The February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia triggered a series of cascade effects in the field of European defence, ranging from NATO expansion to EU financial and military support to a party involved in an active conflict (Marsh 2023). Critically, the current war in Ukraine has led to a sea change in European countries’ attitude to arms production. European states and the EU have sought to dramatically improve their own military readiness and capability and concomitantly provide Ukraine with the arms and ammunition needed to fight against Russia. However, both governments and the European Commission rapidly discovered that their defence industries lacked the capacity to produce arms in the quantities needed for the first high intensity war in Europe for almost 80 years.

Since March 2023, in response to this problem, the then EU Commissioner for defence industry, Thierry Breton, and other policy entrepreneurs have regularly invoked the need for European defence industry to move to war economy mode. While the use of the term has not always been appreciated by member states (Schulz, 2023), the idea is materialising into more concrete proposals, such as Breton’s proposal of a €100 billion fund to boost EU defence industry production, with the aim of equalling or outstripping Russia’s military industrial capacity within 18-24 months (Wax and Kayali 2024), and a new EU defence industrial strategy worth €1.5 bill. Exceptional measures like this would co-exist with the general commitment across all European states to significantly increase their defence budgets to NATO’s 2% goal, and beyond. But what would this mean for European economies, industries, and societies? Is preparedness for war understood consistently? How are defence industrial priorities being imagined, negotiated and contested among different European countries, where NATO and EU membership now largely overlaps but not without consequential exceptions? What is short is the political sociology of these contested discourses?

The paper aims to theorise the dual role of future-thinking and future-making in European foreign and defence policy. It is concerned with the future-thinking as a social fact that can help us to understand how actors think about risk, uncertainty, threat, opportunity and strategy. Assumptions or expectations about the future are not always explicit and conscious but theories of foreign policy or the evolution of the EU's security and defence policy need to adquately and explicitly set-out their assumptions about how future-thinking matters. The paper draws on five partly intersecting bodies of literature even though all of them have shortcomings: the literature on the evolution of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP; the strategic surprise literature in the field of intelligence studies and foreign policy analysis; the literature on the role of expert knowledge and learning in public policy; the literature in International Relations around forecasting, temporality, and the challenge of the future; and finally, the multi-disciplinary and multi-domain field of future studies. Drawing on these five lieratures the paper develops a theory of how future-thinking matters to understand change and continuity in the core assumptions and ideational underpinnign of foreign policy. It also an indispensable anchor for evalutions and critique of foreign policy in terms of being short-termist/mypic, vulnerable to wishful-thinking and denial, or being overly optimistic or pessimistic.

The paper illustrates the explanatory and normative potential of this theoretical approach with reference to the evolution of the EU’s Strategic Compass and discussions about the EU's approach to Ukraine and Russia prior to and post Russia’s aggression against Ukaine in 2014 and 2022. This will be based on document analysis as well as interviews in Brussels, Berlin, Paris, Warsaw and Stockholm.

From the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin and others in the Russian elite used alarmist language implicitly threatening escalation to a direct war with NATO, including the use of nuclear weapons. Western leaders also feared this possibility, with President Joe Biden warning of a potential World War Three. Western critics of military support for Ukraine and of the lack of a diplomatic track warned that the West and Russia risked being trapped in an escalatory cycle that would end in a nuclear war. So far, escalation to a wider war between Russia and the West has not happened. Against this background, this paper will explore escalation dynamics in the Russia-Ukraine War. The paper will draw on existing literature on conflict escalation and crisis and intra-war behaviour. The paper will argue that, notwithstanding Russia’s unprovoked aggression and war crimes, both the West and Russia have behaved with important elements of restraint. In particular, this has included: the West’s decision not to become directly involved as a combatant; Russia’s decision not to target NATO states militarily, especially supply routes for Western military assistance to Ukraine; the non-use of nuclear weapons by Russia; and cautious responses to incidents which might have triggered escalation (such as Russia missiles falling on the territory of some NATO states). The paper will explore the possible reasons for the limited escalation of the war to date, including: the overall balance of power between the West and Russia; nuclear deterrence; the likely consequences of a conventional war between Russia and the West; the maintenance and use of channels of communication between the West and Russia. The analysis will suggest reasons for cautious optimism about the prospects for continued great power peace in the 21st century.

This proposal presents the preliminary findings of my postdoctoral research, which investigates the institutional adaptation and lesson-learning processes within the Italian military, focusing on Italy’s participation in European Union-led missions. By analyzing variables such as troop size, financial commitments, mission mandates, and the civil-military nature of operations, the project examines how Italy’s strategic culture and defense policies have evolved through its engagement in EU frameworks. The methodology combines a detailed analysis of foundational EU and Italian documents (e.g., white papers, multiannual strategic plans, and EU strategic frameworks) with interviews conducted with key political and military stakeholders, primarily in Rome.
The preliminary findings highlight Italy’s active involvement in EU missions, driven by its commitment to multilateralism, humanitarian values, and peacebuilding within a European context. Despite its significant role in such operations, gaps remain in academic reflection on the lessons learned and their integration into strategic planning. This study identifies critical mechanisms influencing institutional adaptation, including alignment with EU norms, domestic political factors, and the evolving role of civil-military cooperation. By focusing exclusively on EU-led initiatives, this research provides a focused framework to understand the dynamics shaping Italy’s defense policy and offers insights into how middle powers adapt to challenges within the European security architecture.