The main scientific objective of this proposed paper is to determine and analyse the function of historical and cultural references in Turkish foreign policy, with a special emphasis on relations between Turkey and the Western Balkan states (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia). Under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), priorities and activities of Turkish diplomacy have fundamentally changed, particularly after the adoption of a novel doctrine that has established a framework for Turkey to evolve into a regional power. In this context, the AKP's political strategy has been firmly anchored in history and tradition, underscoring the significance of a shared past for the contemporary relations between all territories that once constituted the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, the Western Balkans has been a region of focus for Turkey's community-building initiatives, spanning a period of over two decades. Against this background, government-controlled institutions (e.g. TİKA, Yunus Emre Institute, Diyanet, YTB, Maarif Foundation), entrusted with the promotion of Turkish political values internationally, provide support to conventional diplomatic services.

This paper adopts a comprehensive research perspective with a view to exploring the formation of Turkey's relationship with the Western Balkans, taking actions of Turkish public diplomacy organisations in the region as a reference point. The image theory in international relations, which allows for examining trends and tendencies in foreign policy, was selected as a theoretical framework in this study. Following a comprehensive review of all available original sources (official documents, public reports, interviews and speeches of AKP politicians) as well as relevant literature on the subject (academic publications, policy briefs), the key areas of Turkey's engagement in the Western Balkans have been identified. In addition, an analysis of semi-structured expert interviews with stakeholders from the Western Balkans (including think tank researchers, NGO activists, academics) was conducted to measure local perceptions of Turkish involvement in the region. Based on qualitative research methodology (e.g. content analysis, political discourse analysis, process tracing method), this paper seeks to assess the effectiveness of Turkish activities to date, and attempts to predict future directions in Turkey's partnership with the Western Balkans.

While Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine changed the EU’s thinking about its Eastern neighbourhood, Russia’s role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has transformed Armenia’s thinking about the EU. The 2018 Velvet revolution had already laid the groundwork for closer relations with Europe through its rejection of autocracy, its embrace of liberalism and its ouster of a political class with close links to the Russian political establishment. Following Armenia’s 2020 war with Azerbaijan and the exodus of Karabakh Armenians in late 2023, public opinion and the government’s position on Russia changed dramatically due to the perception that the erstwhile ally had let them down. In parallel, the profound shock of having lost Nagorno Karabakh and an influx of displaced Karabakh Armenians led to unprecedented polarisation within Armenian society. Faced with major contestation, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan – the leader of the 2018 Velvet revolution – began to exhibit authoritarian tendencies himself. Meanwhile, the EU’s efforts to support Armenia’s democratic transition and its reorientation towards Euro-Atlantic institutions are delayed by internal dissensus, with individual member states slowing down support packages aimed at supporting Armenian security and reducing its dependence on Russia or measures such as the visa liberalisation dialogue. Exploring these dynamics, this paper seeks to provide a better understanding of how the EU’s approach to democracy promotion is shaped by both its global competition with the autocratic international, including the compromises between strategic interests and democratic principles that this competition involves, as well as the EU’s internal dissensus over the liberal democratic script.

This paper argues that the South Caucasus represents a paradigmatic case of a “regional dominance vacuum”, a condition of instability generated by emerging global multipolarity. Building on Patrick Rhamey’s regional adaptation of Power Transition Theory, the analysis contends that conflict in the region is driven not primarily by local military buildups or classic balancing, but by the erosion of a once-dominant external authority – Russia – and the failure of any competing power to establish a new, durable order. Theoretically, the paper extends Rhamey’s core idea that conflict is most likely where a dominant power’s influence wanes, rather than where challengers are strongest. While Rhamey applies this framework primarily to Central Asia, this paper demonstrates that the South Caucasus exhibits an even clearer configuration of dominance vacuum dynamics. The region is defined by the overlapping yet incomplete influence of multiple external actors like Russia, Turkey, the EU, the US, and Iran, none of which possesses the combination of capability, legitimacy, and will impose stability. This external power parity creates a permissive environment for conflict. Empirically, the study traces the evolution from the post-Cold War period through the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh wars. It shows that Russia’s declining enforcement capacity, exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, has hollowed out its role as security manager. Crucially, major conflicts reignited at moments when Russia’s deterrent credibility visibly weakened, not during periods of Azerbaijani military superiority alone – a finding that challenges neorealist expectations and supports the dominance vacuum hypothesis. The paper further refines the framework by highlighting regional agency. Unlike other regions where instability remains latent, the South Caucasus features highly mobilized states that actively exploit power vacuums to pursue revisionist goals. This transforms systemic permissiveness into decisive outcomes, conceptualizing the region as a high-intensity shatter belt characterized by short, sharp conflict cycles rather than prolonged stalemates. Therefore, the case of the South Caucasus reveals that dominance vacuums are crucial characteristics of a multipolar world, where global power diffusion translates into regional instability. For external actors like the EU, this underscores that limited normative engagement is insufficient; strategic incoherence in such vacuums risks entrenching, rather than mitigating, conflict.

This study investigates the evolving construction of "Europe" within Azerbaijani public discourse, analysing how the concept of European civilization has been deployed to serve shifting national narratives. Drawing on a corpus of official state speeches, mass media editorials, and national history textbooks, it traces the genealogy of these images from the pre-colonial era through the Soviet period to the post-independence republic, with particular attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's influence in the image of Europe in public discourse.

Specifically, the research examines how Europe's dynamic image from a sly and silent enemy to a source of modernization, and from a reliable partner to an actor with double standards, has evolved across historical periods and discursive aspects. By analysing the proximity Azerbaijani sources assign to Europe, the study highlights the strategic "bridge" rhetoric that positions the country as economically European yet culturally distinct. Ultimately, it demonstrates that the image of Europe is not a fixed geographical reality in Azerbaijan, but a malleable political tool for navigating national identity between the Silk Road legacy and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.