While there is a significant literature on regional representation of EU member states, their channels of influence and patterns of mobilization (Callanen and Tatham, 2013; Tatham, 2010; Minto et al., 2023; Donas and Beyers, 2013), few studies have focused on non-European territorial mobilization in Europe. While the importance of Brussels as a focal point for regional mobilization is often viewed through the lens of intra-European politics, this paper analyses third country subnational mobilization in Europe by examining the engagement strategies of eighteen American states in terms of trade diplomacy. Despite that some US states have had an active presence in Europe to advocate for their territorial interests in search of trade and investment opportunities (Antunes, Guimarães and Egan 2023), their activities remain understudied. Though US paradiplomacy takes place within a multilevel context similar to Europe, there is limited research on their “actorness” in Europe. How do US states frame their efforts to promote their economic interests within Europe? What channels do they use to promote those interests in Europe? Does the increasing influence of EU trade policy decisions on third countries (the so-called Brussels effect) motivate US states to have a regional representation in Europe? This paper provides an analysis of the “external” dimension of regional mobilization in Europe drawing on data collected from multiple US states through a mix of surveys and semi-structured interviews. It offers a comparative account of the American subnational representations in Europe highlighting the ways that states effectively or not exercise their commercial paradiplomacy.

Amid the European Union’s (EU) evolving geopolitical turn, its normative trade agency is shifting through the integration of unilateral policies that partly respond to internal societal demands—particularly those related to the Green Deal. At the same time, accusations of “green colonialism” by political elites have grown more frequent, raising pressing questions about how trade partners perceive these initiatives. This study contributes to decentring EU-focused analyses by drawing on the expertise of both European and Asian scholars to dismantle the influence of colonial legacies and by applying the concept of norm localization, which highlights how local actors reinterpret and adapt external norms within their own contexts. Using a hermeneutic framing theory approach, we compare Vietnam and Indonesia to examine how historical narratives and contemporary diplomatic practices shape perceptions of the EU’s normative ambitions in trade policy. Drawing on a large corpus of local media coverage and semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in both countries, our findings indicate that while colonial legacies exert a stronger negative impact in Indonesia than in Vietnam, it is the EU’s present-day diplomatic conduct—often perceived as overconfident, protectionist, and paternalistic—that drives much of the negative sentiment. In an era of heightened geopolitical rivalry, these perceptions may be leveraged by competing powers, further weakening the EU’s standing. Nevertheless, Vietnam exhibits comparatively more favourable attitudes, viewing the EU’s normative goals as potential catalysts for domestic reform. We argue that acknowledging partner countries’ agency, moving beyond paternalistic tendencies, and recognizing the critical role of norm localization are essential if the EU seeks to effectively advance sustainability and development objectives through its reconfigured Trade and Sustainable Development governance.

The modes of economic governance vary from country to country, but legal traditions play an important role. Approaches to economic governance differ significantly between the EU, which has a civil law system, and the US, which has a common law system. In many economic issue areas, the EU prefers top-down across-the-board type of governance that incorporates fundamental values of the civil law system. The US, on the other hand, prefers bottom-up, flexible, case-by-case type of economic governance, which is in line with the core values of the common law system. The two sides have very different approaches to various economic related issue areas, such as intellectual property, services, and investment. They often cannot agree upon the fundamental goal of economic governance, such as what to govern (regulate) and how to govern (regulate), which had led to the deadlock of international negotiations such as the WTO Doha Round. The conflict between the EU and the US over economic governance has global implications. Many countries in Latin American (such as Brazil), countries around the EU (such as Turkey) and possibly China would prefer the civil law type of economic governance. The UK, some countries in the Asia Pacific (such as Australia and Singapore) and possibly India would join the latter group because of their common law traditions. There is a risk that the global economic governance will become divided in terms of legal traditions rather than democratic values.

There has been a proliferation of studies of the EU’s ‘geoeconomic turn’. These more or less take for granted that the EU’s trade policy orientation has fundamentally shifted under the von der Leyen Commission Presidency, from an emphasis on multilateralism and open markets to greater unilateralism and selective protectionism. This paper argues not that there has not been such a shift, but rather that we should understand it as fundamentally performative – in two senses. First, theorising the phenomenon within the academy has done a lot to bring the referent object into effect: theory is constitutive of the perceived reality. Second, and while not claiming that geopolitical concerns are irrelevant in EU foreign economic policymaking, the paper homes in on the EU’s new unilateral trade policy instruments to argue that being seen to act in a ‘geoeconomic way’ for an external (trade policy rivals) and internal audience (Member States/the European Parliament) is secondary to the actual practice of geoeconomics. The instruments themselves are broadly dissuasive and defensive, with some reluctance within the European Commission to put them into effect. What is new about the ‘geoeconomic turn’ is not so much the focus on geopolitical concerns, which was there before, but the desire to brand these measures explicitly as such. The paper concludes with a call for EU Studies to more critically interrogate the (self-)narration of European integration.

Whilst significant for New Zealand, and its exporters, the free trade agreement between the EU and New Zealand impact assessment suggested no economic impact on the EU. Nonetheless, the EU pursued the agreement and hails it as a significant success. Its significance lies not in potential economic gains, but in innovations in the text of the agreement and its potential implications. This is the first EU agreement to contain a legally binding trade and sustainable development chapter, and to elevate the Paris Agreement to the status of an ‘essential element’ of the agreement, a breach of which could lead to fast-tracked suspensions of the trade agreement. This encapsulates EU ambitions to be a global leader on climate change and the green transition, something that gains greater significance in light of President Trump’s second term in office and his withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement. The trade agreement with New Zealand also serves to extend EU ties with Pacific states, and to weave closer economic relations with CPTPP states, most of which already have free trade agreements with the EU. CPTPP has emerged and presents itself as a bastion of a rules-based order, in reaction to China’s rise, Russia’s aggression, and US retreat from international norms and rules-based organisations. This ambition links the EU to CPTPP states, despite disagreements on specific trade and economic rules and regulations. An agreement with New Zealand an important symbolic statement in support of a liberal rules-based economic order; demonstrates an intention to forge economic alliances with ‘like-minded’ partners wherever they might be. New Zealand’s push for legally binding trade and sustainability chapters has also afforded the EU the opportunity to present itself as a green leader. This paper relies on qualitative textual analysis of speeches and preparatory documents justifying the agreement, as well as interviews with key officials involved in the agreement to unpack the symbolic rationale underpinning the agreement and to interrogate its potential effect beyond symbolic performance.