Conference Agenda

Despite the existence of a rich body of scholarship on impeachment globally and in specific national settings, particularly the US, there is little written on the impeachment in the EU order. This is somewhat surprising due to the extent of the power wielded by EU institutional officeholders. It is perhaps less so, however, when one considers that in the EU's entire history there have only been two cases that might be described as impeachments, and in both against former officeholders (ex Commissioner Edith Cresson in 2006 and former Member of the Court of Auditors Karel Pinxten in 2021). Scattered around the EU Treaties are a number of impeachment procedures that may be instigated to remove misbehaving EU institutional officeholders from office. These procedures are idiosyncratic and assymentrical, providing disparate grounds for removal for different officeholders, as well as separate procedures for iniation and trial of the process. However, all the procedures share certain core characteristics, not least that they tend to be capable only of initation in-house within the impugned officeholder's institution and that the trial of the accusation is almost always conducted by the EU's Court of Justice. There is, therefore, no participation by citizens in any aspect of the process, nor by the EU's only directly elected institution, the European Parliament. The ideal balance between independence of institutions (and the security of their officeholders), on one hand, and accountability, on the other, is a difficult question in any constitutional system. Designing impeachment procedures so that they are sufficiently available and robust to disincentivise and punish officeholder misbehaviour while at the same time ensuring thy are not open to abuse owing to short-termist popular pressures or political grounds is especially difficult. The creation of independent supranational institutions in the EU was motivated in part by a desire to technocratise decision-making in certain areas, and thereby de-democratise it. Seen as such, it is immediately evident why the EU Treaties' framers would have sought to limit the power of initiation and place the trial of impeachments in judicial hands, rather than entrusting either or both to popular representatives. This paper argues, however, that the fears that motivated this approach to impeachment in the founding Treaties may no longer be as relevant in the contemporary context in which the EU has evolved into a Union of values, with a Parliament elected directly by Union citizens, who enjoy a right of participation.

Rule of law backsliding has become a pressing concern in the European Union (EU) as some Member States have increasingly shown signs of undermining the principles of democracy and the rule of law. This paper examines the EU response to rule of law backsliding and the effectiveness of its measures in addressing this issue. The research question that guides this study is: How effective have the EU institutions been in responding to rule of law backsliding in Member States?

The focus is on Croatia as a new Member States with recurring struggles and challenges in meeting the requirements of an efficient, independent and quality justice system. Starting from European Commission measures aimed at strengthening the rule of law in Croatia, an evaluation of the effects of the envisaged exchange with the EU institutions will offer insight and room for discussion. It will evaluate whether the policy choices translate into functioning solutions at national level or guidelines or further legislative initiatives at EU level are needed, in order to discipline the national legal systems into compliance.

Following his 2021 power grab, Tunisian President Kais Saied began to reverse the democratic progress made in the only country that saw a sustainable transition in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab uprisings. However, despite the EU’s declared ambition and major financial effort to support and defend Tunisia’s young democracy, its reaction to the country’s re-autocratisation has been muted. The EU’s democracy promotion tools and instruments – notably targeted financial assistance, various types of civil society support and diplomatic dialogue – were, to some extent, adapted to the new context. However, they were dwarfed by a support package initially agreed in June 2023, offering major economic assistance in exchange for stronger Tunisian efforts to prevent migration to Europe. This article examines both how the EU has adapted to the new Tunisian context and how its prioritisation of migration has affected the EU democracy promotion toolbox both before and after 2021. Drawing upon ethnographic research in Tunisia, it argues that EU migration policy has not only undermined the EU’s credibility as a promoter and defender of democratic norms in the eyes of reform-oriented actors within the country, but also its pre-2021 attempts to help consolidate Tunisia’s democratic institutions and foster their resilience. Thus, it inadvertently helped to pave the way for some of the regressive practices that have seen a comeback under Kais Saied.