Policy makers widely recognize pollution taxes as one of the most cost-effective and impactful measures for reducing emissions that drive climate change. Paradoxically, despite their efficacy, pollution taxes remain one of the least publicly supported climate policies. Public opposition is often attributed to concerns about fairness and distrust in governmental institutions who would need to carry out these policies. This study investigates how public support for carbon taxation is impacted by awareness of corruption in a country. Using the latest Transparency International corruption report, we examine whether raising awareness of corruption (via priming) affects respondents' acceptance of carbon taxes, alongside their perceptions of the policy's fairness and effectiveness. The study focuses on Lithuania, where a carbon tax—introduced as a fuel excise with a pollution reduction component—is set to take effect in January 2025. Specifically, we assess whether the priming of the individuals to information about corruption levels decreases their support for the forthcoming fuel excise tax increase, as compared to those unexposed to such information. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a pre-registered face-to-face vignette-based survey experiment (N=1000) within a representative national omnibus sample. We also analyze heterogeneity in treatment effects across subgroups, including political orientation (left- vs. right-leaning), gender, car ownership, education level, income, trust in science, and political trust. Furthermore, we explore whether this relationship is mediated by respondents’ perceptions of fairness and effectiveness. The data collection is currently underway, with preliminary results expected in early February.

Questions about tackling climate change present themselves with a force not found elsewhere. This is, in part, due to the enormity of the downside consequences should policymakers blunder the regulatory environment within which climate-related activities take place. Hence, ‘net zero’ has become the target in many global, regional, and local policy commitments. And growing numbers of the world’s largest firms are declaring their own plans for carbon emission reduction, including financial institutions.

As part of the European Union’s strategy, in 2022, the European Central Bank (ECB) carried out its debut climate stress test to model the impact of global warming and extreme weather on banks’ balance sheets. The results signalled future financial catastrophe. They estimated that the 41 largest eurozone lenders could suffer €70 billion of losses from these risks over three years. Even then the ECB suggested this significantly underestimates the actual climate-related risk. An effective policy response to climate change must therefore include financial sector reform. But, as climate change accelerates, the financial sector risks idling in neutral, unable to keep pace. Whilst the European Green Deal along with the suite of other European-led initiatives are held out as positive developments, the financial sector remains exposed to climate events. One reason for this is that banks continue to be major holders of carbon-heavy assets. As long as carbon-intensive finance remains lucrative, and without additional reform, this is unlikely to change and banks will not genuinely transition to make climate commitments credible.

This paper explores ways to incentivise investment in ‘green’ finance whilst simultaneously discouraging the backing of carbon-intensive projects. In particular, the paper concentrates on the role of banks and argues in favour of three policy changes. The first involves imposing greater capital requirements contingent on the holding of carbon-heavy assets. The second is to tether part of executive remuneration to a specified percentage of the value of the bank’s ‘green’ assets. Third, and more broadly, it is argued that fossil fuel subsidies should be scaled back.

The inclusion of maritime emissions within the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) under the European Green Deal background represents a significant evolution in regional climate policy and a critical response to global regulatory gaps. This research examines the process through which the European Commission led the European Union to present a unified stance in global climate governance between 2019 and 2024. This research analyses the European Commission’s leadership in climate governance, showcasing its ability to balance ambition with pragmatism. By analyzing the legislative process behind the inclusion of maritime emissions in the EU ETS, this study examines how the Commission, particularly DG CLIMA, navigated complex interactions with Member States and international actors. Through the lens of Two-Level Game Theory and Constructivist Role Theory, it reveals the strategies and compromises that shaped this pivotal climate initiative.

Internally, the European Commission managed differing perspectives among Member States, with some, such as Greece and Cyprus, expressing concerns due to their significant maritime interests, while others, including climate-progressive actors, voiced strong support for decarbonisation measures. Externally, the policy sought to align regional action with broader global governance efforts by engaging with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and third countries, addressing complexities at the intersection of internal and external EU policies.

Using a qualitative approach, this research draws on interviews with EU officials—primarily from DG CLIMA and other relevant DGs—policy documents, and process tracing of key decision-making milestones to analyse the intricate dynamics between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and Member States in shaping and advancing this policy. Specifically, it investigates how the Commission balanced its dual leadership role, managing institutional tensions and varied national interests within the EU, while promoting ambitious climate policies at both regional and global levels. The study pays particular attention to the maritime sector, a domain where regulatory gaps persist, offering insights into how regional initiatives can catalyse global governance innovation. This research fills a critical gap in the literature by highlighting how the Commission bridges regional and global governance frameworks and coordinates with key internal stakeholders to align diverse interests with broader climate objectives as a leader. The findings contribute to understanding how supranational actors adapt governance mechanisms to foster global climate action under multi-level constraints.

With the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), questions about the emergence of European unity in the form of a common identity have arisen. Since then, European identity debates have often come to the fore of European Union (EU) developments. The paper explores the puzzle surrounding the EU’s climate actorness, asking how the Green Deal is contributing to the European identity construction and whether we are witnessing a ‘greening’ of European normative power.
Therefore, the paper tests the EU’s green power in the policy context of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It aims to evaluate what role the CBAM plays in the construction of European identity and how it shapes the EU’s image as a climate actor both internally and externally. The investigation of European identity formation in the case of the CBAM is significant owing to the potentially wide-ranging impact of this policy, which has not been significantly studied hitherto owing to its relative novelty. The contrasting opinions on CBAM by third countries (non-EU member states), understood broadly as dissatisfaction with its present design, puts the issue of European identity as normative power at the heart of the policy debate. The paper adopts qualitative research methods with a single case study design. The analysis is framed within the boundaries of multi-level and network governance that draws attention not only to how institutions shape European identity, but also how non-state actors and different stakeholders.