Trump’s second administration has generated what German Ambassador to Washington Andreas Michaelis described as a moment of “maximum disruption” for the European Union and the transatlantic relationship, unsettling assumptions that have long structured European security politics. Transactional alliance signalling, challenges to established norms of restraint and reciprocity, and growing uncertainty about the reliability of security guarantees have placed unprecedented strain on the ideational foundations of European security. This context is particularly salient for traditionally Atlanticist member states, for whom the transatlantic alliance has long constituted the primary reference point for security guarantees and strategic orientation.

This paper examines how such disruption is reflected in national security discourse on European Strategic Autonomy (ESA) through a discursive institutionalist framework, with a focus on Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These states constitute analytically demanding cases: shaped by geographic proximity to Russia, historical experience of occupation, and deep reliance on United States security guarantees, they have long articulated some of the EU’s most firmly Atlanticist security discourses. ESA is therefore analysed not as a policy outcome, but as a programmatic security paradigm whose meaning is negotiated through discourse. Particular attention is paid to the interaction between cognitive ideas about what security strategies appear workable and normative ideas about what forms of action are considered appropriate, legitimate, or politically acceptable.

Drawing on elite security discourse in the Baltic states, the paper analyses how political actors frame, delimit, and justify autonomy as established assumptions about alliance behaviour are unsettled. By tracing how ESA is articulated in relation to NATO, dependence, and responsibility, the analysis explores whether this moment of strategic disruption is associated with greater discursive convergence around what European Strategic Autonomy can plausibly mean, or whether familiar reservations and divisions persist. In doing so, the paper examines whether and how traditionally Atlanticist actors engage with emerging calls for European solidarity, and what this suggests for the evolution of East–West dynamics in European security debates.

Transatlantic relations have been shaped by geopolitical and domestic dynamics. Against the backdrop of the EU’s ambition to achieve strategic autonomy, the second Trump administration has reignited a central question: do current developments constitute a rupture in EU–US relations, or merely an acceleration of longer trends? One perspective holds that meanings and norms have eroded to an unprecedented degree, rendering cooperation along established lines increasingly unviable. A second interpretation emphasises continuity, arguing that today’s tensions reflect shifts that predate Trump. Given the EU’s continued dependence on the US for security and defence, assessing the evolving nature of the transatlantic relationship is essential, particularly as differing interpretations shape competing views on strategic autonomy.

This paper argues that developments under “Trump 2.0” are best understood through the lens of uncertainty surrounding US foreign policy. While uncertainty is frequently invoked in analyses of EU–US relations—often in connection with strategic autonomy—its analytical potential remains underdeveloped. To address this gap, the paper proposes an actor-centred, relational framework for analysing uncertainty in the transatlantic context, particular with attention to its effects on security and defence policy.

Existing theoretical scholarship conceptualises uncertainty as a phenomenon that extends beyond missing information to encompass interpretations, cognitive limitations, and socially constructed frames. Although structural conditions can generate uncertainty, agency plays a central role in its production and management. Uncertainty may act as both a constraint and an opportunity, enabling actors to exercise influence, promote policy change, or reinforce existing preferences. However, prevailing approaches tend to locate agency unidirectionally—either in the deliberate actions of one actor, such as withholding information, or in the interpretive processes of another, including misperception or bounded rationality.

This paper advances an alternative perspective by conceptualising uncertainty as potentially bidirectional and relational. Uncertainty can emerge from the relationship itself when values, norms, and beliefs of one actor are unknown to, or only partially aligned with, those of another. In such situations, insufficient information about value commitments—or perceived value divergence—undermines actors’ ability to predict other’s future behaviour. This argument differs from constructivist claims that divergent identities merely shape how information is interpreted; rather, it highlights the absence or ambiguity of information about values as a source of uncertainty. While this form of uncertainty primarily concerns future behaviour, it can exert a significant influence on present policy choices. Although theoretical in nature, the paper draws on empirical examples to illustrate its claims.

This paper lays bare and critically analyses the tough choices that the pursuit of “strategic autonomy” by the European Union entails in the near future. It seeks to move the discourse beyond general theorising on the concept, arguing that a series of difficult and often clear-cut trade-offs will have to be made. Given that immediate threat perceptions and required responses differ across Member States—particularly between those on the EU’s eastern flank and those more remote—these choices are likely, at least initially, to deepen rather than reduce divisions within the Union. This dynamic may persist unless a critical threshold is reached in a shared perception of the need to ensure European security without external support (the “Europe alone” scenario).

The shift away from the post–Cold War order towards raw great-power politics, and potentially the end of the rules-based international order, appears well under way. The rupture caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was followed by proclamations of the EU’s “geopolitical awakening”. More recently, the hostile turn of the United States towards its European and other allies, and towards multilateralism more generally, has been described as a “rupture in the world order … and the beginning of a brutal reality” in a landmark speech by Canadian Prime Minister Carney at the in Davos in January 2026. This historical moment raises existential questions for the European Union, not only concerning its long-standing commitment to multilateralism and international law, but also regarding its future role and cohesion.

In recent years, the EU has begun to adapt strategically at increasing speed, has reached out to like-minded partners, and has developed a range of new policy instruments. Nevertheless, it faces a set of difficult choices in which principles and pragmatism may not always be reconcilable. This paper highlights these dilemmas and, moving beyond merely observing the EU’s ongoing “geopolitical turn”, examines the legal, political, and moral trade-offs involved. It does so through a selection of ethically and legally salient case studies from different policy fields, including: (1) securing the eastern border (including through landmines, in light of the recent withdrawal of several European states from the Ottawa Treaty); (2) reducing dependence on the United States (including in military and technological terms); and (3) making concessions to strengthen ties with new partners (for example in the context of the EU–Mercosur and EU–India agreements).

The European security architecture that emerged after World War II was built largely around Western institutions—especially NATO and, eventually, the EU. Although the European security order was founded on a US-led framework and has remained US-centric, it evolved through extensive East–West arrangements, shaped in part by negotiated agreements and cooperative frameworks with the Soviet Union during the late Cold War, and later continued with Russia, contributing to the broader European security environment. However, there is a subtle, important detail in these East–West arrangements: despite ongoing cooperation and negotiations, Russia continued to challenge the security order by violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries—actions that were to some extent normalized for the sake of sustaining the existing arrangements and due to Western pragmatism. Consequently, Russia’s efforts were arguably not perceived as geopolitical revisionism, as post-Soviet countries were tacitly regarded as being within Russia’s sphere of influence—states managed through the Kremlin’s curator system and possessing limited agency due to Moscow’s influence over their domestic politics. The axis of arrangements initially seemed acceptable to both sides, but it gradually began to erode and ultimately collapsed in 2022. The negotiated framework had a progressively exclusionary impact on the Kremlin, which came to understand that the post-Soviet countries had reached a point of no return regarding any reintegration into Russia’s orbit. The states of the Eastern Neighbourhood had increasingly moved beyond the “post-Soviet” label by distancing themselves politically, economically, and—most painfully for Russia—culturally. They embraced Western modernization projects and elements of the normative principles underpinning the Western modus operandi. For the Kremlin, it therefore became existentially important to reshape the normative and institutional foundations of Europe’s security architecture. The year 2022 became a watershed moment in EU–Russia relations, placing the EU at a crossroads as it redefines its identity through the enlagement process and shifts from a geopolitical coordinator to a geopolitical actor.