Conference Agenda

How has been the European Union (EU) shaping its identity in relation to Russia in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape? This paper provides a compelling investigation into how the European Commission has been discursively constructing Russia as the "Other" between 2012 and 2024, offering fresh insights into the evolving relationship between the EU and one of its most consequential neighbours. Tracing a timeline from the strategic partnership rhetoric of 2012–2013 to the ruptures following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the seismic destabilization caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this study unveils the complex interplay of discourse, identity and meaning-making practices. Theoretically drawing on discursive institutionalism, performativity, and the concept of "Othering”, the paper works with an extensive dataset of 885 European Commission press releases, capturing the nuances of official EU discourses over more than a decade (Schmidt 2008; Sonnentag and Frese; 2002). Methodologically, it employs a multi-method approach, combining content analysis to systematically identify recurring themes and tonal variations in the European Commission’s portrayal of Russia, with critical discourse analysis to explore deeper linguistic strategies such as metaphors, modality, or presuppositions (Neuendorf 2017; Wodak 2020). This integrated approach uncovers how the European Commission’s discourse has been constructing and sustaining Russia’s identity vis-à-vis EU, revealing the performative power of language in shaping geopolitical perceptions. Offering both temporal depth and analytical rigor, this research provides a vital contribution to understanding the discursive underpinnings of EU foreign policy and the enduring significance of Russia as the EU’s "Other."

The paper aims to contribute to the existing research which is focused on current conflict in Ukraine and the discourse of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It aims to explore the evolution of Putin´s discursive justification of the invasion of Ukraine and the following “special military operation”, using the concept of securitization, more specifically, securitization through association. In the paper we analysed the development of the discourse of Russian President in the period 2022-2024 via the analysis of the key speeches that were addressed both to domestic and also to the international audience and which included allusions to the conflict in Ukraine.

The main research question focuses on how Vladimir Putin in these speeches has portrayed first Ukraine and the political conduct of its leadership, and second (with the gradually growing emphasis) the West as the security threats.

The main preliminary findings are that in his discourse Putin has presented the war in Ukraine more and more strongly as a conflict with the West. We focus on the particular associations connected to past, historic threats that Putin has used to portray Ukraine and the West as current security threats.

The role of the West in Putin’s discourse is twofold: Firstly, it serves as a threat association through which Ukraine is portrayed as an extension, or proxy, of the West. Secondly, the West itself is securitised in Putin’s discourse as a threat. As the time has progressed, it becomes more evident that Putin perceives and portrays the conflict in Ukraine as a struggle limited not only to Ukraine, but rather as a struggle between great powers with far-reaching consequences for the whole world and for the order of international relations, which (according to his discourse) has been dominated by the West.

For the discourse analysis we used the concept of securitisation through association as we focused on the development of not only direct securitization of the above-mentioned subjects in Putin´s discourse, but also on their indirect securitization through associations with issues that often refer to the history, mainly the history of the 20^th century and the earlier times.

Both the theoretical discussion about the usage of the concepts of securitization and securitization through association in case of the war in Ukraine and also the selected methodological approach to the discourse analysis aim to contribute to the existing debate about emotions and historic allusions in the justification of war in political discourse.

In this paper I use an original corpus of parliamentary speeches to present three major ways Russian institutional actors define the identity of the Russian Federation: as part of Europe, as part of Eurasia, and as a self-referential, idiosyncratic civilization. I outline the evolution of these identitary options over the last two decades (2004–2024), showing how the variability of self-images is anchored by Russia’s ambition for great power status – one of the few constants scholars have found at the core of its foreign policy. For each identity, I identify sources of greatness that respond to this ambition to achieve and maintain a special international status. For instance, the European identity option sources greatness in the semantic and normative power to define and redefine “Europeanness”, as uncorrupted by either hegemonic unification and the hollowing out of its special agency (Americanization) or by post-modern degradation and the rejection of “traditional values.” Claiming Europe’s political and intellectual tradition can thus give Russia a special place in the region and turn it into a pole of attraction for conservative forces. I then demonstrate how, for each identitary option, the claim to greatness is endangered, creating acute vulnerability. Thus, Russia’s willingness and ability to represent genuine European culture and values must be accepted by the conservative actors it wishes to represent and lead. Without such recognition, great-power status is impossible to achieve and self-understanding becomes fragile.

This article investigates how key EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of the EU) has been constructing and projecting solidarity with Ukraine through their official Twitter accounts since the outbreak of Russian aggression in 2022. Theoretically, the study draws on discursive institutionalism, performativity, and the concept of solidarity to examine how institutional narratives shape and reinforce the EU’s identity as a normative and geopolitical actor (Schmidt 2008; Sonnentag and Frese 2002).Employing a multi-method approach of frame analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), this study unpacks the linguistic and rhetorical strategies underpinning the EU’s digital communication during this geopolitical crisis. Frame analysis systematically identifies recurring frames embedded in the EU’s tweets. CDA interrogates deeper linguistic features, including modality, metaphors, and intertextual references, to reveal the performative role of solidarity in constructing the EU’s self-image and its symbolic distinction from Russia (Gutterman 2016; Wodak 2020). The findings illuminate how solidarity is framed not only as a moral imperative but also as a geopolitical strategy, highlighting its evolution from immediate emergency responses to enduring commitments of military, economic, and humanitarian support. By enabling comparisons across institutions and over time, the analysis sheds light on the temporal and institutional dynamics of EU solidarity narratives. By focusing on Twitter, the analysis captures the immediacy and performativity of the EU’s digital narratives, shedding light on the discursive dynamics of contemporary EU foreign policy and the ways in which institutional discourses both reflect and shape the broader geopolitical order.

The UK is a long-standing key security actor in Europe, embedded in a complex web of relationships embracing bilateral agreements, minilateral groupings and membership of regional organisations. The purpose of the paper is to advance the explanation and understanding of the role of the UK in European security post-Brexit and most especially in the aftermath of the Russian war on Ukraine.

The approach of the paper is to take the UK Government’s response to Russia’s war on Ukraine as the basis on which to explain Britain’s approach towards foreign and security policy in Europe. Further, the paper organises its argument around the idea that the UK has responded to the war on Ukraine as a key component of a ‘status-seeking’ strategy to finding a role in European security post-Brexit. It draws upon the conceptual literature on status-seeking to organise the subsequent empirical analysis.

The paper starts from the assumption that UK security policy and practices are taking place within a contested status for the UK post-Brexit, including a prospective loss of influence. It situates the challenges of UK European security policy in a fluid and contested international setting, defined by challenges to the security order of Europe heightened by Russia's war on Ukraine, and uncertainty in transatlantic relations. By examining the UK's shifting position in this context, but with its primary focus on the UK’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine since 2022 the paper provides conceptually solid and empirically rich insight into this key component of the European security environment and how it has shaped the UK's current involvement and contribution to European security.

The paper will seek to answer a set of key questions: (a) What policies or strategies has the UK adopted to secure its position in the European security order since 2016 (b) What factors have influenced adoption (and change) of policies or strategies and shaped the UK's role in European security following Russia’s war on Ukraine and what is the logic of their development? (c) How has the UK's standing as a security partner shifted by reference to the UK governments response to the war in Ukraine and how has it impacted relationships with the UK's security partners (notably the EU)?

The paper concludes by evaluating the conceptual and analytical utility of status-seeking as the basis to account for the role of the UK in European security post-Brexit.