Conference Agenda

The EU has supported a rules-based international order mainly through promoting its own liberal multilateral system, focusing on normative power and liberal-minded institution-building in its neighbourhood. Instruments like the African Peace Facility (APF) aimed to enhance Africa’s peace and security architecture (APSA) rather than serve geopolitical interests. In this regard, it was crafting a rule-based order through supporting institution-building focusing on input legitimacy (institutions as rules). The transition from the APF to the European Peace Facility (EPF) marks a pivotal shift towards a more geopolitical EU, concentrating on output effectiveness. For example, we can see that the geographical focus of the EPF is increasingly, and predominantly, on Ukraine and its direct support for military ad hoc coalitions in Africa leaves the AU at the side-lines. This paper critically examines the consequences of the shift from APF to EPF, honing in on the consequences for liberal institutions such as the APSA. For doing so, it relies on insights from official documents and a series of elite interviews with senior EU officials.

The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy resembles a coffee machine without beans: as one pushes the button, there is as much huffing and puffing as if there were beans in it - but not coffee will result. Member States keep the machine going, without adding th beans, because they seemingly do not want to align their defence efforts under the EU flag. The debate in Brussels has hsifted, though: capitals may not be ready to turn the coffee machine off, byt hey are discussing other options, notably a European pillar in NATO. That would resemble a layer-cake: in the NATO Defence Planning Process a new, European layer would have to be added, in between the layer of NATO as a whole and the layer of individual targets for each Ally. The European layer would include the strategic enablers that the European Allies need to achieve military autonomy, i.e. to ensureconventional deterrence and defence without relying on US assets. Coffee and layer cake go well together: EU instruments, in particular those under the Commission, could support this ambition. What about the expeditionary forces though, for operations outside Europe: will the NDPP plan for these too, or must the CSDP coffee machine be put to use anyhow and provide a real Rapid Deployment Capacity? CSDP doesn't work, we need a European pillar or layer in NATO; easily said, but what does it actually means, and how will it happen? This paper will offer some options.

The existing literature mostly consists of individual case studies of national strategic cultures in Europe and whether and how they have changed and potentially converged over time. However, few works offer an explicit theoretical framework or model to explain the depth, scope and speed of cultural change as opposed to policy change. The underlying drivers, actors, conditions, and causal mechanisms at different levels are rarely specified. This paper attempts to address the gap by offering a theoretical framework for explaining strategic cultural change among member states of the European Union. It is the first one to apply realist constructivism to strategic culture research, by selectively fusing assumptions of neoclassical realism and modernist constructivism around the interplay of structures and agents, material power and ideational factors, and pressures arising from the systemic and EU level.

The proposed framework argues that focusing events, especially if they are constructed by authoritative actors as crises, can, under certain conditions, act as catalysts for cultural change. Such crises, often connected to the threat of or actual use of force, can have cognitive, functional, and affective repercussions that translate into lasting cultural change at the elite and, eventually, societal levels. Yet, whether actors at the EU and national levels succeed in driving cultural change through epistemic and political advocacy depends on enabling conditions, especially pressures arising from changes in global power distribution and regional configurations.

However, change is unlikely to be uniform in depth, trajectory, geographical scale and speed across various dimensions of strategic culture. In particular, the paper distinguished between five dimensions: threat perceptions of the environment, goals for the use of force, preferred cooperation patterns, the way in which force is used, and views of the utility and legitimacy of the use of force. While the framework offers a more nuanced account of the links between different forms of crises, agency, structure and change, tailored empirical research is required to validate it in the context of the EU and, to explore whether it may also work for other regions and non-European states.

The European Union (EU) occupies a prominent position in global politics, shaping international norms and multilateral cooperation, yielding influence as a major trade power, and addressing international security issues like the Russian war against Ukraine. However, its global relevance makes the EU also a prime target for external actors like Russia, China, but also the United States, who employ hybrid threats and strategic engagement to manipulate EU decision-making and policy cohesion in times of growing competition. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms and tools utilized by external actors to influence the EU's foreign policy and undermine its cohesion. Hybrid threats rely on a wide array of tools designed to destabilize societies, weaken governance, and exploit vulnerabilities within targeted states. These tools can be grouped into five overarching categories: disruptive, coercive, subversive, polarizing and weaponizing tools. And they provide distinct challenges to the EU’s political cohesion as an international actor. By exploring hybrid threats—including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and economic dependencies—this research highlights the vulnerabilities within the EU's multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-sector governance system. In an era of global competition and internal challenges, understanding how hybrid tools and external engagement shape EU foreign policy is critical for safeguarding its unity and resilience. This paper bridges the gap between existing research on intra-EU dynamics and the under-explored and under-theorized role of external influence on EU foreign policy cohesion.

This paper uses data from interviews with experts and policymakers working in security and defence to assess the significance or otherwise of the much-vaunted geopolitical ambitions of the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen. The paper examines the substance of the ‘geopolitical turn’ and analyses CSDP for signs of emerging strategic coherence (or not). Strategic coherence is a prerequisite for the EU being more than a rhetorical partner to NATO, and instead becoming a proactive facilitator of European defence autonomy within the Atlantic alliance. In an increasingly volatile and dangerous multipolar environment, the EU must bring member states into line so that it can shape its own destiny, speak the language of power, and engage in impactful exchange with other powers.

This paper argues that for ‘principled pragmatism’ to work, member states must at last recognise common interests and develop strategic coherence that translates into geopolitical power. This requires capability, coherence and political will. Without such a transition, the Union risks losing its status as a substantial and relevant global actor.