In March 2025, the European Commission put forward a Proposal for a Regulation ‘establishing a common system for the return of third-country nationals staying illegally in the Union’ (COM(2025) 101 final). Framed as a necessary pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, the Proposal seeks to replace the 2008 Return Directive (2008/115/EC) with a binding and uniform framework aiming to accelerate return rates across Member States.

Yet, behind its neutral language lies what appears to be a deeper political project, that seems recastiing irregular migration as a threat to public order and seeks to entrench coercive mechanisms under the guise of administrative efficiency.

This paper critically assesses three problematic profiles in the proposed Regulation.

First, it addresses what can be termed a ‘detention normalization’ phenomenon. Indeed, the Proposal significantly extends the grounds, scope, and duration of immigration detention. Deprivation of liberty up to 24 months becomes lawful, including for children and families, while “emergency” derogations allow for further erosion of safeguards under vaguely defined conditions of “unforeseen burden” on Member States. Though the Proposal also enables geographic restrictions and electronic monitoring as so-called alternatives-to-detention measures, the cumulative effect appears overall as a normative shift – from detention as a measure of extrema ratio to a default mechanism of migration control, with worrying implications for individual liberties.

Second, it analyses risks of weakining of judicial protection and the potential erosion of habeas corpus guarantees. In fact, the Proposal appears: (i) to restrict access to effective remedies against removals compared to the previous legal framework, (ii) to narrow the automatic suspensive effect of appeals, (iii) to introduce stricter procedural obligations on third-country nationals to ‘cooperate’ with their own removal – de facto instrumentalizing procedural guarantees in function of enforcement.

Thirdly, and echoing Italy-Albania asylum deal, the Proposal allows transfers to third countries based on opaque arrangements rather than formal readmission agreements. These so-called “return hubs” may fall outside EU fundamental rights jurisdiction and judicial oversight, raising concerns of accountability, extraterritorial detention, and the risk of chain refoulement. From a broader perspective, this move signals a deeper crisis – the outsourcing of Europe’s human rights obligations under conditions of legal uncertainty or, to say the least, opaqueness.

In conclusion, this abstract argues that the new Proposal reflects a securitized, crisis-driven logic that risks normalizing immigration detention in EU migration law.

The Schengen area is based on two pillars; the elimination of internal border controls and the harmonisation of external border controls. Since at least 2015, both pillars have been eroded by various national and supranational processes of ‘re-bordering’. Schengen’s re-bordering has been conceived, among other things, as a ‘reconfiguration’ and as a ‘defensive integration’. Notably, re-bordering does not manifest as de-legalisation because no states have withdrawn from Schengen and the CJEU’s jurisdiction has not formally changed. Re-bordering does not take the form of disintegration either, because both national and supranational executives are empowered by its processes. Yet, Schengen is fundamentally changed - both de jure and de facto. Existing rules are routinely ignored, while new rules carve out areas of exception to be governed by political discretion. The cumulative effect of these changes is to reinforce member states’ capacity to protect their borders vis a vis third country nationals, while largely leaving Schengen intact for EU citizens.

In this paper, I conceptualise Schengen’s re-bordering as having been driven by a transformation of its fundamental purpose - both in discourse and in policy. Following Bornemann’s (2024) argument that the identity building dimension of Schengen has been eclipsed by its security dimension, I suggest that security has come to be seen as the principal ‘good’ that Schengen produces. Two main consequences flow from the elevation of security - above identity, mobility or rights - as Schengen’s principal good. First, that there has been a shift in the mode of Schengen’s governance from collective to unilateralised. Second, that in order to facilitate this shift, there has been a hollowing out of Schengen’s legal framework in favour of maximising the space for political discretion.

Empirically, I track the reconstruction of the Schengen area as primarily a security-producing project over the period 2010-2025, by focusing on its discursive framing by the European Commission and the European Council. Specifically, the project addresses the following research questions. How do key EU actors frame Schengen’s purpose? To what extent have security-oriented framings of Schengen increased over time, vis a vis identity-, mobility-, or rights-oriented framings? Finally, to what extent do changes in the discursive framing of Schengen feed into its reconstruction under a unilateralised, rather than collective, mode of governance?

This paper aims to examine the role of anti-immigrant hate speech in shaping security policies in Europe, where migration is increasingly treated as a security issue.This study examines the interrelationship between the securitization of migration and hate speech, focusing on the role of hate speech in constructing perceptions of threats to European security.The conceptual framework of this study is based on the Copenhagen School's securitization theory, focusing on who and through what discourses security is constructed, and on how migrants are positioned as "threats" or "others" within European security discourses. In this context, hate speech is considered not only a social problem but also a structural security practice that influences policy-making processes.Critical discourse analysis will be used as a method. The analysis focuses on the relationship between securitization and hate speech, specifically examining the impact of hate speech on policymaking processes in Italy (populist securitization) during the Matteo Salvini era. The presentation of migration across the Mediterranean as an "invasion," as well as the closure of ports and the portrayal of sea rescue operations as a threat to the Italian people, draw attention to hate speech as a practice of security and othering.

This multi-layered analysis aims to reveal how hate speech is intertwined with security discourse and how it serves a legitimizing function.The study concludes that security needs to be re-evaluated on the basis of human security and inclusive belonging perspectives, rather than exclusionary frameworks reproduced by hate speech.

Keywords: Security, Hate Speech, Discourse, Migration, Italy.

I would like to present a reseach below based on recently published article where I was the lead-investigator - https://www.politicsincentraleurope.eu/how-czech-politicians-and-parties-securitise-refugees-comparing-the-mena-and-ukrainian-crises

This comparative analysis scrutinises the distinctive features of the 2015 MENA and 2022 Ukrainian refugee crises in the Czech Republic, revealing notable differences in threat perceptions and stakeholder engagement while answering who was finally portrayed as the victim and by whom. Hence, the MENA crisis prompted EU-level action and migration system reform, and the Czech government was the leading securitisation actor; meanwhile, the Ukrainian crisis differs. Cultural and religious dimensions influenced negative perceptions of Muslim migrants, contrasting with the positive reception of Ukrainian refugees rooted in cultural affinities with the West rejection of Russian aggression. Despite that, during the Ukrainian case, the shift in threat perceptions from sovereignty to socio-economic concerns marked the latter. Our study shows that this was not done by the Czech government but by the opposition party groups. With a potential new MENA crisis on the horizon, both opposition and government persist in securitising migration. The 2025 parliamentary election is expected to spotlight migration, necessitating further exploration of evolving securitisation in Czechia.