This paper examines the EU’s promotion of connectivity in its neighbourhood as a technology of pacification. Literature describes EU connectivity policies as both ‘value-based’ and driven by Brussels’ willingness to assert itself as a geopolitical actor amidst an increasingly competitive international context. While critical geopolitics scholarship has interrogated the imperial logics underpinning EU external governance practices in its neighbourhood, few studies have examined how these power relations operate on the ground, and how Europe is produced, negotiated and contested through infrastructural projects in its peripheries. Drawing on critical and feminist interventions into geopolitics and infrastructure studies, this paper approaches connectivity as a mode of EU imperial governance that is enmeshed with geo-political imaginaries and everyday contestations. It focuses on the South Caucasus, where the 2020 and 2023 wars over Nagorno-Karabakh, together with the ‘power vacuum’ caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have created a window of opportunity for EU engagement. This has manifested through efforts to mediate a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, reopen long-sealed borders, and enhance connectivity under the Global Gateway strategy. As suggested by the proposed ‘Trump Road for International Peace and Prosperity’ – which the EU has signalled readiness to support, connectivity in the South Caucasus has become a key site where infrastructure and trade are linked to the pacification of geopolitically contested regions. This paper asks: how is connectivity in the South Caucasus linked to promises of peace? How are infrastructural promises and geo-political imaginaries of connectivity received and contested on the ground? Methodologically, the paper combines discourse analysis of EU and national (Armenian and Azerbaijani) policy texts with ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Armenia’s Syunik province, a borderland where connectivity projects intersect with conflict-driven insecurity and geopolitical competition. The analysis suggests that EU connectivity projects serve the purpose of pacification of peripheral regions, whereby infrastructural promises are leveraged to align the South Caucasus with Western geo-economic interests, while disciplining local political contestations. Simultaneously, pacification is necessary to secure EU connectivity projects. While governments in the South Caucasus leverage connectivity promises for their own geo-political legitimation, local communities use these projects’ inherent ambiguities to make and contest claims around their socio-economic futures. The paper advances critical European studies by foregrounding alternative conceptual lenses to study how EUrope is legitimised and contested at its peripheries, and by challenging predominant Brussels- and elite-centric analyses of EU external governance.

In the context of the high level of uncertainty brought about in transatlantic relations by the second Trump administration in the US, the European Union has embarked on a landmark project to rearm and enhance its defence capabilities. Discussions around strategic autonomy have a long track record in the history of European integration but were significantly accelerated during Trump’s initial presidency when he first put into doubt the US commitment towards preserving the European security architecture. At the same time, EU enlargement was also provided significant drive by Russian aggression and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia were offered candidate status, reversing the previous policy of keeping these countries at the gates of the EU. Enlargement is no longer framed primarily as a way of extending the benefits of European integration to like-minded countries but also as a geopolitical response to Russian aggression.

The main aim of the paper is to examine the interplay between these two strategic priorities for the EU. Can the EU pursue strategic autonomy and geopolitically driven enlargement simultaneously in a coherent manner? The paper answers this question by first analysing the genealogy of ideas and practices that underpin these two strategic priorities, namely the interaction between the different parts of the European Commission responsible for designing and delivering these strategic priorities. Second, it revisits the capabilities and expansion gap debate by evaluating the effectiveness of the way the EU seeks to mobilise resources for pursuing these two strategic priorities. Does strategic autonomy complement geopolitical enlargement, or will their implementation strain the EU’s resources and lead to ineffective implementation?

In the study of EU accession processes and EU policies towards its Eastern neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, many dimensions have been examined in-depth, resulting in a comprehensive understanding of the individual aspects that can further as well as hinder these processes.
Empirical evidence across time has shown how complex the interrelation between these different dimensions truly is, and it is therefore important to continue conducting research that bridges the various aspects at a conceptual level. Connecting political ownership and territorial capital is one such approach that can bring us new insights into the reasons for differentiated outcomes across partner states. This paper aims to make a conceptual contribution to this exercise by considering the illiberal and authoritarian obstacles that can affect the connection between these two parameters.
To that end, the paper will map out what concrete obstacles need to be considered here. It will do so by building on existing literature as well as by considering alternative and complementary arguments, by way of an exploratory study. Specific elements that will be addressed include domestic democratic backsliding or even authoritarianisation; democratic backsliding at the EU supranational level; and influence of external actors with an illiberal agenda. The paper will explore how these dimensions can affect political ownership, terroritorial capital, and the relationship between these two.

The events of the past years, in particular the Russia’s attack on Ukraine, brought the European Union (EU) Member States closer together in their work on the strategic defence of Europe. Shortly after the 2022 Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Strategic Compass, which had been developed by the European Commission in the previous years, was accepted by the EU. But what role do common threats play in bringing the idea of European society forward? And are security challenges the only way to strengthen European bond? The paper makes an inquiry into how the meaning of European society can be built on and intertwined with security issues. In particular, I look into how the notion of European society is constructed by the EU institutions. First, by the means of qualitative data analysis I explore whether and to what extent the idea of European society is linked to the so-called ‘security challenges’ in the EU security discourse. Second, I look closer at the understanding(s) of European society in this discourse. Discourse analysis of the key sources on the EU security strategy helps shed light on how the ‘self’ of Europe and the ‘other’, or multiple ‘others’, are constructed. The analysis corroborates the latest tendency of constructing multiple issues in terms of security challenges and the EU’s growing focus on strategic defence and common security - rather than the idea of common peace and humanism. The work helps grasp the dynamics between the two in their significance for constructing European society.