Conference Agenda

This paper investigates the ways in which three British Prime Ministers (PMs) – Theresa May, Boris Johnson and Rishi Sunak – employed fear appeals as a rhetorical device in their discourse on Brexit and UK-EU relations during the post-referendum period. It builds on the existing literature on the use of fear in political communication surrounding Brexit (Cap, 2017; Eaton, 2016; Eroglu and Köroğlu, 2020; Galpin, 2016; Grinan-Moutinho, 2022; Zappettini, 2019) but extends it beyond its hitherto narrow focus on 2016 campaign. As such, the paper fills a critical research gap by investigating the way(s) in which fear-based discourse persisted in British political rhetoric post-referendum and uncovering the specific discursive strategies and evolving patterns through which it was constructed and sustained within the context of significant political turbulence. Drawing on Lazarus’ theory of emotion as a primary theoretical framework, the article employs mixed-methodology comprising content analysis and the discourse-historical approach to critical discourse analysis. The inquiry works with extensive datasets of official addresses, social media posts, and televised interviews by all three PMs, comprehensively covering the period between 13 July 2016 and the UK general election on 4 July 2024, according to the Prime Ministers’ terms of office. The analysis empirically contributes to understanding how fear-based language evolved and adapted to political challenges in post-referendum Britain. It furthermore makes a policy contribution by drawing attention to the implications of political elite-driven fear messaging. Finally, it advances theoretical discussions on the role of fear in political communication explicitly as a legitimising strategy during crises.

Opinion polls prior and post the 2016 Brexit referendum indicate that there was a clear majority in favour of membership of the EU among Generation Z. Turn out at the referendum, however, was lower than all other cohorts, and, unlike in Scotland at the 2014 Referendum on Scottish Independence, 16- and 17-year-olds were excluded from the plebiscite. Nearly a decade on from the referendum, and four years since the UK exited the EU, the paper analyses the attitudes of future UK Generation Z voters in terms of their perceptions and memories at the time of the referendum, their current sentiments about the UK’s relationship with the EU and their perceptions of potential future developments. Drawing on a mixed-methods survey (conducted in Spring 2025) among sixth form students (aged 16-18) in three different UK schools and colleges, the paper provide insight into future UK Generation Z voters' perceptions of the UK's relationship with the EU.

This paper explores the variegated ways in which citizens from across the Brexit divide imagine the United Kingdom’s (UK) future relationship with the European Union (EU), and more broadly, their visions for the UK’s role within a changing European and global geopolitical context. The new Labour Government has repeatedly promised to ‘reset’ the UK’s relationship with the EU. However, opinion polls show that the UK public continues to be divided on exactly what form a closer relationship with the EU should take. Thematic and narrative analysis of data collected through guided interviews, conducted with forty-one individuals between December 2023 and November 2024, reveals that voters are increasingly (re-)considering their policy preferences towards the EU. The ongoing wars in the Ukraine and the Middle East, the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the UK’s slow economic growth and a perceived global migration crisis significantly frame how voters are imagining the future of the UK in Europe. At the same time, pre-Brexit era narratives persist, with many voters continuing to hold a Churchillian view of the UK’s international and European responsibilities, and a sense that irrespective of Brexit, the UK will continue to be an ‘awkward partner’ to Europe.