Conference Agenda

Since Commission president Von der Leyen took over in 2019, there has been a paradigm shift in EU development policy, expressed, among others, in the renaming of the Commissioner and the DG that are since responsible for International Partnerships. While the EU has long presented itself as a major development actor with a global scope and key proponent of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the emergence of geopolitics as an explicit guiding logic with more interest-driven cooperation agendas, such as the Global Gateway, has called this image into question. This contribution asks to what extent this shift in the understanding of development policy affects policy coordination with the member states. Coordination between the EU and member states in development policy has been a long-held ambition, especially on the part of the Commission, to enhance the EU’s common impact as an actor in the world. One aspect undermining coordination effort was that the Commission has long treated development policy in isolation, not acknowledging overarching EU-wide interests, which have been integrated after 2019 through the Team Europe initiative, especially the Global Gateway. Yet, to what extent this has improved coordination remains unclear and this form of horizontal policy integration at the EU level potentially creates further tensions with member states. Drawing on the instrument of the Global Gateway, this contribution analyses in what ways coordination structures and practices have evolved and on what basis coordination takes place. In a second step, it seeks to understand how obstacles to coordination between EU and member states persist.

The rapid digital transformation in developing countries offers significant opportunities but also poses challenges as countries struggle to develop the technical and political capacities needed to address ICT risks. Cybersecurity cooperation is increasingly framed as essential for development, enhancing resilience and maximizing the benefits of digital connectivity. However, its frequent association with national security, intelligence, and law enforcement often disqualifies it from Official Development Assistance criteria, highlighting its dual nature as both a security and development issue.

Despite the growing importance of cybersecurity in international development, the EU’s cooperation in this field remains understudied. This paper examines how the EU frames its cybersecurity capacity-building (CCB) initiatives in developing regions, with a focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. Through qualitative analysis of EU policy documents, official discourse, initiatives such as the EU-LAC Digital Alliance under the Global Gateway framework, and EU funded projects including EL PAcCTO 2.0 and the LAC Cyber Competence Centre, it assesses whether the EU prioritizes security concerns or development-oriented objectives in its approach to CCB.

Preliminary findings suggest that while CCB initiatives can enhance global cyber resilience and foster sustainable development, the securitization of cybersecurity cooperation risks positioning these efforts as tools of EU foreign policy rather than genuine development aid. This dual framing challenges the EU’s credibility as a global development actor and influences cybersecurity governance in recipient regions. By examining the intersection of development and security, this study contributes to debates the future of international development cooperation and to scholarship on EU Cybersecurity Policy.

Recently, numerous non-profit organisations, journalists, and academics have underscored how Official Development Assistance (ODA) has been instrumentalised to fulfil foreign policy objectives of the European Union (EU). This shift is attributed to the increasing perception of development cooperation as a valuable tool for enhancing European strategic autonomy and economic security (Gavas and Moore, 2024). Although this approach might appear novel, the separation of development cooperation from donor interests has been a longstanding issue.

For decades, the bulk of the literature suggests that donors' economic, trade, geopolitical, and cultural interests predominantly dictate the allocation of development funds, outweighing considerations of the recipient needs (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). This paper explores the changing nature of the EU as a development actor through the various visions that it has held on to international cooperation, and the subsequent ODA allocation.

During the Cold War, development cooperation was considered an instrument of state diplomacy used to reward allies (Pauselli, 2021). Therefore, more funds were provided to former colonies and to anti-communist regimes (Grilli and Riess, 1992). The end of the Cold War brought human rights and democracy into focus (Humphrey, 2010). Consequently, the EU emphasized institutional capacity and promote policies conducive to development, especially with its neighbours (Reynard, 2011). In the 21st Century, with the MDGs adoption and the War on Terror, the development of third-party countries was seen as a necessary precondition for security, outside and within donor borders. Hence, EU ODA saw significant increases (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011) and donors began to focus on fostering development in countries where the potential negative impacts of underdevelopment were considered high (Bermeo, 2011). In the last decade, immersed in a poly-crisis decade, EU international cooperation has increasingly intertwined with other aspects of foreign policy, especially security (Olivié and Pérez, 2021) and migration control (Lauwers et al., 2021). Based on the evolving situation in the international arena and the position that the EU holds within it, it can be observed how EU development policy has evolved.

Finally, the paper studies the allocation of EU ODA resources over time (from 1980 to 2022) to understand whether, beyond these changing views on development, there are differences in resource allocation. Our preliminary results suggest that even though recently, EU ODA is more focused on border countries and with fewer humanitarian concerns, the self-driven approach is not something new; it has been observed since the inception of EU development cooperation policy.

The European Union (EU) has long portrayed itself as a global leader in development, emphasizing its commitment to poverty eradication and human rights. However, recent shifts toward geopolitically motivated agendas have prompted debates over the consistency between the EU’s actions and its professed values. This chapter examines the EU’s international cooperation towards global access to medicines to explore whether its development practices align with the principles of international human rights law (IHRL), particularly the duty of international cooperation enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Uniquely, this paper complements the existing literature on global access to medicines through the EU’s trade and aid agendas by taking a fresh perspective on EU development cooperation. This analysis focuses on three EU internal market actions rooted in and with substantial impacts on the Union’s development cooperation: the joint procurement of COVID-19 vaccines, the Trade Diversion Regulation, and the European and Developing Countries Clinical Trials Partnership. This paper assesses how the Union’s law towards pharmaceuticals in these cases engages with the ICESCR obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill socioeconomic rights.

The first case on joint vaccine procurement highlights the EU’s potential to respect the right to health through coordinated actions with Member States and third countries. However, the unintended impact of the EU’s large-scale vaccine purchases on the global vaccine supply raises questions about its commitment to ensuring equitable access, particularly for low- and middle-income countries. The second case evaluates the Trade Diversion Regulation, which aims to prevent the re-importation of low-cost medicines intended for developing countries. This initiative reflects the EU’s role in protecting human rights by shaping extraterritorial corporate practices and promoting access to affordable pharmaceuticals for vulnerable populations worldwide. Finally, the Clinical Trials Partnership demonstrates the EU’s efforts to fulfill socioeconomic rights through international research collaboration for the development of public health innovations.

The findings reveal that while the EU’s actions often align with IHRL principles, there are notable gaps in explicitly embedding human rights commitments into its laws, particularly in balancing the EU’s internal priorities with global equity. These inconsistencies challenge the EU’s image as a normative power and complicate its ability to project coherence (e.g. with EU treaty objectives) and credibility in its development role. This paper argues that understanding how the EU navigates these tensions provides valuable insights into its evolving role in global health and its broader external relations.