This paper examines the evolution of product trade patterns between European Union (EU) member states and African countries from the early 2010s to the early–mid 2020s. Understanding these shifts is essential for assessing the changing economic and geopolitical relationships between the two regions in a period marked by global rebalancing, supply chain reconfiguration, and rising multipolarity. Using descriptive statistical methods, the analysis explores the role of Europe in Africa’s trade structure and vice versa, focusing on export and import shares, product composition, and major trade destinations.

The study first maps the relative importance of EU member states in African exports and imports over time, highlighting changes in market shares and sectoral patterns. It then assesses the concentration and diversification of African export structures, with particular attention to evolving destination markets. Preliminary results indicate a relative decline in the position of Western European countries as both exporters to and importers from Africa. Compared to the early 2010s, African exports in the 2020s are increasingly oriented toward Asian markets, most notably China and Gulf countries, and exhibit a more concentrated product structure, suggesting growing dependence on a narrower set of commodities and partners.

At the same time, the analysis reveals a differentiated European response. While several long-established EU economies have lost ground, a group of Eastern and newer EU member states, particularly Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Cyprus, have expanded their exports to African markets during the period under review. These cases suggest that smaller or less traditional EU exporters may be identifying niche opportunities or leveraging more flexible trade strategies in Africa’s changing economic landscape. The paper therefore conducts a detailed examination of the export profiles, product composition, and destination patterns of these four countries to better understand the drivers of their relative success.

Overall, the findings point to a gradual restructuring of EU–Africa trade relations, characterized by declining European centrality, increasing African engagement with Asian partners, and emerging heterogeneity within the EU itself. These trends carry important implications for future EU trade, industrial, and geopolitical strategies toward Africa.

This paper examines how the EU and Indonesia were able to conclude the IEU CEPA free trade agreement in 2025 despite earlier tensions surrounding the EU Deforestation Regulation. It situates this puzzle within the EU’s broader geopolitical awakening, in which climate, development, and economic instruments are increasingly used to strengthen strategic resilience. As great power rivalry intensifies, EU trade policy has taken on a more explicitly geoeconomic function, and in Asia the Indo‑Pacific Strategy seeks to diversify supply chains and reduce exposure to global volatility.

Against this backdrop, the paper analyses how Indonesian elites, businesses, and civil society groups reinterpreted the EU’s role throughout the EUDR–CEPA process. Government officials initially framed the EU as an intrusive and neo‑colonial regulator whose climate‑linked trade measures disregarded Indonesia’s development and export needs. Yet as geopolitical and economic incentives shifted, this narrative softened. The EU’s postponement of the EUDR, combined with Indonesia’s own strategy of supply‑chain diversification and hedging between major powers, encouraged a reimagining of the EU as a pragmatic trade and investment partner. This shift helped rebuild political momentum and facilitated the conclusion of CEPA.

Civil society organisations followed a contrasting trajectory. While many initially viewed the EUDR as a tool to strengthen governance, their position hardened once the EU delayed implementation and proceeded with CEPA without robust safeguards. NGOs such as Fern subsequently described the EU as inconsistent and overly aligned with commercial interests. These shifts reflect broader post‑colonial concerns about the EU’s claims to sustainable and inclusive trade, and show how climate‑related trade measures can be reframed as self‑serving when geopolitical considerations take precedence.

The paper argues that these changing narratives demonstrate how the meaning and legitimacy of the EU’s climate‑trade agenda are shaped not only in Brussels but also in partner‑country debates. In Indonesia, these interpretations influenced whether the EU was perceived as a credible promoter of sustainable trade or as a strategically motivated actor responding to global competition. The analysis shows that such contestation matters for the EU’s broader ambitions to use trade policy as a tool for global sustainability and rule‑shaping.

Methodologically, the paper draws on Indonesian‑language media analysis, policy documents, civil society publications, elite statements, and interviews from Jakarta and Brussels. It employs narrative process tracing to show how competing interpretations emerged, gained traction, and shifted over time, highlighting how partner countries actively co‑construct the EU’s role in global trade governance.

The transformation of global trade is increasingly shaped by the intersection of climate imperatives, technological competition, and strategic autonomy. Within this context, the electric vehicle (EV) sector has become emblematic of a new industrial and geopolitical logic driving the European Union’s trade and investment policy. This paper examines how the EU’s evolving trade policy framework—particularly its Green Deal Industrial Plan, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), and sustainable raw materials partnerships—is reshaping its external economic relations with China and Latin America. By exploring the dynamics of foreign direct investment (FDI) and supply chain dependencies in the EV industry, it investigates how the EU seeks to balance its climate ambitions with competitiveness and security concerns.

The analysis situates the EU’s trade transformation within a triangular framework: Europe’s green industrial policy, China’s strategic outward FDI in the EV supply chain, and Latin America’s position as a crucial supplier of lithium, copper, and rare earth materials. Drawing from policy documents, trade data, and case studies from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, the paper argues that the EU’s emerging strategy denotes a shift from liberal market openness to “strategic green pragmatism.” This evolution is expressed through greater emphasis on reciprocity, resilience, and regulatory power projection in trade and investment partnerships.

However, the paper also highlights tensions within this transition. The EU’s sustainability-driven trade instruments often contrast with China’s state-led investment model, creating competing and overlapping spheres of influence in Latin America. At the same time, Latin American countries are not passive recipients: they are increasingly leveraging this geopolitical competition to pursue industrial upgrades, technological transfer, and policy autonomy within the green transition. The EU’s approach therefore risks reproducing asymmetrical dependencies if not underpinned by equitable frameworks for cooperation and capacity building.

Ultimately, this study contributes to debates on how global trade governance is adapting to the twin challenges of decarbonization and geoeconomic fragmentation. It suggests that a truly sustainable and resilient EV value chain requires triangulated collaboration between the EU, China, and Latin America—focused not only on securing supply but on fostering inclusive green industrialization across regions.