It has become increasingly clear that the security situation in Europe has worsened and that the United States can no longer be regarded as a reliable security ally. Logic would suggest that the ideal of European strategic autonomy is the only realistic option left. Why then are the two major Franco-German defence procurement projects perennially near collapse and why is there notable national pushback to the European Commission's defence ambitions?

Drawing on the imaginary turn in International Relations and Security Studies scholarship, the paper critically interrogates how proponents of strategic autonomy imagine its fulfillment. It argues that while technology development is commonly viewed as crucial to the project, the conceptualisations of states, firms and defence procurement are frequently rooted in what was rather than what is, and that this mismatch proves contentious and hinders progress. Alternative imaginaries of a strategically autonomous future though tend to propose adoption of other national systems such as those of the US and Ukraine. However, these too are problematic as they potentially clash with key elements of the strategic autonomy ambition.

The paper seeks to reconcile these imaginaries of strategic autonomy. Developing Marsh et al's (2025) conceptualisation of a European Iron Network, it attempts to outline what a feasible autonomous European political economy of defence might need to look like.

Research establishes that economically driven industrial consolidation is a key catalyst for subsequent defense integration. This paper investigates whether post-2022 dynamics in the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) support consolidation or signal a structural divergence. Contrary to the US model of centralized consolidation, contemporary European patterns paradoxically point to a locking-in of a divergent effect. Utilizing a database of M&A activity from ORBIS, supplemented by Factiva analysis of aborted mergers, we examine consolidation patterns and query fragmentation. Findings highlight that rather than cross-border integration, we see the rise of national champions through IPOs and state-backed capital, creating institutional barriers to future synergy. These patterns suggest that despite increased EU defense funding and cooperation tools, national and industrial actors are opting for strategic autonomy at the firm or national level rather than the supranational level. Consequently, these divergent M&A trajectories risk undermining the effectiveness of EU initiatives and entrenching a fragmented security architecture despite unprecedented political momentum.

Defence policy has historically remained shielded from the dynamics of supranational integration within the European Union. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, however, has brought defence back to the centre of the European political agenda, generating unprecedented pressure for collective responses at the EU level.

This paper examines the decisions taken in support of Ukraine, focusing on the Joint Acquisition scheme for 155mm artillery shells coordinated by the European Defence Agency (EDA). It analyses how this initiative challenged the long-standing reluctance of Member States to delegate defence-related competencies to EU institutions and explores its implications for European defence integration.

The analysis shows that the EDA’s role in coordinating joint procurement went beyond purely technical functions. The joint acquisition initiative generated institutional learning that informed subsequent policy proposals advanced by the European Commission. These proposals reframed joint acquisition not only as an emergency response mechanism, but also as a mid-term industrial strategy aimed at strengthening the European defence technological and industrial base. This momentum culminated in the proposal of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), which explicitly links defence industrial policy to the broader objective of EU strategic autonomy.

The paper argues that the joint acquisition of artillery shells represents a silent yet significant shift in the institutional balance of EU security governance. While the EDA emerged as an enabling actor in coordinating Member States’ efforts, the Commission’s growing assertiveness in proposing budgetary instruments for defence suggests a functional expansion of supranational roles. This trajectory supports the argument that pragmatic and technical instruments can generate political and institutional effects that reinforce integration dynamics.

At the same time, the research highlights the persistent reluctance of Member States to transfer authority and resources in a policy domain intrinsically linked to national sovereignty. Despite its strategic relevance, the joint acquisition initiative has received limited attention in the academic literature.

The analysis is grounded in neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958; Schmitter, 1970) and liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998), with particular emphasis on the concept of cultivated spillover (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). This framework helps explain the entrepreneurial role played by supranational institutions in fostering policy innovation under crisis conditions.

Methodologically, the paper relies on primary sources and adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining interviews with key institutional and governmental actors at both EU and national levels with the analysis of official documents and political discourse.

Defending the European Union (EU) today is simultaneously strategic and constitutional: it requires accelerating military readiness while preserving the Union’s identity as a values-based, rules-governed polity (Art. 2 TEU) and protecting its capacity to act in pursuit of shared interests (Arts. 3 and 21 TEU). This abstract analyses joint procurement in the EU’s rearmament cycle against the yardstick of cohesion policy and “European values and interests”, asking whether industrial acceleration can be reconciled with solidarity and balanced territorial development (Arts. 174-178 TFEU).

The argument is that the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) can become the fulcrum of that reconciliation by creating the first long-term legal framework, backed by a dedicated budget, to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), secure supply chains, and deepen industrial cooperation through market-shaping instruments such as European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCIs) and Structures for European Armament Projects (SEAP).

Yet EDIP’s “Buy European” impulse must remain Treaty-compliant and legitimacy-enhancing: it should be grounded in objective security-of-supply and security-of-information criteria (Art. 346 TFEU), aligned with internal market and industrial policy competences (Arts. 114 and 173 TFEU), and constrained by “rule-of-law-by-design” procurement clauses (auditability, lawful access, cybersecurity assurance).

Finally, the paper frames cohesion reprogramming for defence-relevant investments (e.g., military mobility) as a stress test of EU solidarity: it is sustainable only if EDIP-driven joint procurement spreads capability, innovation, and regional opportunity rather than displacing cohesion’s core distributive purpose.