Conference Agenda

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) emerged as Germany’s second-strongest party in both the 2024 European Parliament elections and recent opinion polls for the 2025 federal elections. This, coupled with the entry of Germany’s newly founded left-wing, populist-conservative party, the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), into the European Parliament in 2024 with 6.2 per cent of the votes, revoked Germany’s standing as the bastion of the Europhile mainstream. Given Germany’s role as the ‘indispensable power’ of the European Union (EU) (Bulmer and Paterson 2016), the rise and mainstreaming of populism on both the far right and the far left of the political spectrum hold significant potential to influence Germany’s European policy and, in turn, the overall decision-making within the EU. Synthesising key insights from the Critical Studies on Men and Masculinities and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), this paper offers a comparative analysis of the positionings of the AfD and BSW on E(U)rope, focusing on the discursive construction of political masculinities as well as the delineation of the boundaries of inclusion of exclusion in relation to European integration. Since politics is contested, we empirically rely on narratives that drive political action, define context, shape public opinion, and frame political issues. Engaging in the three central constituents of narratives – setting, characterisations, and emplotment – we unpack the masculinised arrangements employed by the leaders, prominent members and official documents of the AfD and BSW in relation to E(U)rope from September 2023 (establishment of BSW as an association) to June 2024 (EP elections). By doing so, the paper re-reads how Europe and Germany ‘are said to be’ through gendered lenses and enables researchers to revisit the different ways in which political actors map onto populist ideals in the (re)construction of the nation and beyond. Accordingly, it also contributes to scholarly debates on the rise of radical populism in Europe and its influence on European politics.

The Netherlands enjoys a reputation for tolerance and norm entrepreneurship in the realm of gender and sexuality. Even far-right parties have traditionally not countered norms of equality and non-discrimination, embracing a homonationalist discourse instead (Mepschen & Duyvendak 2012; Spierings 2021). Sexual tolerance even became constitutive of national identity. This situation led two leading scholars to speak of the depoliticization of homosexuality in the Netherlands (Hekma & Duyvendak 2011). Yet, this assessment no longer applies. The greater visibility of transgender people triggered a backlash against LGBTI+ rights that expressed itself in a surge of hate crimes and hate speech; the growing prominence of anti-gender organizations; and the appearance of Forum for Democracy as a far-right party that explicitly targets ‘gender ideology’ and ‘LGBTI propaganda’. This chapter describes the emergence of anti-gender politics in the Netherlands and the response of progressive actors. It argues that activists as well as political parties have adopted repoliticization as a resistance strategy. Two case studies illustrate this strategy: (1) the growing emphasis on activism at the Amsterdam Pride, which for years had been a predominantly celebratory and apolitical event, and; (2) the addition of sexual orientation to the anti-discrimination clause of the Dutch Constitution in 2023, which most political parties had thought redundant only a decade before. The chapter, in short, describes a shift from depoliticization to repoliticization concerning LGBTI+ rights. Empirically, the chapter draws on news articles, parliamentary debates, press releases, and official documents of anti-gender and LGBTI+ rights organizations.

Populism pervades our political and journalistic landscapes. Increasingly, populists on the right and left use ‘celebrity techniques’ - personalisation, privatisation, social media uniquity and engagement with popular culture – to construct and maintain close relationships with their fanlike followers. The concepts of ‘celebrity politics’ and ‘celebrity populism’ inform such analysis. However, gender as an analytical category is muted within the debate, particularly on celebrity populism. This paper seeks to address that. Drawing on Vuković and Carpentier’s social-construction-of-leadership framework, I use qualitative analysis of social media comments on Giorgia Meloni and Alice Weidel’s social media posts. Employing social constructionism, I explore commenters’ constructions of (populist) leadership, and the gendered dimensions of this. Through comparison with social constructions of leadership among contemporaneous male ‘celebrified’ populists, I identify broad similarities in the leadership traits identified in both cases, suggesting some congruity between male and female populists. Where they differ slightly, I argue, is in the degree of personalisation or ‘celebrification’, which is more open to male than to female populists.

Over the past 15 years, the resurgence of populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in European politics has garnered significant attention from scholars, particularly regarding their impact on party systems and competition structures. Existing literature highlights the structuring of party competition around pivotal issues such as immigration and European integration (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012; Hobolt, 2016; Downes and Loveless, 2018; Akkerman, 2018; Joppke, 2020). Scholars suggest that PRRPs have the potential to influence the positions of moderate parties (Albertazzi and Vampa, 2021; Mudde, 2014; de Lange, 2012).

This project aims to investigate the extent to which the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and the Reform Party have influenced the positions of the British Conservative Party and the Labour Party on gender related issues including gender equality, women rights, and LGBTQ+ rights. Employing a mixed-method approach, this study analyzes the political parties’ official social media accounts, specifically Facebook and X (Twitter), by focusing on posts published within six months leading up to the general elections. Additionally, it involves 40 semi-structured elite interviews with figures from the Conservative Party and the Labour Party, including MPs and advisors.