This study explores the relationship between political and economic criteria in the EU accession process, focusing on the Western Balkans (WB) case over the period 2014–2024. Drawing on indicators from European Commission progress reports and complementary macroeconomic data, the research examines whether advancements in political reforms are associated with improvements in economic performance and business climate, or whether the two dimensions evolve independently.

The main objective of the study is to assess the dynamics between political and economic conditionality by identifying periods of parallel progression, divergence, or asymmetrical development. It further seeks to investigate potential causal links between institutional consolidation, rule of law reforms, and economic transformation, including competitiveness and investment-related indicators.

Methodologically, the research combines a comparative analysis of political and economic acquis chapters with quantitative assessment of macroeconomic indicators. This mixed-method approach allows for a systematic evaluation of whether political reforms function as a prerequisite for sustainable economic development or whether economic progress can advance despite limited political consolidation. The study hypothesizes that political reforms exert a stronger influence on economic outcomes than vice versa, while also acknowledging periods in which economic performance may outpace institutional reform. By addressing the political–economic nexus within EU conditionality, the research contributes to ongoing debates on the effectiveness and sequencing of reforms in the Western Balkans.

Despite the structural changes on the world stage, together with the loss of value for the rule of international law, the EU continues to exert leadership on climate change matters on international stage driven by its Green Deal agenda. The paper will examine the role the European Union has in the promotion of the sustainable development and climate action throughout its environmental policy. It will focus on the EU impact in the Western Balkan countries throughout the climate action and compliance with the environmental standards. It will elaborate on the importance of the international standards and on the EU membership obligations in the area of climate action and the progress made by the Western Balkan countries in implementing them. The EU environmental policy is an important part of the EU integration and there is a substantial secondary legislation that also is relevant for the candidate countries for EU membership. The paper examines the legal mechanisms that are available to the EU candidate countries and the obligations they create for them in the context of the EU enlargement. The paper focuses on the EU conditionality policy in the area of protecting the environment and explores the particular efforts by the EU, pursued under the Energy Community Treaty (ECT), which aims towards integrating the energy markets of the Union and those of the Western Balkans countries. It argues that the EU’s success in establishing energy connectivity is tightly connected with a broader endeavour to align these countries to its environmental regulations.

What does it actually mean for a country to be ready to join the European Union? The EU’s enlargement process places strong emphasis on legal alignment and formal compliance, yet recent experience shows that accession does not necessarily lead to economic convergence. This paper takes a different approach by asking whether candidate countries are structurally prepared to benefit from EU membership.

It introduces a longitudinal Integration Readiness Index, designed to capture deeper forms of preparedness across four dimensions: macroeconomic stability, market readiness, institutional readiness, and environmental readiness. Grounded in the integration maturity framework, the index shifts attention away from box-ticking and toward the economic, institutional, and sustainability conditions that shape post-accession outcomes. All indicators are benchmarked against EU averages and tracked over time, allowing for both cross-country comparison and analysis of change.

Readiness is then considered alongside a simple Convergence Index, measured as GDP per capita (PPP) relative to the EU average. Rather than modelling growth, convergence is treated as an observable outcome. The analysis highlights persistent weaknesses, especially in institutions and environmental governance, that help explain why convergence among candidate countries remains uneven. The paper presents the index as a first step toward a longer-term monitoring tool for EU enlargement.

“If we have to choose between the United States and Denmark here and now, we choose Denmark, we choose NATO, we choose the EU”. With these words, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, Greenland’s premier, expressed just deeply the US’ sabre-rattling had disturbed Greenland’s political balance. Already since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, voices in Nuuk, Reykjavik and Oslo have debated whether the time is ripe for considering northern enlargement again – a discussion that has gone from a whisper to a part of strategic discussions also in Brussels. EU enlargement studies have, since Croatia joined in 2013, primarily had its gaze fixed on the Western Balkans as a site of potential enlargement. This article seeks to map out the conditions for EU membership in the three northern candidates, namely Greenland, Iceland and Norway. Greenland has truly entered the global picture and looks for international anchoring, while Iceland’s government has expressed its desire to hold a public referendum – and opinion polls tend toward “Yes” to membership. Norway, on the other hand, has not yet seen a public debate re-emerge, and has a strikingly high opposition to EU membership, both among voters and political parties. The three have distinctly different histories with the EU and widely varying economic and political brawn, but are all faced with a situation where increased global interest in the Arctic coincides with a declining trust in NATO. By comparing political and public support for EU membership as well as the broader discourses on what EU membership would entail, I aim to contribute to an understanding of the unique political sensitivities the EU debate entails in northern Europe, understand why the three countries differ so significantly, and to identify key issues where the northern enlargement package differs from eastern enlargement discourses.

This paper examines the role of external incentives and government policy preferences in explaining why EU candidate countries formally converge with the EU social acquis. Building on the external incentives model (EIM), the article argues that the effects of external incentives are conditioned by domestic political factors, most importantly the preferences and agency of governments in power. Focusing on seven candidate countries – Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine – the article asks: what is the effect of government policy preferences on formal convergence with the EU social acquis under conditions of increasing credibility of the EU membership promise? The article uses a multi-method design. The analysis relies on a novel dataset measuring annual formal convergence scores in social policy between the signing of Association Agreements/Stabilization and Association Agreements and 2024. The quantitative part of the article uses panel regression models, where the dependent variable captures the average annual change in convergence during each government term. The qualitative part draws on expert interviews in Georgia and North Macedonia to explore the mechanisms behind observed patterns and to unpack the domestic political constraints that cannot be fully captured in cross-national quantitative indicators. The findings provide strong support for the EIM: more credible membership incentives are consistently associated with faster convergence, even in the potentially politically contentious area of social policy. By contrast, the influence of government policy preferences is weaker and less robust. The quantitative evidence offers only limited support for the hypothesis that more left-wing governments converge faster, while the qualitative evidence shows that political entrepreneurship, informal veto players, and strategic use of EU conditionality can decisively shape reform episodes.