This paper examines how recent geopolitical and geo-economic shocks have tested the European Union’s institutional balance. It focuses on the tension between the formal distribution of decision-making power in the EU Council, as defined by qualified majority voting rules, and the asymmetric distribution of crisis-related costs and pressures across Member States. The paper aims to develop an analytical framework with two objectives: first, to identify the level of disproportionality of impact of recent crises on different Member States; and second, to contribute to the explanation of national policy positions in EU policy areas most affected by these crises.

While the analysis of qualified majority voting and its implications for the formal allocation of power among Member States is well established in EU studies, research adopting a distributional perspective on the material effects of the EU’s recent multiple crises remains underdeveloped. This paper seeks to address this gap by examining the uneven consequences of crises triggered by major geopolitical transformations. These include the implications of Russia’s war against Ukraine for energy dependence, for security policy, for restructuring of energy supply chains, as well as pressures related to migration, and the reorientation of trade flows in an increasingly fragmented global economy.

The paper further considers how these material shocks interact with evolving political preferences across Member States, including shifting attitudes toward European integration, solidarity, and external alignment, particularly in the context of strained transatlantic relations. By juxtaposing formal institutional power with differentiated crisis-induced burdens and interests in the areas of energy, security, migration, and trade, the analysis seeks to identify tensions, mismatches, and patterns of alignment within the EU. Rather than advancing institutional reform proposals or policy prescriptions, the paper offers a diagnostic contribution, indicating how the EU’s existing decision-making architecture operates under conditions of heightened geopolitical polarization and how this may eventually matter for the long-term perspective of Ukraine’s EU membership.

Why does the European Union articulate strategic ambition in its China policy while delivering uneven and selective policy outcomes? Existing explanations tend to privilege either geopolitical pressure, institutional complexity, or domestic political constraints, yet struggle to account for the persistent gap between rhetoric and implementation. This paper advances a layered foreign policy analysis (FPA) framework to explain contestation and implementation gaps in EU’s China policy.

The paper argues that EU’s China policy outcomes are shaped by the interaction of three analytically distinct mechanisms operating at different stages of the policy process. First, external pressure, most notably intensifying US–China rivalry and broader geopolitical shocks, acts as an agenda-setting force that elevates China on the EU’s strategic agenda. Second, the EU’s multi-level institutional structure translates strategic ambition into selective and incremental policy outputs. Third, structural political-economy and governance constraints, including uneven economic exposure to China, industrial and administrative capacity limits, party-political incentives, and legal-institutional boundaries, impose durable limits on implementation.

By integrating these layers, the paper explains why strategic ambition in EU China policy does not translate into consistent policy transformation. Implementation gaps arise from the interaction of institutional fragmentation, political-economy constraints, and uneven administrative capacities, producing outcomes that are only partially coordinated and, in some cases, internally incoherent. Theoretically, the paper extends foreign policy analysis to a supranational actor by demonstrating how capability limits in multi-level governance structures shape external action and impede coherent policy formulation and implementation.

The Baltic states have become a critical case for reconfiguring the EU’s nascent anti‑coercion instruments, anchoring their China policy in the framework of economic security and de‑risking. This paper analyzes how Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have actively shaped the EU’s turn toward strategic autonomy by recalibrating the traditional dependencies and solidarities between Central and Eastern European (CEE) and Western member states. Grounded in the EU’s evolving economic-security agenda, the analysis traces how, since 2020, these three states have shifted their relations with China from engagement to a strategy of “selective disentanglement.”

Empirically, it focuses on the coordinated Baltic withdrawal from the China–CEEC cooperation framework after 2021, and on Lithuania’s deepening ties with Taiwan—which not only raised tensions with Beijing but also successfully elevated a bilateral dispute into an EU‑level concern. The analysis develops a two‑level account of small‑state diplomacy: Baltic governments simultaneously respond to domestic expectations for values‑driven foreign policy and deliberately mobilize EU solidarity to manage risks from asymmetric interdependence.

Comparative observations across the CEE region suggest that, although many governments prefer incremental adjustment, Lithuania’s experience has expanded the perceived scope for more openly security‑oriented and values‑oriented China policies. This paper concludes by outlining scenarios where EU anti‑coercion tools may again be tested—including future Taiwan‑related controversies and technology supply‑chain disputes—and proposes indicators to assess whether EU collective action functions as credible deterrence rather than reactive symbolism, and whether the Baltic case signals a broader regional shift toward institutionalised resilience.

Paper for the UACES conference 2026

(proposal for the themed track EU strategic autonomy or trade policy transformation)

Dr Konstantinos J. Hazakis^[1]

Strengths and weaknesses of the new European trade policy: An institutionalist approach

Abstract

Trade unilateralism, Doha trade round failure, emergence of regional trade blocs and covid-19 disastrous economic effects, complicated international trade politics. EU trade policy develops new tools to accommodate derived economic uncertainty and transaction cost through “open strategic autonomy”.

The paper examines the new EU trade policy, (OSA or open strategic autonomy approach), from an institutional perspective. It focuses on the effort of EU to balance mutually beneficial bilateral/regional agreements with collective EU integration norms and values. Is it possible to accommodate economic welfare, competitiveness and EU integration values with multilateralism in a highly complex and hostile international trade environment?

The effort of EU is to act as a norm setter in key areas of international trade, (i.e. digital and green transition) and to reorganize its international commercial/productive supply chains to reduce dependence on critical inputs and resources.

JEL codes : B52 ; E14 ; F13 ; F15 ; O24

[1]Professor, Department of Economics, Democritus University of Thrace, University Campus, Komotini, Greece, PC 69100, tel: 6974813381, e-mail: kchazaki@econ.duth.gr

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