EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) began in 2003 with high aspirations for the EU to build defence relevance and a common strategic culture among member states. But for over two decades, member states have never agreed on the need for EU competence in defence nor on how to coordinate efforts towards enhanced military capacity. CSDP instead settled for a focus on humanitarian crisis intervention, before even this faded, and CSDP became security-driven, often working in tandem with EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) instruments. CSDP military operations, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia excepted, are naval: Atalanta, Irini, Aspides. The Franco-German driver of European Integration is in poor shape, unable to provide leadership, and Europe’s primary military power, the United Kingdom, has quit the Union. Spurred by a considerably worsening threat environment and a clear understanding that Europe cannot continue to rely on the US security umbrella, the Commission has stepped up its interest and engagement in defence. Russia's illegal war on Ukraine and Trump's second Presidency changed everything. But the Commission is not a lawmaker and lacks executive power over security and defence. What it does have is (some) money, budgetary control, and capacity to initiate, incentivise, and to (gently) coerce. Our paper highlights some risks in how the Commission seeks to play a role in increasing defence capability and identifies the key instruments involved. We ask how best the Commission can exercise influence in securing an uplift in European defence capability, while highlighting ongoing impediments to European strategic autonomy.

The paper is informed by elite interviews with 40+ experts and Brussels-based officials.

In his second term in office, US President Donald Trump has introduced revolutionary – if haphazard – changes in US foreign policy, in particular as relates to trade, relations with long-standing allies and relations with perceived ideological opponents and allies. This paper will explore Europe’s response to the Second Trump revolution, placing this analysis in the context of the range of strategic options open to Europe. The paper will examine different policy areas (in particular, trade, defence and political ideology) and assess the response of different European states and NATO and the EU to the Second Trump revolution. The paper will argue that, while existing international relations theories and strategic vocabulary (e.g., balancing, bandwagoning (including appeasement) and hedging) shed light on European response to the Second Trump revolution, they are too reductionist and limit our understanding of the dynamics at play. Although there are important divisions amongst European states, the paper will argue that European states have pursued a relatively coherent strategy towards the second Trump administration, key elements of which including buying time, standing strong on Ukraine, seeking to moderate US behaviour to the extent possible, building collective European strength and building ties with other like-minded partners. The strategy can be summed up as making the best of a bad world – the medium-term success or failure of the strategy remains to be, but it is sensible international politics in difficult circumstances.

The European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was initially shaped as a strictly intergovernmental framework. In recent years, however, the European Commission has assumed a growing role in CSDP, particularly in defence industrial policy. The “White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030” can be seen as a continuation of this development. However, it also goes significantly further, because it calls for a more comprehensive role of the Commission in CSDP.

The proposed paper therefore seeks to answer three questions: First, what new areas of action are proposed in the White Paper as new areas of action for the European Commission? Second, how does the Commission justify this claim for an expanded scope of action? Third, how can we explain these dynamics in terms of integration theories?

By doing so, the paper aims to contribute both to the empirical analysis of the European Commission's growing role in the CSDP and to the changing debate on integration theories within CSDP research. While CSDP research has long been dominated by intergovernmental approaches, the increasing role of the Commission—also referred to as partial supranationalization of CSDP —has led to a broader spectrum of integration theory approaches being applied to the CSDP today.

Against this backdrop the proposed papers is conducting a detailed analysis of the white paper to show that the Commission is acting as a policy entrepreneur, who is applying a strategy to frame problems of CSDP as problems of competition policy, research policy, and industrial policy. By doing so, the Commission is linking its existing competencies with a call for an extended scope of action in the area of CSDP. I call this strategy “strategic-linkig”. By applying this strategy of strategic linking the commission is successfully arguing for becoming a crucial actor in CSDP. Particularly, the White Paper goes significantly beyond former claims of the Commission to be an actor in industrial defence policy and is calling for an active role of the Commisison in many other areas of CSDP.

In sum, the white paper can be seen as a significant step toward expanding the Commission's role in the CSDP. The way in which the Commission is proceeding in this regard also shows that theoretical approaches that have previously only been applied to the field of supranational integration can contribute to a better understanding of recent dynamics within CSDP.

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 formally created the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a tool of the European Union’s foreign policy that has the power to deploy military and civilian missions aimed at upholding international security and maintaining peace. The finalisation of the policy has been a long journey. National governments have had to compromise on how much authority to grant the supranational system, which remains a debatable issue. Since its founding, it has undergone substantial change and international shocks or crises have often been the main triggers for reform. For instance, the Yugoslav wars and the reunification of Germany contributed to the drafting of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and similarly, the EU Global Strategy of 2016 can be seen as a result of the migration crisis, Brexit and the 2010 Arab Springs. On this line, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but especially the harsh US foreign policy under the second Trump administration, may create a new window of opportunity for the EU to finally implement a common defence policy, as it was previewed with the establishment of the CFSP. This piece examines the evolution of this policy from the perspective of various EU integration theories, such as historical institutionalism and neofunctionalism. This paradigm suggests that the European Union should improve its strategic autonomy by taking advantage of the current situation.