As global politics witnesses the rise of populist leaders and parties, the consequences concern several areas of EU policy adaptation, including the European Green Deal. The arguable imposition of common environmental goals is yet another motive for populist factions to frame it within Euroskeptic and climate denialist narratives. Italian populist parties (chosen following the PopuList periodical classification) are promoting their stances about climate change science as well as climate change policies in several sites. The present analysis draws on both the literature on the formation of public opinion and the available sources on its present state (such as the surveys conducted by YouGov on lively topics like the environmental policies), selecting a list of keywords and phrases typical of the political debate on the topic. At the core of this work, however, there are these parties’ press releases and parliamentary speeches. Are there significant differences between the occurrence of selected keywords and the sentiment orientation between the three mainstream populist partiesof Italy (Brothers of Italy, Five-Star Movement, League)? This paper also examines the ways in which these parties contest the Green Deal by appealing to the "thin" ideology of populism or to the "thick" left-right ideologies they each represent (such as nationalism). Do these communicative choices relate to the salience of the climate issue in public opinion? Answering such questions provides insights on the different ways the EU green policies are discussed and opposed by the most significant populist parties.

This paper rests on the assumption that the EU has sustained hegemonic structural power in the European political economy. Its unique mix of supranationalism with enduring intergovernmentalism has forged a unique form of ‘regional hegemony’. It is argued that there has been an intrinsically liberal quality to this, given its multilevel, flexible, pluralist and consensual mode of operation, and the fact that the core dynamic of integration has been the construction of the Single Market.

As widely noted, a series of events have moved the regional and global political economy in a more geoeconomic (less neoliberal) framework. This paper focuses on how the EU’s response to some key changes (Brexit, the Trump effect and systemic rivalry with China) have affected the EU’s hegemony in Europe. Embedded in a mid-level constructivist ontology, it offers a framing analysis and policy analysis of some key recent EU initiatives made in response to these challenges. As such, it hopes to contribute to our understanding of the impact of the response to geoeconomic pressures on the supranational-intergovernmental balance, relations with non-member European states and the liberal character of the EU system.

The European Union’s (EU) climate diplomacy aims to align the European Green Deal’s goals with energy autonomy since the Ukraine war. This has led the EU to refocus on Latin America (LATAM) for strategic investments and cooperation in energy transition after a decade-long hiatus. The Global Gateway, launched during COVID-19 and effective since June 2021, signifies Europe's investment strategy in developing countries where China's Silk Road had already expanded. Following the Ukraine conflict, the EU resumed partnerships with LATAM, launching the EU-Latin American and Caribbean Global Gateway Investment Agenda (GGIA) (JOIN/2023/17 final, 2023). This paper maps two phases of EU climate diplomacy: from the Paris Treaty (2015) to the initiation of the Green Deal in 2021, and post-2022, marking a shift in the European energy transition. The hypothesis posits that the EU, seeking energy autonomy from Russia, reconnects with South American nations in its climate diplomacy. The research tracks policies and strategies, emphasizing the EU's legitimacy through support and coherence with regional policies. It includes a historical overview of energy transition changes since 2015 and assesses regional policies concerning investment, cooperation, and trade, particularly with Brazil and Chile—key players in lithium and green hydrogen reserves. Preliminary findings indicate the EU exports its regulatory standards through diplomatic strategies, not only discursively and persuasively, but also by promoting its international image as an actor committed to norms and values. These are included in international association clauses and bilateral trade agreements, as in its various comprehensive free trade agreements and interregional associations, such as the EU-Mercosur and EU-Chile agreements.