This paper examines the normative efforts of the European Union, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Taiwan in the regulation of AI technologies for civilian purposes. Each of these countries is in the process of developing their approach to AI governance reflecting broader societal values and interests. In this context, ROK and Taiwan represent an alternative model to countries that adopt an authoritarian approach to AI, first and foremost, China. By juxtaposing Taiwan’s and Korea’s alternative yet complementary model of democratic innovation with the EU’s human rights-driven framework, we explore how the identity of these actors but also their cross regional horizontal ties shape AI governance. Coherently with its identity and values, in the case of the EU, the emerging AI governance has been guided by its long-standing emphasis on human dignity, civil rights, protection of privacy, and transparency, incorporated in the 2024 EU AI Act. The EU seeks to establish norms to ensure that AI technologies are safe, transparent. Meanwhile, as democracies in the East Asian region often characterised by competing views of AI governance models, Korea and Taiwan have taken on a role as leaders in what can be defined as “democratic innovation”. This means that their focus is on fostering innovation ecosystems that support public participation and reflect democratic values. However, they remain commercially competitive and responsive to technological advances. This comparison of different normative models paves the way for the assessment of potential collaborations in the development of multilateral frameworks that address the democratic implications of AI, while also fostering innovation.

The rapid proliferation of AI has thrust global governance into an era of developpment and uncertainty. As regulatory leadership becomes a key axis of geopolitical influence, the EU and China have emerged as two of the most proactive actors in shaping global AI norms. Yet existing literature often frames their interaction through a binary lens—either focusing on the need for common ground and commitment or the irreconcilable technological competition and normative divergence—overlooking the paradoxical simultaneity of emulation and alienation.
This paper examines how copying and othering unfold in parallel within EU–China AI governance interactions. It argues that these processes are not contradictory but co-constitutive elements of their evolving role constructions and performance. Drawing on role theory, the paper conceptualizes copying as a form of role adaptation, where emulation of regulatory standard-setting serves both pragmatic and legitimizing functions, particularly through the emulating role of regulatory standard-setting and global commitments. Othering, in turn, is understood as strategic altercasting, whereby each actor reinforces its own global role by projecting a complementary or adversarial role onto the other. For example, the EU’s narrative of “trustworthy and human-centric AI” is juxtaposed against the portrayal of China as a “state-led normative challenger”—a logic reciprocated in Chinese policy discourse.
Empirically, the study employs a qualitative textual analysis of key policy documents, white papers, and bilateral communications (e.g., the EU AI Act, China’s AI Development Plan, EU–China digital dialogues). By theorizing the structural interplay of these dual role construction processes, this paper contributes to broader debates on global tech governance, norm diffusion, and role performance in an increasingly multipolar and contested international order.

Quantum computing poses an existential threat to global digital security: within decades, sufficiently powerful quantum computers will break the encryption protecting everything from state secrets to financial transactions. Yet despite this known, accumulating danger, the issue is primarily treated as an industrial opportunity rather than a looming security crisis. This fits the notion of a “creeping crisis”, which can be defined as a threat that evolves gradually, is foreshadowed by precursor events, attract fragmented attention, and receives insufficient coordinated response despite expert warnings. For non-member states deeply integrated with EU digital infrastructure, this creeping crisis creates a distinctive autonomy dilemma: how to prepare for future threats when the institutional frameworks needed for protection remain uncertain and access cannot be guaranteed.

This paper examines how Norway navigates this dilemma through its participation in the EU’s Digital Europe Programme (DIGITAL), using quantum computing as an empirical case of anticipatory governance under creeping crisis conditions. While contributing financially for access to EU supercomputing and quantum infrastructure and embedding itself deeply in European digital capabilities, it is locked out of the European Quantum Communication Infrastructure due to its non-membership. This shows that when creeping crises hit the tipping point and ‘explode’ into an acute crisis, non-members may find their dependencies have become severe vulnerabilities.

Drawing on interviews, document analysis, and crisis management literature, this qualitative study addresses how non-members exercise autonomy when facing slow-burning technological threats that require infrastructure investments beyond national capacity. It contributes to crisis management and European integration scholarship by investigating how crisis temporality conditions non-member autonomy. Unlike acute crises requiring immediate adaptation, creeping crises may force non-members to make strategic calculations about future institutional configurations under deep uncertainty: accepting dependencies today that may prove catastrophic tomorrow when crises materialize and exclusions become apparent.

This article critically examines one of the key factors of the Brussels Effect: regulatory capacity, defined as a jurisdiction’s capability to produce stringent legislation, which is increasingly significant in global technology governance. Drawing on the recent Artificial Intelligence Act, the article argues that the involvement of a higher number of stakeholders with diverse roles complicates the regulation beyond its initial intent. This complexity not only undermines the EU’s competitive advantage but also reveals that the Brussels Effect is not simply the smooth alignment of various powers creating high-quality regulation. Rather, it is an equilibrated regulatory phenomenon influenced by numerous actors both inside and outside the EU, each pursuing their own self-interests. This regulatory dynamic also challenges the portrayal of the EU as a regulator unafraid of the adverse effects of stringent regulation against the private sector demands. Instead, the growing lobbying power of the private sector is leading to a ‘lobby-driven Brussels effect’, which adds a new dimension to its de facto and de jure forms.