Conference Agenda

The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union in 2016 led to a substantial realignment in its foreign and security policy strategy. As the UK transitioned from an EU member state to an independent global actor, it confronted intricate challenges in redefining its role in European security and its relationship with the EU. This transition coincided with significant global event, including the war in Ukraine, which underlined the paramount of importance of collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The aim of this paper will be to examine the UK’s efforts to rebuild trust and foster cooperation in the field of security with both the EU and its member states in the post-Brexit era. This paper argues that Brexit strained trust and disrupted security arrangements that had been institutionalised under EU frameworks, as well as bilateral relations with EU member states. Besides, the UK’s initial attempts to establish itself as a global power with an Indo-Pacific focus reflected a divergence from its traditional Euro-Atlantic priorities. However, the evolving geopolitical landscape and the advent of a new UK leadership have led to a strategic recalibration, placing significant emphasis on trust-building and the pursuit of pragmatic collaboration both with EU member states and the EU itself in the realm of European security.

The paper draws on examples from the relationship with the EU, as well as the bilateral relationship with France, in order to highlight mechanisms through which trust can be re-established, especially regarding security cooperation. Its empirical contribution relies on the two cases it studies, and it constitutes a theoretical contribution to International Relations and security studies by focusing on the role of trust in bilateral and multilateral relations.

Intentional, coordinated and automated spread of false or misleading information can have far-reaching consequences in various policy areas, be it public health or climate, and adversely affect electoral processes, thus endangering entire democratic systems (OECD 2024). Within the US and EU context disinformation is increasingly being securitized as asymmetric information warfare (Wagnsson et al. 2024; Arcos et al. 2024). One of EU’s priorities for countering hybrid threats is to respond effectively to a particular type of disinformation, namely foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), originating in particular from Russian and Chinese actors. At the same time, EU member states are stepping up efforts to establish both national systems of coordination, as well as a system of coordinated response to FIMI at the EU level.

Drawing on the experience of Russian interference in the 2017 French presidential elections, as well as Russian information manipulation regarding the involvement of the French armed forces in Mali in 2022, the French government has sought to establish itself as a champion of the European fight against FIMI. This paper thus seeks to shed light on the newly established institutional set-up aimed at countering FIMI in France, including a specialized government agency VIGINUM. More precisely, it will analyze to what extent and how the specific institutional solutions adopted in France aim at balancing security concerns on the one hand, and the safeguard of basic democratic values, on the other. Empirically, the paper relies on desk research, expert survey and in-depth interviews conducted in France in the framework of the Horizon Europe project SAUFEX.

As a result, the paper seeks to empirically contribute to the growing strand of research on how contemporary democracies respond to disinformation threat, balancing openness and the safeguard of liberal values on one hand, and security and on the other, in an international environment that is being defined as increasingly confrontational and hostile to liberal values.

Political stability and security are fundamental to Latvia’s democratic resilience, particularly amidst escalating geopolitical tensions in the Baltic region and Europe as a whole. Security threats increasingly span multiple domains, including the political environment, which is a critical pillar of a country’s internal and regional security. In this context, a stable political environment – characterized by sustainable political parties and party associations – becomes indispensable not only for maintaining democratic governance in Latvia but also for contributing to the broader security framework of Europe. The research methodology combines quantitative and qualitative methods for data acquisition, analysis, and interpretation. This research highlights the interplay between party sustainability and political security. As of early 2024, only one active political party in Latvia exceeded the threshold of 2,000 members, despite there being more than 50 political parties and party associations in the country. According to research, Latvia’s political system faces several key challenges: 1) The political environment is characterized by high levels of party fragmentation; 2) Party associations demonstrate greater sustainability compared to individual parties; 3) Political parties with populist agendas tend to have relatively short lifespans; 4) Many new political parties in Latvia emerge in response to specific political or social issues; 5) The role of personalities outweighs the importance of the ideology implemented by the party; 6) Political forces focused on short-term goals and leader-centric strategies struggle to maintain long-term sustainability; 7) Citizens are generally reluctant to join political parties. Promoting party sustainability in Latvia serves as a strategic measure to enhance stability not only domestically but across Europe’s eastern flank, fortifying Latvia against both internal fragmentation and external pressures.

This paper seeks to examine the activities of the EU CyberNet initiative related to cyber capacity building in partner countries. The European Union (EU) is recognized as one of the most advanced regions in the development of cyber policies and maintains a comprehensive cyber diplomacy strategy toward external actors. The EU CyberNet initiative represents a key component of the EU's cyber diplomacy efforts, encompassing projects focused on cyber capacity development, training, and the sharing of best practices with partner countries. By leveraging expertise from across the EU, the EU CyberNet establishes a network and practical learning platform aimed at strengthening global cybersecurity. Insights from contributing experts play a critical role in shaping the formulation and implementation of EU cybersecurity policies directed at partner countries.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the current landscape of EU CyberNet projects, with a focus on key initiatives in areas such as cybercrime prevention and cyber diplomacy. The analysis employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating a comparative examination of the cyber policy conditions of partner countries alongside an in-depth study of selected projects. The anticipated findings aim to illustrate the current cybersecurity capacities of the countries involved, highlighting the role of the EU in fostering the development of their cyber policies through network formation and capacity-building initiatives. The results present the EU as an international actor in global cyber policy, and outline the global cybersecurity ecosystem.