Conference Agenda

Far-right and right-wing populist parties, movements and ideologies are viewed as contributing to the erosion of European democracy (Svolik, Avramovska, Lutz & Milaèiæ), a trend highlighted by the ‘far-right surge’ in the 2024 European Parliamentary election (Mudde 2024). Existing scholarship has focused on explaining this surge, whether through the aftereffects of 2008 or because of the mainstreaming of far-right ideas (Kotroyannos & Mavrozacharakis 2018, Mondon & Winter 2020). Rather than offering another explanatory analysis, in this paper we seek to adopt a normative approach to analyse the specific ways in which far-right parties and movements threaten the six core values associated with EU democracy: respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, and respect for human rights, including those of minorities. In doing so, we seek addressing two questions: to what extent, and in what ways, do contemporary far-right European ideologies threaten the norms underpinning European democracy? And, how can we conceptualise and understand the issue of democratic resilience in the face of this plausibly existential threat?

In this paper, we map the key norms and values of current right-wing ideologies in EU countries, as represented by both far-right parties and movements, as well as the populist right (we aim to try and not conflate the two phenomena), to analyse their normative threat to the value system of European democracy. More specifically we will focus on the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alternative for Germany (AFD), the Swedish Democrats and the Slovak National Party.

Our analysis will demonstrate that contemporary European far-right and right-wing populist ideologies present a threat to EU democracy by 1) the erosion of democratic norms, for example by attacking established democratic institutions including the judiciary, media, and government institutions; 2) the polarization of European communities, by fostering an 'us vs. them' mentality, far right movements which deepen social divides, weaken social cohesion and which makes European integration more challenging; 3) challenging minority rights, including those of migrants, ethnic minorities, and the LGBT+ community and; 4) challenging the rule of law through attempts to manipulate legal systems to favor the ruling party or leader,.

We seek to understand democratic resilience in the context of this normative threat to EU democracy in which we argue attention needs to be paid to the ability of democratic institutions’ capacity to absorb and adapt to both the functional and normative challenges posed by the far-right’s surge in Europe.

The past two decades have marked a turning point in European politics. A series of crises has tested the resilience and unity of the European Union, increasing both the relevance and polarization of European issues within national political arenas (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). This paper examines the relationship between political parties and their voters in the context of the transnational cleavage (Hooghe & Marks, 2018), with a specific focus on the multiple nuances the European Union issue can entail. This study aims to contribute to the comparative literature on the European Union by assessing the evolution of the politicization of the transnational cleavage in all its forms. Specifically, it investigates how different manifestations of both Eurosceptic and Europhile stances influence voting patterns in the 2024 European Elections. In particular, this paper explores whether the salience on EU issues and voter-party congruence on them affects voting behaviour on the three dimensions of the transnational cleavage: institutional, economic, and cultural. Employing an original dataset combining both the demand side (public opinion surveys collected by the SOLID project consortium before and after the 2024 European Elections) and supply side (text data from parties’ literature) of party politics, this research provides valuable empirical insights into the dynamic interaction between party strategies and voter behaviour. Ultimately, it highlights the role of multidimensional aspect of the transnational cleavage in shaping electoral outcomes and its implications for debates on European integration by identifying which EU issues resonate most with voters and their party choices.

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the Our Homeland Movement, a hard Eurosceptic party established by former members of Jobbik, was able to gain a seat with more than 6 percent of the votes in Hungary. At the same day, in the local elections, the party entered all the county assemblies and the vast majority of local councils of big cities and towns. Following the elections, the party became one of the founding members of the Europe of Sovereign Nations in the European Parliament. The paper has two main research questions. First, can the Our Homeland Movement be considered as a successor of Jobbik regarding its European policy? What are the similarities and differences? Not only the current programme of the Our Homeland Movement will be analysed, but also the ones of Jobbik (and the shifts within them). Examining statements of the relevant politicians of the parties helps to make the picture a bit more detailed. Moreover, by conducting interviews with relevant actors of the party, we also discover whether the shift of Jobbik was one of the key reasons of their departure from the party. The second research question focuses on the international alliance / network of the party. We compare it to the former international network of Jobbik. Even though Jobbik drew attention to build an international network of similar parties (nevertheless, not very relevant ones), they always failed to establish or even join a group in the European Parliament. On the other hand, the Our Homeland Movement seems to have more relevant allies in the European political landscape. By mapping this alliance, we would also like to see whether Hard Euroscepticism was one of the key features behind establishing this new EP group.

This paper examines the impact of National Recovery and Resilience Plans (NRRPs) on the discourse surrounding the European Union (EU) within political party debates in parliament. Focusing on Italy as a case study, it explores how the EU’s carrot-and-stick approach—linking reforms with financial transfers to national governments—has influenced the rhetoric of traditionally eurosceptic parties. The analysis investigates whether this framework has mitigated extreme criticisms of the EU, particularly among traditionally Eurosceptic parties, by providing material benefits that alter cost-benefit calculations and reshape political incentives. Using parliamentary debates from the past two Italian legislatures as empirical evidence, the study employs qualitative and quantitative discourse analysis to identify shifts in tone, content, and focus in party positions toward the EU. The findings contribute to understanding how EU governance mechanisms interact with domestic political dynamics, shedding light on the conditions under which EU policies can temper national-level euroscepticism and foster more constructive engagement in parliamentary discourse.

After the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) party emerged as the fourth largest group, led by MEPs from Brothers of Italy (FdI). On the face of it, the ECR's historic origins as a more recognisably centre-right movement founded by the British Conservative Party back in 2009 now seemed a distant memory. Yet in this paper, it is argued that the tenth session of the EP is also likely to see much continuity within the faction, with the ECR trying to act as the main voice for Conservatism in Europe. With large numbers of MEPs from Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party also still leading the grouping, there will also be much similarity with ECR policies that are opposed to political ‘ever closer union’ but not the European project altogether, enthusiastically in favour of trade and the single market, and fully committed to the wider role of the United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in international relations.