Conference Agenda

Intentional, coordinated and automated spread of false or misleading information can have far-reaching consequences in various policy areas, be it public health or climate, and adversely affect electoral processes, thus endangering entire democratic systems (OECD 2024). Within the US and EU context disinformation is increasingly being securitized as asymmetric information warfare (Wagnsson et al. 2024; Arcos et al. 2024). One of EU’s priorities for countering hybrid threats is to respond effectively to a particular type of disinformation, namely foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), originating in particular from Russian and Chinese actors. At the same time, EU member states are stepping up efforts to establish both national systems of coordination, as well as a system of coordinated response to FIMI at the EU level.

Drawing on the experience of Russian interference in the 2017 French presidential elections, as well as Russian information manipulation regarding the involvement of the French armed forces in Mali in 2022, the French government has sought to establish itself as a champion of the European fight against FIMI. This paper thus seeks to shed light on the newly established institutional set-up aimed at countering FIMI in France, including a specialized government agency VIGINUM. More precisely, it will analyze to what extent and how the specific institutional solutions adopted in France aim at balancing security concerns on the one hand, and the safeguard of basic democratic values, on the other. Empirically, the paper relies on desk research, expert survey and in-depth interviews conducted in France in the framework of the Horizon Europe project SAUFEX.

As a result, the paper seeks to empirically contribute to the growing strand of research on how contemporary democracies respond to disinformation threat, balancing openness and the safeguard of liberal values on one hand, and security and on the other, in an international environment that is being defined as increasingly confrontational and hostile to liberal values.

Political stability and security are fundamental to Latvia’s democratic resilience, particularly amidst escalating geopolitical tensions in the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. Security threats increasingly span multiple domains, including the political environment, which is a critical pillar of a country’s internal and regional security. In this context, a stable political environment – characterized by sustainable political parties and party associations – becomes indispensable not only for maintaining democratic governance in Latvia but also for contributing to the broader security framework of Europe. The research methodology combines quantitative and qualitative methods for data acquisition, analysis, and interpretation. This research highlights the interplay between party sustainability and political security. As of early 2024, only one active political party in Latvia exceeded the threshold of 2,000 members, despite there being more than 50 political parties and party associations in the country. According to research, Latvia’s political system faces several key challenges: 1) The political environment is characterized by high levels of party fragmentation; 2) Party associations demonstrate greater sustainability compared to individual parties; 3) Political parties with populist agendas tend to have relatively short lifespans; 4) Many new political parties in Latvia emerge in response to specific political or social issues; 5) The role of personalities outweighs the importance of the ideology implemented by the party; 6) Political forces focused on short-term goals and leader-centric strategies struggle to maintain long-term sustainability; 7) Citizens are generally reluctant to join political parties. Promoting party sustainability in Latvia serves as a strategic measure to enhance stability not only domestically but across Europe’s eastern flank, fortifying Latvia against both internal fragmentation and external pressures.