Conference Agenda

Regrettably, the EU’s eastern borders are not characterized by peace and stability as envisaged in its strategic documents. Instead of amiable relations, peaceful conflict resolution, cooperation and mutual understanding promoted by the liberal worldview, the space in question rather reflects the revival of the past Cold War settings, characterized by the traditional great power politics and balancing merged with fierce competition. Russia’s recent rogue state behaviour in the region hamstrings any attempt to establish more constructive and cooperative relations with the Community. In addition, economic and social interactions between the EU and Russia have been severely damaged as well by the latter’s determination to restrict freedom and human rights, conduct aggressive military incursions and annex territories, to which the European Union have responded with several packages of sanctions. Russia’s feedback included the use of a mix of unconventional instruments from disinformation to cyberattacks, election interference etc., all meant to destabilize the EU. Concomitantly, the Arctic migratory route (Norway) gave testimony of third country nationals being used as a tool in Russia’s political manoeuvre against the EU and its Member States as well. In this regard, more and more scholars were talking about the weaponization of migration or the deliberate facilitation of irregular migration, even describing the deployed modus operandi as a tool in Russia’s hybrid warfare waged against the Community. Similar methods have been employed by the Belarusian government at its border with Poland, Latvia and Lithuania. As a consequence of the deliberate weaponizing of human beings by facilitating irregular immigration, Finland has also joined the group of EU Member States closing their borders with Russia and erecting fences. Accordingly, by using a cross-case over-time comparative analysis (3 case studies: Norway, Poland and Finland), the paper wishes to prove the existence of a pattern, Russia and Belarus deliberately weaponizing immigration, by pushing third country nationals at the EU borders, thus using human beings for political purposes. It is being argued that the erection of fences or augmenting the length of the fences are the results of the deliberate facilitation of irregular migration. The EU and its Members States’ collective response to the weaponization of immigration were grouped in five major categories, assessing the political/legal, institutional, inter-institutional, regulatory and societal measures.

This research investigates the relationship between identity resilience and societal security, with a focus on the Republic of Moldova and Romania within the current geopolitical environment. Identity resilience refers to the ability of individuals, communities, or nations to maintain and adapt their core cultural, social, and national identities in the face of external challenges, disruptions, or threats. In the context of societal security, identity resilience plays a crucial role in fostering cohesion, unity, and a sense of belonging, which can help communities withstand social, political, or economic pressures and external influences that may undermine their sense of self or cultural integrity.

This study seeks to address the gap in the literature by examining how identity resilience contributes to shaping and safeguarding societal security, particularly in nations vulnerable to unconventional threats. The research employs a qualitative approach and the analysis is based on publicly available datasets related to democracy, identity and security. The primary analytical method used is process tracing. Hypotheses are developed based on indicators such as identity resilience, societal resilience, community cohesion, response to threats, and public engagement.

Though intentionally progressive and inclusive, EU-derived rights, particularly those stemming from the principles of free movement, non-discrimination, and social rights, may have provoked rejection reactions or been exploited to fuel anti-European feelings. This paper explores how several populist and Eurosceptic movements instrumentalised EU rights to feed anti-European rhetoric, calling into question the social and legal cohesion of the European project. For several years, far-right and populist parties have been gaining ground in the EU Member States and within the European institutions, threatening the achievements of European integration based on the rule of law. The Brexit referendum campaign led by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) illustrates how EU-derived rights can fuel populist and nationalist narratives. While UKIP influenced the referendum result, its approach to EU citizens' social rights access also spread to other far-right populist parties in EU member states who adopted the strategies used by UKIP in their national contexts, exploiting fears about immigration, national sovereignty and cultural identity to mobilise support against the EU. In Germany, for example, the far-right political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has used the idea that intra-European migrants took advantage of the German welfare system. This argument has often been aimed at Romanian or Bulgarian workers. These criticisms have had several consequences: the increased division between the Member States and delegitimisation of the European institutions, particularly regarding managing migration and sovereignty.

This has highlighted the EU's vulnerabilities in the face of ideological discourse. This paper investigates how UKIP and other EU populist far-right movements have mobilised this rhetoric against EU-derived rights and how the EU responds to these challenges. If the EU wishes to protect its integration project, it must indeed raise awareness of these rights, respond to criticism, and find ways of countering populist rhetoric without compromising its fundamental principles.

The main objective of this article is to study the evolving security dynamics within the EU’s challenges on geopolitical tensions and security. The aim is to value the EU's responses to the challenges, its strategic alignment with NATO, and the integration of member states into the EU framework, as well as, Turkey's role in European security and the evolving nature of EU foreign policy.

A qualitative analysis of existing literature and policy documents is used, including historical EU security strategies and the EU’s strategic compass, to value the trajectory of European security policy and EU-NATO military collaborations, forming conclusions about the EU's future global security role.

The EU's security strategy has shifted from economic integration to a focus on geopolitics, due to the Ukraine crisis and global threats. Key developments include:

Strategic Autonomy and NATO: The EU seeks autonomy but acknowledges NATO’s irreplaceable role, with both organizations complementing each other in defense and crisis management.

Turkey’s Role: Turkey's strategic importance has grown, especially in Black Sea security, balancing NATO and EU interests.

Internal EU Tensions: EU divisions persist over defense spending, Turkey's role in handling relations with Russia, reflecting the challenge of balancing the values with geopolitical realities.

European security is shifting as the EU struggles to balance its normative values with global geopolitics. The EU must adapt to a world where strategic autonomy and military capabilities are essential, while NATO remains a key partner. The EU’s success will depend on overcoming internal divisions, integrating new members, and strengthening defense and crisis management. Turkey’s role is important, as its geopolitical position improves EU security. The EU must mediate its ideals with the realities of global power dynamics to maintain influence in the future security architecture.

The term “submarine cable” has been widely used, including in international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea, but very little attempt appears to have been made to define it or to address the systems and networks associated with the term, at the international level. Even at the domestic level, at least amongst countries of the Indo-Pacific, there appears to be a very worrisome dearth in the degree of legal comprehensiveness with which this subject has been dealt. An exception is Australia, which “...is one of only a few nations with a dedicated regime for the protection of submarine cables”. Schedule 3A of Australia’s “Telecommunications Act 1997” (as amended and in force on 2 March 2019) specifies in considerable detail, the legal regime for the protection of international submarine cables landing in Australia. As such, it offers an excellent example of a “best practice” that Europeaan own legal and maritime-strategic communities would do exceedingly well to study. The protection of subsea infrastructure is a growing concern for countries in the currently fragile geopolitical milieu. Subsea cables are a crucial conduit of telecommunications that enable internet connectivity and support growing cyberinfrastructure by reducing latency and increasing bandwidth, a quality that satellites lack. However, recent disruptions either through sabotage, espionage, manipulation, or sheer accident highlight the issue of subsea infrastructure protection. In sum, submarine cables form a part of Europe’s critical infrastructure that require legislative and physical protection. Europe is emerging as a crucial hub for submarine cable infrastructure. Currently it has many submarine cables landing from different parts of the world. However, Europe currently lacks jurisdictional, legislative, and physical protection measures for these expensive and vulnerable underwater assets, except the Recommendation on the security and resilience of submarine cable infrastructures, which presents a set of actions at national and EU level aimed at improving submarine cable security and resilience, through a better coordination across the EU, both in terms of governance and funding. The Recommendation, on which I will focus on, outlines a series of actions at both national and EU levels. The aim is to enhance the security and resilience of submarine cable systems. Australia is, viceversa, one of the few nations with a dedicated regime as well as declared zones for the protection of undersea cables. Australia’s world-leading legislation provides a template for creating cable protection zones on which I shall reflect

The Icelandic space sector, while nascent, holds significant potential within the global space ecosystem. This research comprehensively analyses Iceland's emerging role in space activities, emphasising its unique geographic, environmental, and policy-based advantages. By examining existing infrastructure, policy frameworks, and international collaborations, this study identifies the challenges and opportunities for Iceland to carve out a niche in the global space industry. Key findings highlight Iceland's strategic location for polar satellite tracking, its pristine environment for astrobiological research, and its geothermal energy resources as critical enablers for sustainable space-related projects. Furthermore, the paper explores the regulatory and institutional gaps in Iceland's space policy and offers recommendations for fostering innovation and attracting international partnerships. Through a framework analysis, this study evaluates Iceland's alignment with global trends in space exploration and its potential to contribute to fields such as Earth observation, climate monitoring, and space technology testing. This work underscores the need for strategic investments and policy adaptations to ensure Iceland's active participation in the rapidly evolving space economy.

The exploration of economic values among Belarusians, both within the country and across its diaspora, has become increasingly pertinent in the context of Europe’s evolving geopolitical landscape. The East-West divide, long shaped by historical, political, and economic factors, finds new dimensions in the migratory flows and socio-economic transformations occurring in Belarus. Examining the economic priorities and preferences of Belarusians offers a nuanced perspective on how geopolitical pressures influence individual and collective economic behaviors.

This study aims to assess how migration affects the income dynamics of Belarusians and the extent to which emigration contributes to the depletion of national economic potential. Understanding the socio-economic success of emigrants in host countries provides critical insights into how East-West divides manifest in lived economic experiences. Furthermore, this analysis can inform strategies for mitigating the adverse effects of emigration, such as brain drain and workforce shortages, while also addressing the challenges of reintegrating returnees.

In the broader geopolitical context, the economic behavior of Belarusians serves as a microcosm for understanding the push and pull factors driving migration between Europe’s East and West. By interrogating stereotypes and exploring the interplay of socio-economic motivations, this research highlights the importance of cross-border connections and their impact on regional stability and integration.

The findings have implications not only for Belarus but also for European policymakers, as they navigate the complexities of migration and regional cohesion. Addressing the economic realities of Belarusians at home and abroad could foster more inclusive approaches to bridging the East-West divide. Ultimately, this work underscores the necessity of rethinking regional strategies to accommodate shifting economic and geopolitical dynamics in contemporary Europe.

Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) has been criticised for being an ‘asymmetric’ legal regime. Investors can hold host states liable before domestic courts and through ISDS. By contrast, local communities and individuals of the host state affected by foreign investors and non-governmental organisations defending the public good (together referred to as third parties) can hold investors liable before domestic courts only. The Investment Court System in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) are reformed models of ISDS. However, they reflect the ‘asymmetric’ structure of traditional ISDS by precluding third parties from bringing claims against investors whose investments have affected their rights under European Union law. This chapter proposes institutionalising third-party claims in the future MIC either based on an investor’s breach of domestic law through legality clauses, or based on an investor’s failure to draw a social and environmental impact assessment of its investment in the territory of the host State through environmental, social and governance clauses.