implementing sanctions, even though such a massive process was started almost from scratch. The sanctions are much more extensive than, for example, the sanctions following the annexation of Crimea. Of course, the experience from 2014-2021 was useful. Preparations of the sanctions could have started as soon as Russia obviously started preparing a war against Ukraine. The Government could have been involved in the preparation more broadly. However, the preparation of extensive packages had to take place in very small groups in order to ensure the surprise of the sanctions. Russia has been clever and it has been able to circumvent many sanctions. Finland has been a pioneer in the implementation of sanctions and preventing the circumvention of sanctions. In addition to the sanctions imposed by the EU, US and UK, it would strongly enhance the impact, if the UN used restrictive measures to show Russia that their actions in Ukraine are unacceptable. Regrettably, that does not seem conceivable because Russia still has a right to veto at the UN Security Council.