Conference Agenda

Scholars argue that in the European Union (EU), the increased frequency, complexity, and number of crises result in the crisification of policymaking, lawmaking, and governance (Moreno-lax 2023; Rhinard 2019). This article posits, from a social constructivist and discursive institutionalist perspective, that crisification begins with the social and discursive framing of issues as crises. Yet, despite its significance, crisification as a discursive trend has not been examined longitudinally, nor has a framework been established to measure crisification at the level of discourse. To address this significant research gap(s), the article develops a novel conceptual framework for analyzing discursive crisification through five dimensions: 1) frequency and 2) breadth of crisis framing, 3) emergence of newly crisified issues, 4) pre-emptive framing, and 5) invocation of polycrisis. This framework is then applied to an empirical case of the Twitter communication of six key EU institutions (European Committee of the Regions, European Commission, European Parliament, European Council/Council of the EU, European Central Bank, and Council President). The study spans an extensive temporal horizon of twelve years (April 2012–June 2024), analyzes a large dataset of 1,925 crisis-related tweets and employs a multi-method approach - Discourse Network Analysis helps map relationships between institutions and their articulated crises, identifying the most crisified issues and key crisifying actors. Content analysis is used to systematically track and quantify the five dimensions of crisification over time. As such, the study provides critical insights into crisification as a trend in EU communication, showing how it drives shifts toward pre-emptive, crisis-oriented policymaking with potential repercussions for EU legitimacy and integration. From a policy perspective, the findings highlight the risks of over-reliance on crisis narratives in policy communication, which can entrench a permanent state of crisis in public perception and influence citizen attitudes, and trust toward the EU.

This paper advances a conceptual framework for strengthening the European Union’s (EU) capacity to withstand sudden shocks—ranging from geopolitical crises to economic downturns—without undermining its legitimacy. Leveraging theoretical insights from complex adaptive systems and multi-level governance studies, the framework introduces the notion of “governance shock absorbers” as innovative mechanisms that diffuse external pressures rather than transmit them directly through EU institutions. These shock absorbers, operating at various junctures between the European Commission, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, and national authorities, are designed to mitigate escalating conflicts, protect public trust, and avoid institutional overload during crises. Building on lessons from the Eurozone, migration, and COVID-19 crises, the paper conceptualizes how well-calibrated governance shock absorbers can enhance both EU’s legitimacy and operational resilience. By limiting the destabilizing effects of acute pressures, these mechanisms enhance responsiveness, accountability, and solidarity—key dimensions in maintaining the EU’s legitimacy among citizens and stakeholders. Through scenario-based modelling and in-depth stakeholder analysis, the paper systematically examines how different configurations of shock absorbers might be embedded in EU decision-making processes, thereby reinforcing the EU’s resilience in a complex and evolving political environment. This paper thus contributes to EU crisis management debates by illustrating how the EU can not only withstand shocks but also enhance its resilience and democratic legitimacy.

Transatlantic relations since 2017 present a puzzling mixture. Following the election of Donald Trump in 2016, there were intense uncertainties about the direction of US foreign policy and in particular its relationship to the EU, centred on the nature of the president’s transactional diplomacy and rejection of multilateralism. When the Trump Administration gave way to that of Joe Biden in 2021, the prospects for partnership were apparently enhanced: there were intense coordination of economic and diplomatic measures against Russia, continued declarations of partnership and a commitment to multilateralism in issues such as climate diplomacy, and institutional development at the bilateral level with the initiation of the EU-US Trade and Technology Council and related bodies. At the same time, there was strong evidence on both sides of domestic preoccupations and a new form of mercantilism centred on state aids and industrial policies, combined with US unilateralism and ‘domesticism’ and the EU’s potential diplomatic marginalisation in areas such as the Indo-Pacific or the Middle East. Alongside these apparent contradictions there were asymmetric responses to the assertiveness of China and associated geopolitical and geo-economic tensions. The second Trump administration appears to have made a quantum leap in relation to its economic and political assertiveness, with uncertain responses on the part of the EU and NATO allies, and challenges to the entire multilateral system on which the Union depends for its international status and effectiveness. How are we to make sense of the tensions and counter-currents that continue to characterise transatlantic relations? This paper sets recent and current EU-US relations in the broader historical and analytical context, by drawing attention to the ways in which the Euro-American system is structured and driven by a set of underlying forces, considering developments since 2017 in light of these forces, and exploring the potential implications of ‘Trump 2.0’ for transatlantic relations.