Conference Agenda

The ability to tell a compelling story, that becomes the dominant frame through which events are viewed and interpreted (Boin et al, 2013), is a powerful tool to prompt unity and to legitimize supranational response, particularly in crisis situations. The pandemic and the Ukrainian war are two examples of crises during which the President of the Commission (VdL) crafted compelling narratives built upon clear binary opposition (heroes vs villains, victims vs aggressors) that encouraged EU’s unity and coordinated response (Camisão and Vila Maior, 2024; Camisão and Peixinho, 2024). Unlike what happened with those crises, the complexity of the ongoing Israel-Hamas war - historical ramifications, differences in types and resources of the actors involved, and disproportional consequences for the Palestinian civilian people, that makes blame more difficult to assess – may hinder the ability to construct a narrative supported upon truly binary opposites, known to be instrumental to raise acceptance and to narrative’s effectiveness (Bruner, 1991; Levi-Strauss, 1960; Propp, 2009). Therefore, we aim to see how has VdL portrayed this conflict and whether she was able to craft a compelling narrative on the war to avoid EU’s cacophony. Using narrative (e.g. McBeth et al., 2007; Jones and McBeth, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2017; Crow and Jones, 2018) and discourse analysis (e.g. van Dijk, 1998; Cap, 2008; van Leeuwen, 2007), we analyse VdL’s speeches (October 2023-December 2024) to answer one chief RQ: Was the President of the Commission capable of creating an authoritative crisis narrative on the Israel-Hamas war?

The paper focuses on analysing and conceptualising selected EU institutions as actors of (self-) legitimisation and legitimation of the EU in times of crisis. By analysing two key institutions of EU governance - the European Commission and the European Council - and two different crises, the paper explores whether there are differences or similarities in the approaches of the various institutions concerning their dealing with the EU's role in the crisis. Departing from the premises of neo-institutional theories, the paper draws on the original dataset of the institutions' outputs on the social network X (formerly Twitter). As such, it contributes to the two streams of literature. First, it adds to the growing literature on the EU's performance in the crisis. Secondly, it engages with the research on the EU's legitimacy.

Few political issues in the EU are as polarizing as migration. This polarization is reflected in the role of the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency ‘Frontex’, which has been the focus of public mistrust due to its low effectiveness on the one hand and the alleged violation of fundamental rights on the other. One way to (re)establish and maintain trust is through accountability.
While Frontex has been confronted with harsh criticism for a lack of accountability, the European Parliament (EP) has become increasingly involved in scrutinizing Frontex’s activities in the light of numerous allegations. Despite the increasing number and importance of these scrutiny activities, little academic effort has been made to study the role and strategies of the EP in holding Frontex to account.
Addressing this research gap, we examine the EP’s expanding de jure and de facto role in holding Frontex to account. In particular, we focus on the budgetary discharge procedure as a tool for the EP to take corrective action when it diagnoses maladministration in the work of Frontex. While the procedure formally relates only to budget implementation, we show that Parliament uses it informally as an accountability tool that goes far beyond financial oversight.
Theoretically, we adopt a rationalist bargaining perspective on institutional change. This allows us to analyse the discharge procedure as a strategy of the EP to increase its leverage over Frontex. Empirically, we combine original material from semi-structured interviews with the systematic analysis of EU documents. Our findings show that in holding Frontex to account, the EP can push over its legal weight by effectively combining well-proven bargaining strategies.

This paper presents a unique, in-depth investigation into how British prime ministers Theresa May, Boris Johnson, and Rishi Sunak employed EU-focused blame-avoidance strategies, as conceptualized by Hansson (2015), during critical phases of the Brexit negotiations and into the post-Brexit era. While previous research has shed light on specific periods – such as the pre-referendum context (May, 2023), the withdrawal negotiations (Hansson, 2019), and Johnson’s leadership years (Brusenbauch Meislová, 2024) – there remains a gap in understanding the longitudinal evolution of these strategies across successive leaderships and political contexts. This study fills that gap by examining a broad timeframe, spanning from 19 September 2018, when May’s Chequers proposal faced rejection by the European Council, to the aftermath of Brexit and the UK general election on 4 July 2024. Through a discourse-historical approach to critical discourse studies, this analysis systematically examines diverse genres of political communication, including public speeches, press statements, and Facebook posts, to trace how leaders adapted their blame-avoidance rhetoric to shifting political pressures and audiences. By revealing distinct approaches to EU-focused blame-avoidance strategies and integrating cross-platform and longitudinal perspectives, this research significantly advances scholarship on blame-avoidance strategies in the Brexit context and anti-EU rhetoric. Crucially, it underscores the lasting implications of such discourse for EU-UK relations, making it an essential contribution to understanding the political dynamics of the post-Brexit era.