While the European Commission negotiates international trade agreements on behalf of the EU, the European Parliament (EP) can veto their ratification. The EP and the Commission have developed institutionalized practices of mutual engagement which allow the EP to influence international trade negotiations. Yet, the mechanisms via which the EP’s activities lead to actual influence remain unclear. The paper argues that the EP’s influence in international trade negotiations cannot be reduced to merely a veto anticipation dynamic. It demonstrates that the EP’s influence is more diverse in nature and that the EP not only influences policy content, but also inter-institutional relations and the following phases of the policy cycle. The paper presents process-tracing analyses of two cases: the EP’s influence on the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam (2019) and on the trade component of the Advanced Framework Agreement with Chile (2023). The empirical analysis is based on approximately 15 semi-structured interviews with EP and Commission actors, and an analysis of primary and press documents. We find that the context of dense inter-institutional practices allows the EP to influence the content of trade agreements, but also legal add-ons. In this process, the EP often acts as an institutional partner for the Commission. In turn, this reinforces the inter-institutional ecosystem allowing EP influence in the first place. It also sets the foundations for EP influence in the implementation phase. Taken together, this paper contributes to a better understanding of inter-institutional relations and of the impact of the EP on the EU’s external policies.

Since the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the European Parliament (EP) has substantially expanded its role in European Union trade policy. Previously limited to a consultative function, it now must give consent to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) negotiated by the European Commission on behalf of Member States. At the same time, as trade negotiations have become more politicized and contentious at the EU level, the EP has emerged as a crucial channel for public demands. Given the institution's significant impact on EU trade policy and its democratic legitimacy, examining how Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) compete for citizens’ support holds considerable relevance. Nonetheless, while there is extensive literature tackling the EP in connection to this policy area, little is known about how European legislators engage with the EU public on trade issues. This paper sets out to fill this gap by inquiring the conditions under which MEPs address citizens’ interests and concerns during PTAs negotiations. In particular, I draw from the concept of rhetorical responsiveness - how politicians address public demands by discussing them - and explore the impact of party families and issue politicization in shaping MEPs' behavior. My expectations are tested through a large-scale textual analysis of all EP plenary debates taking place between 2009 and 2024 on twelve major PTAs. This article contributes to both research on competition within the EP in the context of trade negotiations and, more broadly, to studies on responsiveness in EU trade policymaking.

While Spanish regions have varying levels of autonomy within domestic politics, they are limited in their ability to engage in trade policy. Despite that trade policy issues across Europe have become increasingly contested at the subnational level, generating subnational mobilization, Spain has not seen the same level of mobilization. What institutional constraints prevent Autonomous Communities from engaging in trade politics? How do Spanish regions promote their trade agendas and shape trade policy? Despite substantial research on the Spanish territorial model, little attention has been given to why subnational entities have limited influence in trade policy. Our paper focuses on the subnational engagement of Spanish regions in EU trade policy and how autonomous regions mobilize beyond the nation-state to advocate their interests at the European level. We argue that existing governance arrangements in Spain do not provide for sustained involvement of the Autonomous Communities in trade policy-making, as the domestic channels of communication are weak and not institutionalized. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with national and subnational trade officials, our comparative research shows that at the domestic level the Autonomous Communities resort to functional channels of horizontal and vertical communication rather than political ones. Bringing together the literature on the politics of trade with that of intergovernmental relations, the paper unpacks and explains regional variation in the strategies of Spanish regions to convey their trade preferences and agendas in Brussels.

Election outcomes spanning from the mid-2010s to the early 2020s within the European Union and

the US, shared a common thread: a rising support for populist parties. In recent years, two major

and conflicting narratives have come to light in explaining the growing appeal of populist parties:

while (Inglehart and Norris, 2016) found mainly cultural reasons for the rise of populist parties,

others including (Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Guiso et al., 2019) argued for a larger role of

economic factors.

This paper investigates the trade shock of China joining the WTO in 2001 and its impact on the

Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. The trade shock in the USA and in Western Europe,

led to the manufacturing sector experiencing import competition from cheaper Chinese goods,

which resulted in loss of business, closures and layoff of workers. This increased resentment

amongst voters, and increased support for populist politicians. However, the CEE region was a

beneficiary of globalisation as many of the enterprises from Western Europe relocated to this

region because of lower wages, therefore the article test whether an increase in Chinese imports led to an increase of populist support amongst voters or was increased foreign direct investment able to counterbalance it?

This article uses a Bartik type instrument (Autor et al., 2013) and NUTS-2 regional data, to test how

voters in CEE countries responded to trade shocks. We use a 2SLS regression and instrument the CEE trade shock with an IV, and prove a significant and causal relationship between the increase of imports from China and the rise of the populist vote in the CEE region and show that despite record foreign direct investment into the region, exposure to trade with China increased the populist vote.