The paper is focused on the issue of Western Balkans integration, process lasting more than 20 years, but without clear perspective about the comprehensive integration of the case study region. The author's leading hypothesis is that Western Balkans will never become fully integrated within the EU due to the lack of political will and the lack of institutional readyness on the both sides. Leading hyphotesis is followed by three particular hyphotesis: 1) Western Balkans political entities are loosing their geostrategic importance for EU in the current European and international flows; 2) European Union is focused on the issues of international positioning in the reconfigurating the global power mosaic between USA, Russian Federation and PR China; 3) Western Balkans political entities are facing domestic and regional political and systematic challenges, risks and threats which are placing themselves as an exporters of instability. Such hyphotesis are leading to the main research question: Does the EU integration policy has lost the power to position the Union as a global actor? From the methodological perspective, authors will use the instruments as concretization, using the empirical example of Western Balkans, in order to explain why the issue of further "horizontal" or geograpgical integration does not contribute in creating or sustaining the EU as a global actor. The paper will be theoretically based on the positions of the representatives of neoclassical realism, bearing in mind the importance of domestic circumstances on both sides, EU and Western Balkans, which are determing the integration process, as well as the importance of the decision-making process from the political elite perspective. Thus, the academic significance of the paper lies in the concretization of the confirmation the academic stands of neoclassical realists, in this paper proven on the case study of small and weak states, such as Western Balkans actors, that the foreign policy positioning is not excusivelly determined by the big powers or international ciscumstances. On the practical side, the importance lies in the needs for redefinition the relationship between EU and Western Balkans: from one side how official Brussel to renew its leading role in the case study region in the era of "freezed" classical integration; from another side how Western Balkans entities to secure its stability and sustainability without complete fullfilment of the strategic goal of full EU membership.

Digital media regulation has become a politically salient and contested domain within the European Union. Over the last decade, the EU has reshaped its regulatory framework through an overlapping ecosystem of instruments spanning the revised Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD), the Digital Services Act (DSA), the Digital Markets Act (DMA), the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA), and the Anti-SLAPP Directive. While scholarship has extensively examined the debates and negotiation processes leading to the DSA and DMA, systematic comparison across these five legislative files remains limited.

This gap is surprising because this framework has generated tensions within Member States (as media remains a national prerogative), contestation from industry stakeholders, and significant disagreements between EU institutions. This paper explains variation in regulatory outcomes across the five files by analysing how each institution defined the regulatory problems at stake, and which institution succeeded in imposing its problem definition.

Examining trilogue negotiations across the five legislative processes, the paper identifies distinctive—yet patterned—configurations of conflict between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU. It systematically maps institutional preferences through automated content analysis of four-column negotiation documents, tracing which framings of digital media regulation took precedence in each case.

The comparative analysis reveals divergent but structured conceptualisations of regulatory problems. The Commission framed the regulatory problems either in market-integration and cross-border harmonisation terms, emphasising EU-level coordination and uniform minimum standards or in rule of law terms, emphasising the safeguard of democracy. The Parliament systematically strengthened protections by extending definitions and establishing additional safeguards, conceptualising issues primarily through fundamental rights and democratic resilience. The Council consistently prioritised subsidiarity and national competences, seeking to preserve Member State discretion.

By analysing how overlapping legal instruments interact and how institutional framings shape outcomes, this paper contributes to debates on regulatory governance and the boundaries of European integration. It highlights tensions between EU-level coordination, fundamental rights protection, and national discretion, with implications for institutional adaptation, regulatory coherence, and political contestation in an era of regulatory proliferation.

This paper adopts a political economy perspective to examine how European Union participation reshapes Chinese investment strategies in Europe, focusing on a comparative analysis of Greece and Serbia. Both countries have attracted significant Chinese investment and occupy strategic positions in Southeast Europe. However, their divergent institutional relationships with the EU -full membership versus candidate status- create distinct domestic regulatory environments. The paper asks whether EU participation alters both the regulatory conditions and the political-economic logic underpinning Chinese investment.

At the international level, the paper situates Chinese investment within the evolving political economy of EU-China relations, characterized by increasing regulatory assertiveness, geopolitical contestation, and the redefinition of the Single Market as a strategic space. EU membership embeds host states within a dense architecture of supranational rules on competition, state aid, public procurement, financial regulation, and foreign investment screening. These frameworks function as market-correcting devices but also as instruments of economic governance reflecting broader strategic concerns over market power, and geoeconomic competition. EU participation constitutes a key structural condition shaping the scope and form of Chinese capital in Europe.

Domestically, the paper analyses how national institutional and regulatory environments mediate these international investment strategies. In Greece, Chinese capital must operate within the constraints of EU competition law and regulatory agencies, limiting discretionary state intervention and bilateral bargaining. These conditions encourage compliance-oriented strategies, complex ownership structures, and adaptation to EU governance norms. In Serbia, weaker regulatory embeddedness in the EU allows for a more state-centric political economy, where Chinese investment is negotiated through intergovernmental agreements and regulatory exemptions.

The paper argues that these differences are technical but also entail distinct political economies shaped by states’ positioning within European and transatlantic power structures. Greece’s EU and NATO membership situates its engagement with Chinese capital within a multilayered system of supranational regulation and geopolitical alignment. By contrast, Serbia’s domestic institutional environment is embedded in a geopolitical strategy that privileges close bilateral relations with China, allowing Chinese investment to function as a tool of state-led development and strategic autonomy regarding the EU.

Methodologically, the paper draws on comparative case studies, policy analysis, and sectoral evidence from infrastructure, energy, and logistics. Conceptually, it contributes to debates on international political economy, regulatory governance, and the political economy of Chinese investments abroad, by demonstrating how EU participation frames the interaction between global capital and domestic political authority.