Metacrisis describes the convergence of multiple, concurring crisis events with global or regional relevance. This paper argues that metacrisis is not a cluster of overlapping crises, but a root condition defined by the interdependence and amplification of crises. It further argues that metamodernism, a paradigm of continuous oscillation between systems and ideologies, offers a theoretical lens capable of examining the inherent complexities and uncertainties of metacrisis. Metamodernism perceives the coexistence of and oscillation between extremes as a sociocultural pendulum swinging over time between radically different yet coexisting views, circumstances, and experiences, which can engender and reinforce a metacrisis environment. To demonstrate the relevance of metamodernism to metacrisis, this paper focuses on different, coexisting reactions from two key Euro-Atlantic actors, Germany and the U.S., to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. While the invasion produced the most severe direct consequences for Ukraine, it also generated grave spill-over effects across the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond. In response, Germany shifted away from its postwar pacifist position, termed the Zeitenwende, or a historic turning point. Similarly, the U.S. has shifted since Trump’s second term, albeit in the opposite direction towards Russia and away from its longstanding allies. How can we understand the reversals from these countries? Do they indeed represent a historic turning point for the Euro-Atlantic region, and if so, is it a new direction or a turn back? This paper aims to demonstrate how core metamodernist concepts illuminate these concurrent swings of historical and cultural significance back to former views and political positions that may have seemed resigned to the past, but were never erased.

When European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, uttered the term “European Defence Ecosystem” it signalled a policy change within the EU as a new approach to the recent geopolitical challenges in the continent. While the term has not been politically clarified, this paper uses it within the context of UK-EU defence capability development to create an analytical framework for the European Defence Ecosystem since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. Conceptualised as the system of actors, institutions and processes engaged in European defence, we envision the Ecosystem as the policy environment in which European and international security and defence actors operate. Existing approaches have focused on individual components of the broader European Defence Ecosystem at the expense of the whole and have comparatively little to say about how different institutions shape outcomes and interact with one another. In answering the question, how can we conceptualise and operationalise the European Defence Ecosystem, we integrate an agent-centred approach focusing on how actors navigate the institutional complexity which characterises the Ecosystem. The approach emphasises the role institutions play in shaping actors’ preferences and channelling individual agency, drawing on research from both new institutionalism and the public policy toolkit. Our perspective also captures the ways in which individual agents navigate and shape institutional complexity, allowing us to highlight core relational dynamics in the European Defence Ecosystem and better understand the broader security landscape in which the UK and EU operate.

This paper examines the evolving defence and security relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom in the context of heightened strategic uncertainty associated with the prospect of a second Trump presidency in the United States. The paper applies the international relations concept of hedging to analyse how European actors are responding to doubts about the future reliability of the United States as a security partner.

The paper argues that both the EU and the UK are engaging in forms of hedging that are cautious, fragmented, and notably unenthusiastic. Rather than pursuing clear-cut strategies of either balancing against or bandwagoning with the United States, European actors are seeking to preserve transatlantic ties while simultaneously investing—selectively and unevenly—in greater European defence and security capacity. This hedging behaviour is most evident in the EU–UK relationship, where cooperation remains politically sensitive, institutionally constrained, and strategically ambivalent despite shared threat perceptions and overlapping interests.

Focusing on the EU and its member states, alongside the UK as a key European security actor outside the Union, the paper shows how hedging strategies are shaped by multiple constraints: intra-EU political divisions, limited resources, competing national priorities, and unresolved tensions in post-Brexit relations. The result is a pattern of security cooperation that is pragmatic but hesitant, incremental rather than transformative, and marked by a lack of strategic enthusiasm or coherence.

The paper’s contribution lies in using the concept of hedging to capture this distinctive posture in EU–UK defence and security relations under conditions of transatlantic uncertainty. It suggests that “unenthusiastic hedging” offers a useful lens for understanding how European actors navigate strategic risk when neither autonomy nor reliance on the United States appears fully viable, particularly in the shadow of Trump II

The twin threats of Russian aggression in Europe and an increasingly volatile US foreign policy are a critical juncture for European security, the EU’s ambition for greater strategic autonomy in defence, and the strategic cultures of European states. Russia’s war on Ukraine and its hybrid war on European states, coupled with significant uncertainty about the US commitment to defending Europe and its support for more authoritarian and populist politicians in Europe, means Europe must provide for its own defence.

CSDP’s aspiration to ‘have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so’, is central to EU strategic autonomy. Yet, over 25 years since CSDP was launched the ‘capability-expectation gap’ (Hill, 1993) in EU foreign, security and defence policy has still not been bridged. While EU and European state responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been relatively decisive and robust both in support for Ukraine and in domestic defence policy, spending, and capability initiatives, longstanding differences and deficiencies persist. Notably there remain clear divergences in strategic cultures and in understandings of and ambitions for European strategic autonomy. Specifically European states and the EU need to (a) urgently clarify the purpose and priorities of a European defence initiatives (b) enhance political will and leadership in defence, and (c) deepen and widen defence capabilities and capacity, drawing on EU efforts to reinvigorate the European defence industry. Without these shifts strategic cultures will continue to diverge excessively meaning ambitions for European strategic autonomy in defence will be undermined.

The paper examines why the EU, and its European partners continue to struggle to overcome these obstacles, despite the urgency generated by an unpredictable and waning US defence commitment to Europe and the direct threat to Europe posed by Russia. It argues continuing divergence in strategic cultures across Europan states is key to understanding the limited progress. Europe requires a strategic culture that accepts the need to provide for its own defence - i.e. strategic autonomy in defence, and the EU has a key role to play in this, especially through its support for the defence industry and capability development.

In the span of five years, Europe’s most pressing weaknesses were exposed. Covid pandemic displayed Europe's industrial dependency on China, while 2022 unravelled its energetic dependency on Russia. Finally, Donald Trump’s first year as a president shows, Europe’s military and commercial dependency on the United States. This triple dependency poses a great threat to Europe’s short-, mid- and long-term security.

The European Union, whose system was made to function in times of peace, has started adapting. A diversification of partnerships can be observed, for example in the field of energy, Norway and the United States have partially replaced Russia for oil. On the other hand, the European Union’s dependency is so deeply ingrained, as in the case of solar panels, 98% of which are being imported from China, that attempts at reshoring essential assets have been having limited effects so far.

As we can understand, the European Union’s nature as a power is shifting. Using Pitkin’s concepts of power to, which refers to the potential capacities of an entity, and power over, the ability to translate this potential into tangible actions, completed by Follet’s power with, an entity’s ability to use its power in a non-coercive manner, we will analyse and qualify the nature of the European Union’s power. The European Union, despite sizable economic size, suffers from decades of diminished military spendings, a fragmented Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB), as well as a lack of unified political will.

For the European Union to become a credible security actor, this essay argues that it needs to improve its ability to translate its potential into tangible actions. We will make various suggestions to enhance the European Union’s power and credibility, notably through a strengthening of international cooperation in order to support a shift from a national to a European logic, as well as strengthening its Defence Industrial and Technological Base. The European Union should also strive to maintain the increased security spendings in the Multi Financial Framework proposal published by the European Commission in July 2025. These would allow the European Union to reinforce in the three areas of power aforementioned and enable it to become functional leaders in some instances, whilst improving its credibility as a global power.