Conference Agenda

Controlling access to sensitive and dual-use technologies through sanctions and sanctions-like measures has long been a minor part of international security policy-making. Such economic sanctions have now returned to the fore amidst increasing tensions in international affairs and novel discourses on international trade, affecting areas outside its traditional applications such as on nuclear security. Through the lens of discussions on European strategic autonomy, this paper considers the problematic position the European Union and most of its member states currently find themselves in, as they are both proponents of technology sanctions in certain domains, while also being at the receiving end of sanctions threats amidst increasing tensions between the United States and China. The paper argues that while economic sanctions are part-and-parcel of the EU’s existing foreign and security policy system, its sanctions toolkit and decision-making is ill-adapted to the current overlap between genuine security considerations and more assertive economic policy-making. While the paper considers the issue of economic security and sanctions more widely, it will explore the EU’s dilemmas using specific cases such as that of ASML and restrictions on technologies related to artificial intelligence and mobility.

Overview

Countries worldwide are revising their export control regimes, adding and removing specific technologies with both civilian and military applications that are subject to restrictions on their international transfer. Increasingly, these developments use the language of ‘national security’ to justify their expansion. In the EU, Regulation 2021/821 establishes the minimum obligations in terms of the export, transit, and transfer of dual-use technologies. Yet since the introduction of this Regulation, the majority of Member States have expanded their export control regulation to go significantly beyond the EU minimum. Developments in this area are particularly relevant given global military tensions, conditioning not only the relationship between EU Member States, but also how the EU connects with other states.

This project analyses comparatively how these systems of regulation are developing – both from an EU Member State perspective and a more global approach. As such, it explores EU, US, UK, and Japanese developments in export control legislation. The research is motivated by a simple question: given the political sensitivity of national security and dual-use technologies, as well as the conceptual expansion of what ‘national security’ actually means, are there any technologies which could not be potentially incorporated within this legislation?

Preliminary Conclusions

There are two main conclusions to this work related to both the conceptual scope of national security and dual-use technologies. First, legal initiatives and international governmental discourse point to a rapid expansion of what exactly can be brought within the language of national security. The lack of clear legislative boundaries is partially due to the nature of modern technology. While technologies in the context of munitions or conventional weaponry are subject to an established network of international law instruments because of their overt military use, recent technological developments demonstrate a distinctly broad scope of practical application. AI, drones, and energy grid technologies are all examples of areas that have acquired a profound national security language.

This expansion in national security necessarily impacts the conceptual boundaries of ‘dual-use’ technologies. Yet a prominent development, particularly in the EU, has been the expansion of non-listed dual-use technologies. Article 4(1) of Regulation 2021/821 establishes the export authorisation requirement for technologies listed in Annex 1, yet Member States have extended this provision to technologies which are not listed. As a result, there is a significant instability in both the conceptual understanding of dual-use technologies as well as the practical impact of regulation in this area.

The article offers a comprehensive analysis of Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 (The European Chips Act), positioning it as a landmark example of the European Union's evolving framework for Open Strategic Autonomy and Economic Security. It critically examines the integration of Economic Security within the EU's internal market architecture, with a particular focus on the semiconductor sector’s strategic relevance to the EU’s industrial and economic competitiveness. This relevance underpinned the adoption of the Regulation, which seeks to bolster internal chip production to safeguard supply chain security, enhance system-wide resilience, and address the EU's geoeconomic challenges in an increasingly competitive global landscape.

The article is structured into three main sections. The opening section unpacks the structure of the Chips Act, offering a detailed legal analysis of its harmonized framework. This analysis is contextualized within the broader geoeconomic and security landscape that drove the European Commission’s Regulation proposal. The discussion extends to the legislative process, highlighting the co-legislators priorities and the safeguards embedded in the final text. The article underscores the Regulation’s governance model as a reflection of the EU’s post-COVID-19 security and digital infrastructure sovereignty imperatives, emphasizing its role in mitigating strategic dependencies and strengthening internal market cohesion.

Subsequently, the article delves into the concept of Economic Security, situating it within a competitive geoeconomic landscape characterized by shifting global power dynamics and the weaponization of interdependence. The analysis positions the semiconductor sector as a linchpin in the EU’s strategy to navigate globalization's economic and security dilemmas, addressing vulnerabilities while fostering technological self-sufficiency.

Building on this foundation, the article engages with theoretical perspectives on sovereignty, competitiveness, and geoeconomic intervention, drawing on the work of scholars and policymakers such as Anu Bradford, Mario Draghi, and Sara Poli. These insights inform the policy evaluation of the Regulation, assessing its implications for the EU’s Economic Security Strategy and its broader impact on industrial competitiveness and economic development. The article highlights the role of the Chips Act in driving a more integrated and resilient industrial policy, positioning the EU to compete effectively in a global landscape.

The article concludes by emphasizing the need to revise the Chips Act in light of recent technological developments, particularly in AI and quantum chips, which represent new frontiers of economic and strategic competition. It argues that these advancements necessitate enhanced provisions to address emerging challenges and opportunities, ensuring the Chips Act remains a robust pillar of the EU’s Economic Security Package.

Arms procurement has significant economic, political, societal, and security implications for any nation, bringing about trade-offs that need to be made across these areas. The dilemmas that this can cause are well represented in the recent decade of discussions held on whether Germany would purchase armed drones for the first time and over what would replace the Tornado combat aircraft. From a structural realist perspective, one might have expected Germany to procure the latest military technology, i.e., armed drones and the F-35 fighter jet as the Tornado successor, out of strategic and alliance considerations in light of threats posed in the international system after 2014. Instead, both procurements were extensively debated over multiple coalition governments. The use of armed drones and the F-35 were initially ruled against or postponed, but then brought back under consideration at the end of 2021/early 2022, and formally approved later in 2022. It is furthermore puzzling that the reconsideration or agreement of both happened after a more left-leaning coalition government came into power in 2021, even prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

This paper will present the preliminary empirical results of a PhD project. It asks, how can change in contemporary German defence procurement decision-making in the air domain towards combat drones and the F-35 fighter jet be explained? To tackle this overall question, it addresses: 1) how did Germany go about making these decisions, in terms of process, as well as, 2) which explanatory factors enabled the change in contemporary George defence procurement decision-making?

The paper argues that policy-wise the link between U.S. arms sales and its broader foreign and security policy, including with regard to EU member states (and NATO allies), has become more profound. However, to what extent has Washington effectively pursued this approach? That is, has U.S. transatlantic security cooperation with Europe evolved to represent a systematic geoeconomic logic, whereby U.S. economic considerations tied to arms sales suggest the emergence of a patron-client dynamic? To explore this, the paper examines trends in EU member states’ defence spending, focusing on trend-indicator value (TIV) data post-2000 to assess whether there has been a discernible shift toward increased U.S. defence-related acquisitions. If such a pattern exists, it may indicate a weakening of the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to resist external economic and security pressures, with significant implications for its global positioning. Preliminary findings suggest evidence of such a shift. When combined with a qualitative analysis of political rhetoric, policy developments, and strategic documents, this trend points to the United States’ growing commitment to leveraging arms transfers as a deliberate foreign policy tool. Notably, this dynamic raises questions about the interplay between arms sales and alliance commitments, as reliance on U.S. weapons systems could, in some cases, create strategic dependencies that complicate extended deterrence rather than reinforcing it.