The war that Russia waged against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, has brought Ukraine into the spotlight of the European public, political circles, and scientific discourse. This article delves into the reactions of the EU and Germany to the Ukraine Crisis, which escalated into a conventional war, by examining the concept of Europeanization as a two-way process: Europeanization versus Germanization. The research assumes that Germany has effectively conveyed its national preferences, both soft and hard power elements, onto the EU level, and the EU has been crucial in altering Germany's initial reluctance to enforce sanctions against Russia. This article also provides an understanding of Germany's leadership position within the EU and explores how it has evolved from a ´civilian power` to a `normal power` taking on more foreign and security policy responsibilities.

Addressing the German federal parliament on 27 February 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that the start of Russia’s massive assault on Ukraine three days earlier marked a Zeitenwende in the history of the European continent. He went on to use this term (which roughly translates as “epochal change” or “watershed moment”) a further six times during his speech, using it to express the significance of what had just happened. While he announced a set of policy changes during the speech, he did not actually, in contrast to what was widely and enthusiastically reported at home and abroad, announce or call for a Zeitenwende in Germany’s foreign and defence policy. His choice of words illustrates how German elites and public are only starting to rethink their understanding and conceptualisation of the world, and the German and European role within it. They are starting to question the idea of Germany as a civilian power that operates in and benefit from a stable rules-based multilateral order and considers geopolitical categories and the projection or use of hard power a thing of the unenlightened past. This paper dissects this identity crisis, trying to determine whether it is starting to produce a genuine and sustainable shift in Germany’s international role or follows the example of previous German debates on the need to take more responsibility, such as those following the Russian annexation of Crimea or after the election of Donald Trump, which also created expectations among allies that were ultimately disappointed.

How do anti-establishment parties engage in European Security? New challenger parties have brought about changes in the party competition dynamics of many European countries. This has had consequences on how parties talk about issues, and scholars have explored how these parties affect foreign and security policy too. However, once elected, these parties do not bring about the end of cooperation but rather make use of their membership strategically. Thus, we still do not know how they affect the multilateral commitment of states in regional security organizations. Taking the case of Italy, this paper advances an argument about the variety of influences of anti-establishment parties on their state's involvement in the EU's CFSP, NATO, and the OSCE. By looking at different anti-establishment parties from 2013 until 2024, the manuscript argues that Italian parties strategize on security issues following party competition dynamics and that their effects on this policy domain depend on their potential domestic gains and international costs. I illustrate my argument by drawing from party manifestos, news coverage, autobiographies, political speeches and texts, and with interviews with Italian MPs, and bureaucrats from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The paper aims to contribute to discussions about the nexus between multilateralism and anti-mainstream politics in Western countries.

Both Germany and Poland have previously sought or been identified as leaders in the CEE region. Whilst Poland has been conceived as a ‘regional leader in the East’ (Longhurst 2002: 56-57), a ‘go to’ player in European security (Witney 2008: 24), and a ‘bridge between east and west’ (Chappell 2012: 59), particularly in respect to Ukraine. Germany was the key advocate of CEE enlargement, as well as one of the motors behind European integration, along with France. Poland and Germany have previously worked together through such configurations as the Weimar Triangle, and Merkel and Tusk had a close working relationship when both were in office. Whilst the Berlin-Warsaw relationship significantly deteriorated under the Law and Justice government in Poland from 2015, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the subsequent election win of the Tusk led ‘Coalition of October 15’, and Germany’s potential ‘zeitenwende’ raise the question as to whether two countries with assumed leadership roles in CEE can work together in a deteriorating security environment. The difficulties here relate to both countries having different approaches to security, with Germany also having been a laggard in security leadership vis-a-vis other foreign policy areas. This paper explores both the types of leadership each country displays from 2008 to present as well as cooperation and competition between them within security. We argue that cooperation and leadership between them is vital in tackling the security challenges which Europe faces and that conflicting security goals and agendas act as a barrier.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2016 followed by its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 determined NATO to enhance its defence and deterrence posture on its Eastern flank. Due to its belonging to the Eastern flank, its proximity to the Black Sea, and its shared border with Ukraine, Romania’s security has been profoundly affected by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forcing it to confront both soft and hard security issues, from inflow of Ukrainian refugees and increased disinformation to the likelihood of war in Europe. Drawing on documentary analysis of official documents, speeches, public statements, and Parliamentary reports this paper investigates the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Romania’s security and defence policy. Specifically, it investigates whether there is a disjuncture between Romania's dominant security and defence narratives and its actions within this new security environment. In so doing, the paper assesses whether Romania’s response to the war has reflected its long-standing self-identity both as a consumer and provider of security or signals a change in its security identity. This paper argues that Russia’s war on Ukraine has provided Romania with the unique opportunity to become a regional leader, particularly through its enhanced bilateral cooperation with Moldova and Ukraine, and its increased focus on soft security issues; however, significant political, military, and societal issues need to be addressed if its regional security leadership is to be secured.