This article examines how European radical right populist parties (ERRPPs) influence EU-China relations, using the vote on the 2022 Hong Kong resolution in the European Parliament (EP) as a starting point. Over the past decade, both these parties and China have grown in power. China's growing clout in the international arena and the EPP's potential to become the largest group in the EP if it were to unite are evidence of this. Although both share illiberal characteristics, the link between China and the ERRPPs has not been widely explored. This is the purpose of this paper.

The study uses Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as a theory and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a method to analyse the conditions under which ERRPPs support or oppose China-related policies in the EP, specifically related to Hong Kong. The findings will be relevant to both academics and policymakers and will help to better understand the possible relationship between liberal actors within and outside the EU.

With the US-China-EU triangle as a critical framework, this article analyses the US as an important factor in today’s EU-China relations. From a strategic perspective, we attempt to find out how the US interplays with the China-EU on their grand strategy, strategy vis-à-vis each other and the (regional and global) issues of common concern, and vice versa. Moreover, regarding Trump’s controversial actions during his first mandate, like the “America first” ideology and the hostility to multilateralism (namely the withdrawal from the “Paris Agreement), how would and should China and the EU deal with the American influence on their relationship with Trump coming back to the White House?

Recent US actions and the reactions received, including on trade sanctions, decoupling efforts, and a retreat from multilateral agreements during the Trump administration, have complicated EU-China engagement on critical issues like climate governance, technological exchange, and global trade. Under the US-China antagonism, the EU seems aligning with US actions in areas such as regulating Chinese technology and addressing security concerns, while approaching China on climate governance with the US' inconstant position on the multilateralism. This creats a delicate balance of alignment and divergence. This article will focus on their interaction on New Energy Vehicle (NEV) and climate change, the critical areas of technological competition and multilateral innovation, to provide a concret lens to explore the weakening and strengthening the EU-China relations with the influence of the US. Drawing on the analysis, future prospects on their interactions and impact on global order will be made.

Alongside the widely discussed reset in UK-EU relations, Keir Starmer’s Labour government has proposed another “reset” - one seeking to reshape UK-China relations. This contribution analyses the evolving construction of China as the UK’s “Other” through the prism of this lesser-noticed but highly significant strategic shift. Since coming into office in 2024, Starmer has articulated a vision of “progressive realism” that stands in stark contrast to his predecessor Rishi Sunak’s overtly antagonistic stance toward China. What makes this reset so interesting is that it diverges from prevailing approaches of key Western allies in Europe. Starmer’s attempt to position the UK as a pragmatic yet values-driven actor resonates with earlier Western efforts to balance economic opportunity with commitments to human rights and international law, which, however, have often yielded mixed outcomes. This contribution investigates the dynamics of this shift in the UK, highlighting both continuity and rupture in Britain’s evolving discursive framing of China. Theoretically, this study builds on the work of Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, and Wodak, whose insights into discursive shifts provide a useful framework for analysing the fluidity of political discourse and its contextual underpinnings. Methodologically, the research applies critical discourse analysis and draws on speeches, election manifestos, campaign materials, official documents, and other public pronouncements to track shifts in the UK’s governmental discourse over time – more specifically the shift from the Sunak to the Starmer government. This contribution helps to understand how value-based diplomacy and strategic pragmatism intersect by situating the Starmer government’s China reset within the broader context of democratic states’ engagements with a resurgent authoritarian power. As such, it is a timely case study of the contested nature of foreign policy discourse in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition.

The European Commission's imposition of countervailing duties on imports of Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs) has been justified primarily on the grounds of addressing illegal subsidies provided by the Chinese state to these companies. Nevertheless, subsequent remarks from European officials and analysts have introduced additional rationales, such as the necessity to encourage Chinese EV manufacturers to establish production facilities within the European Union, thereby facilitating technology transfer. As many Chinese EV producers are currently developing new factories in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), it is essential for policymakers in these countries to enact laws and regulations that promote technology transfer.

This paper adopts a typology developed to analyze state interactions with global value chains, which identified four principal categories: facilitator, regulator, producer, and buyer. In the CEE region, post-communist states have historically functioned as facilitators, driving foreign investment by accommodating the strategic needs of foreign capital through neoliberal economic policies. However, effective technology transfer necessitates a shift towards a regulatory role, wherein the state must impose restrictions on firm activities or encourage actions that may not align with their immediate economic interests.

This paper aims to analyze the challenges faced by CEE politicians in adopting the role of a regulator and implementing meaningful policies to facilitate technology transfer within the EV industry. The analysis will concentrate on two primary areas: geopolitical alignment—specifically, the reluctance of certain countries to alienate China by mandating technology transfer—and the difficulty of transcending the traditional facilitator role, as these politicians have often been socialized within the prevailing neoliberal framework that dominates post-communist policymaking. In conclusion, it will assess the probability of a successful technology transfer from Chinese EV manufacturers in the region and discuss its implications at the EU level.