In this paper, I analyse the ideology of key players of the early phase of Italian fascism (-1922) and show that it shares important similarities with Italy’s ‘post-fascist’ present. I apply a ‘conceptual morphology’ approach to ideology (Freeden, 1996; Freeden, 2013/2015) to assess the definition and relative importance of political concepts—e.g. the nation, the state, the people, etc.—for the ideology of these players. Also, I follow a ‘generic minimum’ (Eatwell, 1996) understanding of fascism: fascism is a phenomenon that goes beyond the regimes of interwar Europe; still today, fascism is a top-tier political ideology.
This paper is part of a larger study, in which I ask whether the ideology of Italy’s current ruling party—the ‘post-fascist’ Fratelli d’Italia (FdI)—presents elements of fascism. In the larger study, I perform an ideological analysis (Lindberg, 2017; Mayring, 2022) of FdI’s texts and speeches (2012-24) and compare it with the ideology of its predecessors—the historical exponents of Italian fascism.
In this paper, I focus on the ‘movement phase’ of Italian fascism, that ended with the fascists’ takeover of power after the March on Rome (October 1922). For this, I study primary and secondary sources: I retrace the historical evolution of key concepts; then, I systematise the material into seven ideological portraits of the main currents and figures. This two-step analysis is an original contribution to the study of the history of Italian fascism.
I argue that the movement phase shares important similarities with the present. First, fascists were forced to appeal to citizens within a liberal-democratic framework. Second, they were forced to and successfully managed to gain cultural hegemony first, on their way to political hegemony. Third, fascism in the movement phase shared many similarities with liberalism: nominal support for popular democracy was widespread, as was support for capitalism and market liberalism. Support for democracy or market liberalism cannot be a sufficient criterion to classify a political actor as ‘not fascist’—e.g. populist or conservative. These elements all apply for today’s FdI, too. The similarities are at the ideological level. Finally, I argue that fascism must be studied in its historical and ideological plurality, as I seek to redress the biased view of fascism as being mainly, or exclusively, a form of totalitarian etatism. My long-term, ideational, comparative approach is the most productive way to historicise fascism, as it allows to recognise continuities and assess threats to contemporary democracies.
