Conference Agenda

Regrettably, the EU’s eastern borders are not characterized by peace and stability as envisaged in its strategic documents. Instead of amiable relations, peaceful conflict resolution, cooperation and mutual understanding promoted by the liberal worldview, the space in question rather reflects the revival of the past Cold War settings, characterized by the traditional great power politics and balancing merged with fierce competition. Russia’s recent rogue state behaviour in the region hamstrings any attempt to establish more constructive and cooperative relations with the Community. In addition, economic and social interactions between the EU and Russia have been severely damaged as well by the latter’s determination to restrict freedom and human rights, conduct aggressive military incursions and annex territories, to which the European Union have responded with several packages of sanctions. Russia’s feedback included the use of a mix of unconventional instruments from disinformation to cyberattacks, election interference etc., all meant to destabilize the EU. Concomitantly, the Arctic migratory route (Norway) gave testimony of third country nationals being used as a tool in Russia’s political manoeuvre against the EU and its Member States as well. In this regard, more and more scholars were talking about the weaponization of migration or the deliberate facilitation of irregular migration, even describing the deployed modus operandi as a tool in Russia’s hybrid warfare waged against the Community. Similar methods have been employed by the Belarusian government at its border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. As a consequence of the deliberate weaponizing of human beings by facilitating irregular immigration, Finland has also joined the group of EU Member States closing their borders with Russia and erecting fences. Accordingly, by using a cross-case over-time comparative analysis (3 case studies: Norway, Poland and Finland), the paper wishes to prove the existence of a pattern, Russia and Belarus deliberately weaponizing immigration, by pushing third country nationals at the EU borders, thus using human beings for political purposes. It is being argued that the erection of fences or augmenting the length of the fences are the results of the deliberate facilitation of irregular migration. The EU and its Members States’ collective response to the weaponization of immigration were grouped in five major categories, assessing the political/legal, institutional, inter-institutional, regulatory and societal measures.

This research investigates the relationship between identity resilience and societal security, with a focus on the Republic of Moldova and Romania within the current geopolitical environment. Identity resilience refers to the ability of individuals, communities, or nations to maintain and adapt their core cultural, social, and national identities in the face of external challenges, disruptions, or threats. In the context of societal security, identity resilience plays a crucial role in fostering cohesion, unity, and a sense of belonging, which can help communities withstand social, political, or economic pressures and external influences that may undermine their sense of self or cultural integrity.

This study seeks to address the gap in the literature by examining how identity resilience contributes to shaping and safeguarding societal security, particularly in nations vulnerable to unconventional threats. The research employs a qualitative approach and the analysis is based on publicly available datasets related to democracy, identity and security. The primary analytical method used is process tracing. Hypotheses are developed based on indicators such as identity resilience, societal resilience, community cohesion, response to threats, and public engagement.

The main objective of this article is to study the evolving security dynamics within the EU’s challenges on geopolitical tensions and security. The aim is to value the EU's responses to the challenges, its strategic alignment with NATO, and the integration of member states into the EU framework, as well as, Turkey's role in European security and the evolving nature of EU foreign policy.

A qualitative analysis of existing literature and policy documents is used, including historical EU security strategies and the EU’s strategic compass, to value the trajectory of European security policy and EU-NATO military collaborations, forming conclusions about the EU's future global security role.

The EU's security strategy has shifted from economic integration to a focus on geopolitics, due to the Ukraine crisis and global threats. Key developments include:

Strategic Autonomy and NATO: The EU seeks autonomy but acknowledges NATO’s irreplaceable role, with both organizations complementing each other in defense and crisis management.

Turkey’s Role: Turkey's strategic importance has grown, especially in Black Sea security, balancing NATO and EU interests.

Internal EU Tensions: EU divisions persist over defense spending, Turkey's role in handling relations with Russia, reflecting the challenge of balancing the values with geopolitical realities.

European security is shifting as the EU struggles to balance its normative values with global geopolitics. The EU must adapt to a world where strategic autonomy and military capabilities are essential, while NATO remains a key partner. The EU’s success will depend on overcoming internal divisions, integrating new members, and strengthening defense and crisis management. Turkey’s role is important, as its geopolitical position improves EU security. The EU must mediate its ideals with the realities of global power dynamics to maintain influence in the future security architecture.

The term “submarine cable” has been widely used, including in international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, but very little attempt appears to have been made to define it or to address the systems and networks associated with the term, at the international level. Even at the domestic level, at least amongst countries of the Indo-Pacific, there appears to be a very worrisome dearth in the degree of legal comprehensiveness with which this subject has been dealt. An exception is Australia, which “...is one of only a few nations with a dedicated regime for the protection of submarine cables”. Schedule 3A of Australia’s “Telecommunications Act 1997” (as amended and in force on 2 March 2019) specifies in considerable detail, the legal regime for the protection of international submarine cables landing in Australia. As such, it offers an excellent example of a “best practice” that Europeaan own legal and maritime-strategic communities would do exceedingly well to study. The protection of subsea infrastructure is a growing concern for countries in the currently fragile geopolitical milieu. Subsea cables are a crucial conduit of telecommunications that enable internet connectivity and support growing cyberinfrastructure by reducing latency and increasing bandwidth, a quality that satellites lack. However, recent disruptions either through sabotage, espionage, manipulation, or sheer accident highlight the issue of subsea infrastructure protection. In sum, submarine cables form a part of Europe’s critical infrastructure that require legislative and physical protection. Europe is emerging as a crucial hub for submarine cable infrastructure. Currently it has many submarine cables landing from different parts of the world. However, Europe currently lacks jurisdictional, legislative, and physical protection measures for these expensive and vulnerable underwater assets, except the Recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructures, which presents a set of actions at national and EU level aimed at improving submarine cable security and resilience, through a better coordination across the EU, both in terms of governance and funding. The Recommendation, on which I will focus on, outlines a series of actions at both national and EU levels. The aim is to enhance the security and resilience of submarine cable systems. Australia is, viceversa, one of the few nations with a dedicated regime as well as declared zones for the protection of undersea cables. Australia’s world-leading legislation provides a template for creating cable protection zones on which I shall reflect