In the last few years, a lot of interest has aroused about financial inclusion. Not surprisingly, in the same period, a great amount of literature has focused on that notion. Moreover, at the global level, the same concept has been linked to the pursuit of some of the Sustainable Development Goals, launched by the United Nations in 2015. In the EU scenario, the legislative initiatives aimed at strengthening open banking as well as regulating open finance, both based on the sharing of clients’ data with third-party providers through digital channels, promise to increase the level of financial inclusion, especially to the benefit of consumers and micro-firms. The paper discusses the current trends and expected developments, arguing that legal provisions on the aforesaid matters should be drafted and applied bearing in mind the need to prevent potential drawbacks, such as the risk that competition on the relevant markets would be significantly impeded due to the presence of the Big Tech companies.

One of the hallmarks of the second Von der Leyen Commission has been a strategy of "simplification": proposing to remove large numbers of regulatory provisions contained in existing, and in some cases only recently-adopted, pieces of EU legislation through a series of omnibus packages. In addition, there have also been repeated postponements of the entry into force of already adopted legislation, removal of previously announced legislative initiatives from the Commission's work programme, and the Commission's decision not to make use of delegated powers that had previously been granted to it. The sum total of these various steps amounts to a far-reaching programme of socio-economic de-regulation that not only promises/threatens to undo significant parts of recent legislative achievements, but also raises the spectre of a fundamental shift in the EU's internal and external ambitions. The paper conceptualises this process as 'regulatory backsliding' and proceeds to interrogate three critical aspects in this regard: first, the paper explores the driving forces behind this process, distinguishing between party politics, market dynamics and geopolitical context as key factors explaining this shift. Second, the paper interrogates the different discursive, legislative and administrative mechanisms which facilitate regulatory backsliding. And, third, the paper discusses the impact of regulatory backsliding, examining the normative, institutional and strategic implications of this process. A special focus here is on the manner in which regulatory backsliding impacts on the EU's institutional balance, leading to a concentration of decision-making power in the hands of the institutional leadership of both Commission and Parliament, alongside a relative strengthening of the role of member state executives. More broadly, regulatory backsliding implies a weakening of the authority of the EU vis-a-vis market operators, national governments and third countries - with fewer and less sharper instruments in its toolbox, the Union is limiting its capacity to influence developments in its political and economic environment, a development that can be viewed critically in the context of rising demands for EU action arising both from internal challenges (the rise of populism and illiberal attitudes) and from external threats (the growing contestation between the EU and itsgeopolitical rivals). In sum, this paper aims to define and map out the concept of regulatory backsliding, to illustrate empirically how this process has been unfolding, and to reflect on the normative and practical consequences of this process.

The reform of the EU economic governance framework has been framed as a response to persistent shortcomings of the Stability and Growth Pact and the European Semester, particularly the limited degree of political ownership and responsibility at the member-state level. By replacing uniform fiscal rules with nationally defined medium-term fiscal-structural plans, the new framework seeks to give Member States greater responsibility for fiscal adjustment and structural reforms, while strengthening macroeconomic stability through revised monitoring and control arrangements.

This paper examines whether, and in what ways, the reformed framework contributes to political ownership and responsibility among Member States, and whether this shift plausibly supports economic stability at the EU level. It does so by comparing governance practices before and with the reform, focusing on the move from rule-based compliance under the pre-reform European Semester to plan-based, negotiated commitments.

The paper argues that while the reform has the potential to enhance national responsibility by embedding fiscal choices more firmly in national policy frameworks, it also creates new ambiguities regarding ownership due to increased Commission discretion and technocratic oversight. Instead of assuming that the reform creates political ownership, the paper examines whether ownership actually emerges with the reform and what this means for legitimacy, effectiveness, and enforcement in EU economic governance.

According to the Central Statistical Bureau, around 30% of Latvia’s population resides in rural areas. Limited infrastructure, long distances and fewer available services create significant challenges for service provision in these regions. Internet availability and use remain uneven: although 93% of the population uses the internet at least weekly, only 83% of individuals in the lowest income quartile have access to it. Latvia’s digital literacy level also remains below the EU average, further limiting the effective use of digital services.

Digitalisation offers opportunities to improve efficiency and accessibility, yet insufficient digital literacy prevents residents from fully benefiting from these developments. Many citizens struggle to understand the specifications and eligibility criteria of social services, which reduces their ability to navigate digital platforms independently. When social workers must carry out tasks on behalf of clients, the clients’ self‑organisation does not improve and may even decline. This increases the workload of social workers and contradicts the primary aims of digitalisation. These issues illustrate the broader “digital divide” affecting rural areas.

To reduce this divide, the project “Development of Digital Skills of Society” is being implemented in 34 out of 42 municipalities with support from the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility. The project aims for 40,000 residents to acquire advanced digital self‑service skills by April 2026. However, by October 2025 only 5,127 individuals had completed training, representing less than 13% of the target. According to the Cabinet of Ministers’ report of 22 December 2025, the initial target is unlikely to be achieved.

Aizkraukle Municipality Social Service has set a strategic goal to expand the use of digital document exchange. Yet at the end of 2025, 30% of service recipients lacked an email address for receiving information. Out of 10,060 submissions received during the year, only 355 were submitted electronically, indicating a very low level of digital literacy among clients. Approximately 20 clients participated in basic digital skills training offered through the project, although not all completed it.

As digital service development continues, it is crucial to recognise that part of the population risks becoming excluded from essential services. Addressing this requires coordinated action by all responsible stakeholders to prevent the deepening of social and digital inequalities.