In the aftermath of the 2004 enlargement, the EU supported the establishment of four macro-regional strategies (MRS) covering the Baltic, Danube, Adriatic-Ionian, and Alpine territories, involving both EU member states and third countries. These macro-regions are governance platforms endorsed by the European Council to address shared challenges and opportunities. By connecting different administrative tiers and policy fields, they provide an experimental framework for coordination. Using multi-level governance as a theoretical point of departure, this article aims to explore how the EU’s green and digital transition is influenced by the capacity to (re)scale and coordinate them jointly across sectors and levels of governance. To do so the article addresses the following research question: How do vertical and horizontal coordination dynamics in the EUSAIR shape the implementation of the twin transition?

To illustrate this, we analyse the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR), focusing on how the macro-region and its discourse implement the twin transition through multimodal connectivity, reduced environmental impact, and smart mobility solutions. This initiative is an ideal case as highlights the dual challenge of coordination of the twin transition: horizontally (Policy), across policy domains such as transport, environment, energy, and digital innovation; and vertically (Polity), between EU frameworks (e.g. European Green Deal, TEN-T, REPowerEU), national strategies, and local implementation. Ultimately, the paper demonstrates that the twin transition is not only a technical and institutional challenge but also a political one, as actors contest priorities, compete for resources, and negotiate responsibilities (Politics).

Why do some regional organisations survive member state withdrawals with little disruption, while others appear more vulnerable to exit? Although recent scholarship has begun to examine why states voluntarily leave regional organisations, far less attention has been paid to how withdrawal processes are managed once the decision to exit has been taken. This gap is particularly striking beyond Europe and the European Union (EU), where empirical work on exit remains limited. As a result, withdrawal is still often treated as evidence of institutional failure or regional disintegration. This paper addresses this dual theoretical and empirical gap by analysing how voluntary withdrawals from regional organisations are managed by both the departing states and the organisations they leave. It advances the argument that withdrawal is best understood not as a linear process of disintegration, but as a form of differentiated disintegration: selective, strategic, and frequently reversible.

Empirically, the paper offers a comparative analysis of several case studies drawn from different world regions. The study is anchored in a comparative regionalism framework and informed by a federalist perspective on membership, authority, and institutional flexibility. Cases are selected to maximise variation in geography, institutional design, and political context, while sharing the common feature of voluntary exit. The analysis demonstrates three main findings. First, contrary to expectations of institutional breakdown, isolated withdrawals tend to have limited systemic effects on regional orders. Second, disintegration processes are highly differentiated: in six of the seven cases, exit was followed by some form of re-engagement, ranging from full reintegration to associate membership or selective sectoral cooperation through bilateral or ‘mini-lateral’ arrangements. Third, regional organisations display considerable institutional resilience, developing informal and formal coping mechanisms to contain the political and functional consequences of exit.

The paper contributes to debates on regionalism, exit, and institutional resilience by reframing withdrawal as part of the adaptive life cycle of regional organisations rather than as their failure. In an increasingly fragmented international order, understanding how organisations manage exit, and how exit can be reversed or reshaped, offers important insights into the future of regional cooperation.

This paper explores how Ukrainian municipalities are navigating the dual challenge of wartime governance and EU-oriented transformation, focusing on their role in implementing climate and environmental reforms. As Ukraine advances through accession negotiations with the European Union during a full-scale war, its local governments have become central actors in both recovery and reform. Yet, they operate in an environment marked by infrastructure damage, administrative pressure, and ongoing security threats. The paper argues that the municipal level offers a critical but underexamined lens through which to understand the politics of EU enlargement under conflict conditions. While enlargement scholarship has traditionally focused on national institutions and elite compliance, Ukraine’s decentralisation reforms since 2014 have empowered local authorities with increased autonomy and responsibility. This shift is particularly visible in the environmental field, where municipalities are tasked with implementing sustainability goals and adapting to EU climate directives under highly constrained conditions.

The tenth session of the European Parliament (2024 - 2029) has seen the EP enter unchartered territory with both the third and fourth largest party groups in the Hemicycle representing Eurosceptic positions. Pro-European factions considered most reliable for sustaining coalitions such as Renew Europe (RE) and the Greens / European Free Alliance (EFA) have been overtaken by Patriots for Europe (PfE) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). While many MEPs opposed to European integration have been elected before, their overall influence has never been higher. The political dynamics of the tenth EP have already had an impact on the way the legislature functions with the leadership of the largest party, the European People’s Party (EPP), embarking on a pragmatic strategy to try to work where they can with the Eurosceptic groups. In particular, the ECR has been allowed inside the famous Brussels and Strasbourg cordon sanitaire ostensibly on the basis that it supports NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. While the policy implications of this remain to be seen, it has caused genuine friction between the EPP and its erstwhile partner, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats for Europe (S&D).