The European Union (EU) has historically relied on political conditionality as a fundamental mechanism of its external governance, particularly in the context of enlargement. By linking the prospect of membership and other external incentives to adherence to democratic norms, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, political conditionality has been widely regarded as one of the EU’s most effective and identity-forming foreign policy tools. Over the past decade, an expanding body of scholarly work has documented the diminishing credibility, consistency, and transformative potential of EU political conditionality, particularly regarding long-standing accession candidates such as Turkey and the Western Balkan states.

This paper argues that the evolution of EU-Turkey relations since the mid-2010s should not be understood merely as a failure or erosion of political conditionality. Instead, the paper conceptualises these developments as indicative of the emergence of a distinct mode of EU external governance, which it labels "transactional conditionality." Whereas political conditionality operates through long-term, rule-contingent reinforcement by reward aimed at promoting normative alignment and institutional convergence, transactional conditionality relies on instrumental, output-contingent reinforcement through short-term exchanges, prioritising the delivery of issue-specific cooperation over sustained rule transfer or broader democratic transformation. In this logic, rewards are typically detached from the accession framework and offered without expectations of broader democratic reform or sustained compliance with the EU acquis.

The paper develops a novel conceptual framework for transactional conditionality by theorising its scope conditions, logics of action, and mechanisms. Drawing on literature on EU conditionality, external governance, transactionalism in International Relations, and EU foreign policy, the paper situates transactional conditionality within broader shifts toward pragmatic, ad hoc, and geopoliticised forms of cooperation. Empirically, the paper applies this framework to EU-Turkey relations since 2015, analysing key episodes that highlight the shift from political to transactional conditionality. The article concludes by exploring the broader implications of this shift for EU external governance and the EU’s self-presentation as a normative power, considering the future of EU conditionality in a multipolar international order.

Focusing on EU–Turkey relations, this paper analyzes their transformation in a fragmenting global order, showing how cooperation with strategically relevant middle powers reflects broader structural shifts in EU foreign and security engagement. As the EU’s capacity to project power and shape security outcomes beyond its borders has become increasingly constrained, cooperation with capable non-member partners has shifted from a political choice to a functional necessity. Defence, security provision, and geo-economic domains—particularly critical raw material supply chains and industrial capacity—have consequently moved to the center of EU–Turkey interactions, even as political relations remain marked by persistent normative divergence.

At the same time, the strategic environment for middle powers is becoming more restrictive. The intensification of great power competition and the increasingly instrumental and alignment-oriented approach adopted by the United States toward alliances have narrowed the hedging space traditionally available to middle powers. Ambiguity has become costlier, and pressures to align more explicitly with competing blocs have increased. This contraction has not eliminated middle power agency but coincides with a growing regionalisation of international politics, where issue-specific cooperation and flexible alliances help middle powers navigate systemic fragmentation.

To address these constraints while maintaining influence, the paper introduces the concept of middle power bridge alliances. These are modular, capability-driven, and sector-specific partnerships that enable middle powers to connect fragmented security and economic architectures without requiring full political or normative convergence. Bridge alliances link regions, institutions, and strategic domains - such as defence production, logistics, security, and critical raw materials - sustaining functional interdependence despite political divergence. EU–Turkey relations exemplify this emerging pattern. Despite stalled accession prospects and ongoing normative disputes, cooperation in defence-related industries, security coordination, and geo-economic interdependence has intensified, driven by Europe’s rearmament needs and its exposure to supply-chain vulnerabilities.

The paper argues that while middle powers lack the capacity to unilaterally reshape the Liberal International Order, middle-power bridge alliances nonetheless play a meaningful role in its gradual reconfiguration by preserving selective forms of interdependence. They represent adaptive mechanisms that preserve functional cooperation despite declining normative consensus. Empirically, the analysis draws on recent developments in European defence rearmament, security cooperation, and critical raw material strategies. Conceptually, it contributes to debates on hedging, middle power strategies, and normative decoupling by showing how regionalised and sectoral alliances can both constrain and enable middle power agency in an era of heightened geopolitical competition.

Historically, Turkey has been recognized as a geopolitically strategic and influential nation-state, and it is widely regarded as possessing mid-power capacity displaying the characteristics of an emerging middle power. One very significant variable of Turkey’s middle powerhood has been an astute Western orientation in the country’s institutional structure and state identity. Although this continuity appears to have been challenged by Turkey's decade-long search for "strategic autonomy," involving security alignments with non-Western actors like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or state-to-state economic agreements it had finalised with countries in Asia and the Middle East to avoid overdependence on any single bloc, Turkey has historically aligned itself with the Western block as a NATO member and EU candidate country. This paper brings together the findings of the CATS Network Project, “Turkey, its Asian Pivot and the West: New Geopolitical Realities in the Making”, reflecting on the fieldwork conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels and interviews conducted with bureaucrats and diplomats from Turkish and EU institutions as well as shareholders from civil society and academia. The main aim here is to reflect on the research question of whether the recent geopolitical shifts epitomised by the rise of China as an economic power and the Russian invasion of Ukraine amount to a change in Turkey’s relations with these countries on the one hand, and with the EU on the other.

EU-Turkey relations are based on an Association Agreement dating back to 1963. The Ankara Agreement created an association between Turkey and the EEC and stipulated the aims, methods and institutions of the relationship. Turkey aimed to step up the relations by applying for membership in 1987 and became a candidate in 1999. The Customs Union, which would be the final stage of the Association, entered into force in 1996. These developments widened and deepened the scope of the relations on the basis of the accession framework. Accession perspective incorporated new norms and rules of conduct into the relationship based on the Copenhagen criteria and the EU acquis. Later on, Turkey’s reforms and the EU’s constructive approach enabled the opening of accession negotiations. However, the negotiations were de facto suspended in 2018, and relations moved towards a transactional and strategic direction. The paper aims to investigate the trajectory of the transition in the norms and institutions governing the relations throughout this period. Three issue areas will be selected, including environment and climate, digitalisation and trade. Changes and shifts in the normative and institutional dimensions will be analysed using the European Commission’s regular reports on Turkey from 2015 to 2025. The paper will aim to resolve the argument whether the changing norms of the relationship have been accompanied by an institutional shift as well, and whether they are linked with a change in the fundamental nature of the relationship from candidacy to partnership.

The rapidly increasing momentum of fragmentation between the USA and the EU prompts many observers of EU-Turkey relations to highlight the need for a rapprochement. The contention is that to weather the storm facing the liberal democratic and economic values or norms championed at the moment, mainly by the EU, requires the Union to seek newly forged or strengthened alliances with like-minded countries or groups of countries.

Whether Turkey is regarded by the EU as among such like-minded parties, and whether Turkey would or could align itself with the Union in the event of a growing rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, any rapprochement requires not only political will but also a detailed mapping and analysis of the available legal and institutional tools and designs within the EU’s constitutional framework for a functioning potential relationship between the EU and Turkey. One must also highlight the difficulties inherent in seeking such a model that would satisfy both parties, particularly given that the idea of a special or privileged relationship has been floated as early as when Turkey began accession negotiations, around 2004-2005, and no concrete mechanism has been put on the table by the EU side since then.

Falling short of such grand designs for a new “rules and procedures-based” structured relationship model, which, for the time being, neither party would arguably consider itself willing or capable, an issue-based, transactional model still requires such mapping and a political and legal impact analysis of potential cooperation.

This paper aims to provide an initial mapping of the legal and institutional tools and mechanisms available to the EU in two crucial areas: the trade and security architecture, and to debate their constitutional and, to a certain extent, political salience. The potential opportunities and constraints, strengths and weaknesses in the EU’s existing toolbox, comprising its rules, mechanisms and practices, will be explored to assess whether the EU has the constitutional, legal and, to some extent, political capabilities to develop novel perspectives to restore the rupture in EU-Turkey relations and pave the way for a prospective functioning partnership. Such observations might also prove instrumental in predicting the appeal and strength of European integration in the turbulent times ahead.