Co-author: BIANCA RADU, bianca.radu@fspac.ro, Babes-Bolyai University

In recent years, in order to bolster their capacity to manage the wicked problems, the systemic challenges of an increasingly more interconnected world (e.g. excessive red tape, corruption, lack of skills), governments have focused on achieving horizontal and vertical co-ordination and delivering policies and programmes that are minimally redundant, incoherent and lacunar (Peters, 1998; Richards and Kavanagh, 2000; Ling, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Bryson, 2003; Humpage, 2005; Christensen et al. 2007; Dramaux and Joyce, 2018; OECD, 2020). Historically, a joined-up government approach to policymaking which entails working across organizational boundaries (be it between portfolios or departments within a tier of government, different tiers of government, government and other sectors or the community etc.) without removing the boundaries themselves, was usually associated with:

- strengthening the overall accountability of the public sector, by achieving democratic legitimacy through shared responsibility and building a consensus around policies (DETR, 1998; McGhee, 2003; Johnson, 2005)

- more effective use of scarce resources (Pollitt, 2003)

- fostering innovation, by bringing together different people, backgrounds and organizations and working together with a sense of shared responsibility (Ling, 2002; SSA, 2007)

- enhancing the degree of visioning in the government’s strategic documents (Bryson, 2003).

OECD’s recent key reports on effective decision-making (2014; 2015; 2018; 2020) focus largely on identifying solutions for sustainable and inclusive growth and advocate in favour of institutionalising co-ordination mechanisms to achieve whole of government policy coherence. Having a centre of government (“a body or group of bodies that provide direct support and advice to Heads of Government and the Council of Minister, or Cabinet”) to engage in strategic leadership, mobilise smart budgeting and transform information into knowledge is key to sound public governance. Despite the diversity of policy contexts and increased intricacies of today’s challenges, centres of government across the world are mandated to ensure the consistency and prudency of government decisions and “to promote evidence-based, strategic and consistent policies” (OECD 2014). Their roles, albeit different so as to better respond to particular domestic characteristics, remain similar across time and territories: they lead cross-cutting policy priorities and initiatives, strategically plan for the whole of government and communicate government messages to the public and across the administration (OECD 2018).

In Romania, according to the legislation in force, strategic stewardship is provided by several bodies: The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, General Secretariat of the Government, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Investments and European Projects, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of External Affairs, and Ministry of Public Works, Development and Administration. Albeit their distinct prerogatives and very specific responsibilities at times, these bodies are collectively designed to ensure coordination and play transversal roles in drafting policies and legal documents relevant to public administration reform, negotiating treaties at state, governmental or departmental levels, facilitating exchanges on the impact of governmental policies and performing strategic foresight for the whole of government.

However, the overall capacity of these transversal actors to act as part of the centre of government and provide a coherent, minimally redundant, and effective coordination within the Romanian public administration system remains a matter of concern. Recommendation COM (2020) 523 final flags two key priorities for Romania in 2021: improving the quality and effectiveness of public administration and the predictability of decision-making (para 25). In the 2020 Rule of Law Report , the Commission pointed out that Government emergency ordinances continue to be widely used and successive uncoordinated legislative amendments also have an impact on the quality of legislation and legal certainty. It also underlined that the overall effectiveness of the ordinary process for preparing and enacting laws varies (a matter discussed also indirectly by the most recent Progress Report under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism ). Finally, in 2022, a World Bank Report on Strategic planning in Romania suggested that in Romania there is poor strategic planning and policy coordination for the whole of government.

This paper builds on a prior analysis performed by Iancu (2021) on strategic planning in Romanian and investigates the quality of the Centre of Government by exploring the professional expertise of all executive politicians and inter-ministerial positions associated with it. It aims to discover the role professionalism plays in the poor performance of the whole of government in Romania. Documentary research and interviews with key members of the Romanian executive triangle are envisaged. The paper will help kick-start the collection of data for COST – CoREX project for Romania.

This article examines the personalized strategies employed by the President of Romania in the recruitment and retention of presidential advisers. Our research addresses a significant gap in the scientific literature on the influence of entourages within semi-presidential regimes. Within the executive power structure, the President and their staff occupy a privileged position that provides legitimacy, stability, and public visibility. The recruitment strategies for the President's personal advisers are closely linked to the President's role within the semi-presidential regime, whether it is characterized by strong or weak presidential authority.

The case study of Romania from 1990 to 2024 elucidates the personal strategies adopted by the four post-communist Presidents concerning the recruitment, promotion, and rewarding of presidential advisers. By conducting both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the President's staff over these eight terms, we can comparatively highlight the standards utilized by these Presidents in the recruitment and promotion processes of their advisers, focusing on meritocracy, loyalty, and visibility.

This report presents the results of a qualitative study of staff advisers to ministers and deputy prime ministers. The study includes three cases, united by the fact that the counsellors studied are university professors with significant research experience in the field of public governance and administration. The defended thesis is that professionalization is not politically neutral due to the fact that expertise is not one. On the contrary - it develops on the basis of different values, ideas and presuppositions, so that the "advice" to politicians is not simply "objectively correct", it is rather "desired" in accordance with the values that individuals and groups believe. Professionalization actually reproduces political dividing lines. Pure, politically neutral policy expertise does not really exist. The search for it is a doomed cause that only creates tension in the policy debate. If this is true, it means that a new reading of the concept and scales of "politicization" is needed, as well as the acceptance that professionalization does not overcome the debate and the presence of at least two advocacy coalitions.

The paper builds upon the theory of patronage appointments and politicization as a lens of studying these practices on agency level in Slovakia, one of the most politicized CEE countries. The research investigates whether personal ties, party affiliation or expertise influence the appointments of senior civil servants as heads of these agencies. Thus, conceptually it adopts the Ramos, Peters and Panizza (2019) as well as Staronova and Rybar (2021) framework of patronage appointments. Empirically, it is based on the unique dataset of heads of Labour office agencies and Slovak Environmental Inspectorate that held office in the period 2003-2024. This article investigates whether the change in the formal way of recruitment from political appointees to meritocratic selection makes a difference in career paths of the heads of above-mentioned offices. The formal legislative change from political to meritocratic appointment took place in 2015 and 2017 which enables us to take into consideration also various government types. Therefore, the research with its unique dataset has the potential to contribute to the debate on patronage and politicization on agency level as well as on the professional characteristics of civil servants between different forms of recruitment.

The study of political and ministerial advisers has seen significant advancements in recent years, shedding light on their crucial roles within government structures, notably top civil servants and their ministers. The key actors of a so called executive triangle engage in formal and informal bargains that effects overall policy-making. Particularly, countries with meritocratic settings focused on these interrelations, moving beyond a more limited focus of dyadic relations. Recently, new studies appeared also from hybrid and politicized settings, showing different perspective.

Still, a notable gap exists in our understanding of these relations with technocratic ministers instead of politicians. This research article addresses this gap by focusing on the recent technocratic government of Slovakia, appointed in March 2023, following the collapse of the previous three-party minority cabinet. Specifically, we look at the type of expertise (policy, political, PR & media) the ministerial advisers possess and how their roles evolve in interactions with the civil servants and technocratic ministers (many of whom held senior civil service positions immediately before becoming ministers). Our primary objective is to scrutinize the traditional understanding of the executive triangle. We aim to uncover who are ministerial advisers to technocratic ministers, many of whom previously occupied senior positions in the civil service and what is the reason for them to employe such advisers. At the same time, we want to understand how ministerial advisers’ roles differ (policy, political, PR & media), evolve and adapt to different circumstances. This inquiry takes on added significance in light of Slovakia's record of a highly politicized (patronage-based) top civil service, marked by frequent replacements of senior civil servants during government transitions. Consequently, it is crucial to explore how ministerial advisers navigate the complex terrain between politicized civil servants and technocratic ministers in the Ódor government. To achieve these objectives, our research employs semi-structured interviews as the principal method. These interviews will involve technocratic ministers, civil servants, and ministerial advisers, providing a holistic and nuanced perspective on the dynamics and challenges inherent in their interactions in the executive triangle.