How has been the European Union (EU) shaping its identity in relation to Russia in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape? This paper provides a compelling investigation into how the European Commission has been discursively constructing Russia as the "Other" between 2012 and 2024, offering fresh insights into the evolving relationship between the EU and one of its most consequential neighbours. Tracing a timeline from the strategic partnership rhetoric of 2012–2013 to the ruptures following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the seismic destabilization caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this study unveils the complex interplay of discourse, identity and meaning-making practices. Theoretically drawing on discursive institutionalism, performativity, and the concept of "Othering”, the paper works with an extensive dataset of 885 European Commission press releases, capturing the nuances of official EU discourses over more than a decade (Schmidt 2008; Sonnentag and Frese; 2002). Methodologically, it employs a multi-method approach, combining content analysis to systematically identify recurring themes and tonal variations in the European Commission’s portrayal of Russia, with critical discourse analysis to explore deeper linguistic strategies such as metaphors, modality, or presuppositions (Neuendorf 2017; Wodak 2020). This integrated approach uncovers how the European Commission’s discourse has been constructing and sustaining Russia’s identity vis-à-vis EU, revealing the performative power of language in shaping geopolitical perceptions. Offering both temporal depth and analytical rigor, this research provides a vital contribution to understanding the discursive underpinnings of EU foreign policy and the enduring significance of Russia as the EU’s "Other."

The paper aims to contribute to the existing research which is focused on current conflict in Ukraine and the discourse of Russian President Vladimir Putin. It aims to explore the evolution of Putin´s discursive justification of the invasion of Ukraine and the following “special military operation”, using the concept of securitization, more specifically, securitization through association. In the paper we analysed the development of the discourse of Russian President in the period 2022-2024 via the analysis of the key speeches that were addressed both to domestic and also to the international audience and which included allusions to the conflict in Ukraine.

The main research question focuses on how Vladimir Putin in these speeches has portrayed first Ukraine and the political conduct of its leadership, and second (with the gradually growing emphasis) the West as the security threats.

The main preliminary findings are that in his discourse Putin has presented the war in Ukraine more and more strongly as a conflict with the West. We focus on the particular associations connected to past, historic threats that Putin has used to portray Ukraine and the West as current security threats.

The role of the West in Putin’s discourse is twofold: Firstly, it serves as a threat association through which Ukraine is portrayed as an extension, or proxy, of the West. Secondly, the West itself is securitised in Putin’s discourse as a threat. As the time has progressed, it becomes more evident that Putin perceives and portrays the conflict in Ukraine as a struggle limited not only to Ukraine, but rather as a struggle between great powers with far-reaching consequences for the whole world and for the order of international relations, which (according to his discourse) has been dominated by the West.

For the discourse analysis we used the concept of securitisation through association as we focused on the development of not only direct securitization of the above-mentioned subjects in Putin´s discourse, but also on their indirect securitization through associations with issues that often refer to the history, mainly the history of the 20^th century and the earlier times.

Both the theoretical discussion about the usage of the concepts of securitization and securitization through association in case of the war in Ukraine and also the selected methodological approach to the discourse analysis aim to contribute to the existing debate about emotions and historic allusions in the justification of war in political discourse.

The ongoing war in Ukraine has been the priority issue for the EU Security and has also been the top one hamper of EU-China relations in the recent years due to the gap between the EU’s expectation of the Chinese attitude and China’s official stance of the war. This paper argues that the Chinese foreign policy making, discourse and culture has determined that the Chinese official discourse on the war will not be able to completely same with the EU’s expectation. The EU should also take consideration of the context and background of China’s verbalisation of the matter, and the special historical and strategic role of Russia to China, so that when the EU interprets China’s stance on the war, it should not simply understand that China’s words without the context.

Through content and textual analysis of China’s official discourse on the war in Ukraine and the EU’s interactive discourse to it, and comparing the discursive interactions with the action interactions between China and the EU on the matter including economic, cultural and military activeness in the same time frame, the paper argues that there are two layers of stances behind China’s official discourse on the matte, the universal value and state value. In this case, the EU should read between and beyond the lines of China’s official discourse and stop interpreting China’s stance as supporting the war. The EU should also give up in persuading China to change its discourse as each country’s official discourse is closely connected to the state interest and history. A more effective way is the EU to understand China’s stance on this matter with a more comprehensive understanding of the connotation and consideration behind the discourse, namely China’s relations with Russia in the world, especially with the US sticking to the “US first policy” and its hegemonic actions

This paper presents three major ways Russian institutional actors defined the identity of the Russian Federation – as part of Europe, as part of Eurasia, or as a self-referential idiosyncratic civilization. For each of these identities, it presents sources of greatness, responding to Russia’s ambition to great power status, that has been considered by scholars as its central foreign policy constant. For instance, the European identity option sources greatness in the semantic and normative power to define and redefine Europeanness. Russia’s willingness and ability to represent the genuine European culture and values, not corrupted by either hegemonic unification (Americanization) nor post-modern degradation (negating “traditional values”) can thus give it a special place in the region; it can act as a pole of attraction for traditional, conservative forces. Having established the sources of greatness, the paper proceeds to demonstrate where vulnerability is generated for each of the identitary options and claims that it usually comes from interdependence with – either in cooperation or in competition with – other major and smaller actors, thus, from the lack of autonomy. It demonstrates how the preoccupation with autonomy and sovereignty swells in the institutional discourse and legislation starting from 2012 and how this extreme perceived vulnerability leads to a radicalization of (self)-othering, explicitly demonstrated by a Member of the Russian Parliament declaring in December 2021: “We stand today on a watershed: the evil is on the one side, the good – on the other. Russia is good. Russia has always brought good… it never aggressed anybody”. The paper concludes with an argument about the paradoxical role of the full-scale war Russia started against Ukraine as an uncertainty reducing tool in the definition of Russia’s identity and of its relation to Europe.

This article investigates how key EU institutions (the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council of the EU) has been constructing and projecting solidarity with Ukraine through their official Twitter accounts since the outbreak of Russian aggression in 2022. Theoretically, the study draws on discursive institutionalism, performativity, and the concept of solidarity to examine how institutional narratives shape and reinforce the EU’s identity as a normative and geopolitical actor (Schmidt 2008; Sonnentag and Frese 2002).Employing a multi-method approach of frame analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), this study unpacks the linguistic and rhetorical strategies underpinning the EU’s digital communication during this geopolitical crisis. Frame analysis systematically identifies recurring frames embedded in the EU’s tweets. CDA interrogates deeper linguistic features, including modality, metaphors, and intertextual references, to reveal the performative role of solidarity in constructing the EU’s self-image and its symbolic distinction from Russia (Gutterman 2016; Wodak 2020). The findings illuminate how solidarity is framed not only as a moral imperative but also as a geopolitical strategy, highlighting its evolution from immediate emergency responses to enduring commitments of military, economic, and humanitarian support. By enabling comparisons across institutions and over time, the analysis sheds light on the temporal and institutional dynamics of EU solidarity narratives. By focusing on Twitter, the analysis captures the immediacy and performativity of the EU’s digital narratives, shedding light on the discursive dynamics of contemporary EU foreign policy and the ways in which institutional discourses both reflect and shape the broader geopolitical order.