Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s claim that she would lead a “geopolitical Commission” is often quoted. Did the EU live up to expectations? The Union did make a strategic decision that reflected the new geopolitical reality: it offered candidate status to Ukraine, which after the 2022 Russian invasion can no longer survive as an independent state unless it is fully embedded in the Western structures. Other decisions, or lack thereof, show less geopolitical awareness, however. Has Brussels really thought through the geopolitical implications of offering the same status to Georgia, which does not border on the EU? And how to explain the lack of urgency in responding to the Houthi threat to commercial shipping in the Red Sea, which is part of Europe’s singly most vital sea lane of communication? This paper will analyse the geopolitical position of the EU, and propose proactive policies for the next European legislature that would turn the Union into a more effective and consistent geopolitical player, which it does indeed need to be in order to safeguard its interests. Those policies include an enhanced military effort in support of Ukraine; a new regional strategy for the Black Sea and the Southern Caucasus; active security engagement in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean; and a new strategy for North Africa.

This research explores three interconnected topics: maritime security in the Black Sea, the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, and the vulnerabilities and opportunities for the European Union's maritime security.

The conflict in Ukraine has been changing, in the last year and a half, the landscape of international security. Recent studies have explored the war through conventional military competition lenses, leaving limited room for analyses regarding maritime security. Ukraine and Russia are countries facing the Black Sea, a crucial region for this military confrontation. The ongoing conflict would threaten the European Union's security, considering the presence of critical maritime infrastructure and undersea cables, a potential vulnerability.

This research discusses the opportunities to strengthen the Black Sea's maritime security, hypothesising that the primary vulnerability relates to the undersea cables. The convergence of political intentions of allied and neighbouring countries would protect critical communication by securing communication and simultaneously guarantee greater regional and international stability.

This research will involve the current EU's strategies in the Black Sea's security, the Russian involvement in the region, current PESCO and bilateral projects to enhance the security of undersea cables, gas pipelines, port security and maritime surveillance and, finally, interviews with serving and retired civilian and military personnel in the EU and nationally.

This research will inform the academic debate, policymakers, and civil servants of European institutions, and at the national level, the potential implications of the conflict in Ukraine on the Black Sea's maritime security and vulnerabilities and opportunities for the European Union.

Strategic political interests, security concerns, and international power dynamics, have become integral and influential factors in shaping discussions, decisions, and policies related to trade. Yet, the manner in which this Geopoliticization actually affects discussions about trade within the European parliament remains uncertain. Beyond the change in the framing of trade associated to Geopoliticization, the new considerations that have come to play a role in trade policy are likely to alter both how MEPs form their trade policy preferences and what those trade policy preferences are. Complicating matters, Geopoliticization may function not as a transformative force but rather as a tactical tool employed by EP political groups to motivate their pre-existing stances on trade. The potential dual utility of Geopoliticization—capable of motivating both liberal and protectionist agendas— further raises questions about whether its influence merely entrenches existing positions, thereby making trade more divisive. As such, it is imperative to explore whether Geopoliticization serves as a catalyst for MEPs to motivate their pre-existing stance or if it prompts a reconsideration of this pre-existing position. Indeed, depending on whether Geopoliticization serves as a federating or divisive external force for MEPs, it may either foster consensus or fuel conflicts, and lead the European Parliament to adopt more protectionist or liberal positions, which would have implications for the EU’s ability to use trade as a geopolitical tool. This study aims to understand how Geopoliticization is shaping EP groups’ trade policy preferences and the implications thereof for EP trade politics. Using a computational text analysis, this study analyzes the longitudinal shift in different EP groups’ positions in plenary and committee debates on trade.

What is the place and function of public diplomacy in the changing world characterized by “fraught and uncertain” international relations (Kurz-Phelan 2022: 9), torn between multilateral rule-based order and muscle-driven power politics? This paper, focusing on the EU-Ukraine public diplomacy at times of war, will argue that for the second time in the last 30 years, public diplomacy scholarship and practice face a dilemma of “reform vs. transformation”. The need for transformation was first recognized in the early 2000s, in reflection to the watershed events that re-shaped global architecture – the collapse of the USSR, the EU’s and NATO’s major enlargements, and the tragedy of 9/11 (Gregory 2008). Relevant scholarship of that time, offered the notion of a “new” public diplomacy, defined as “political instrument with analytical boundaries and distinguishing characteristics… used by states, associations of states and nonstate actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behaviour; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values” (Gregory 2008: 276, italics original). However, multiple geopolitical, geoeconomic and existential shakes of the third decade of the 21st century and the new media ecology in all spheres of international affairs suggest that perhaps there is a need for a “new” new public diplomacy conceptualization.

In our paper, we focus on the notion of public diplomacy being “increasingly defined as diplomacy by rather than of publics” (Hocking 2005: 32). For Hocking, “Individuals and groups, empowered by the resources provided by the CIT revolution are direct participants in the shaping of international policy. Through an emergent global civil society, they may operate through or independently of national governments”. We explore the case of Ukrainian civil society as a (co)-producers of (public) diplomacy towards the EU featuring an increasing and diverging range of narratives on Ukraine and EU-Ukraine relations post-2022. We offer a novel conceptualization of the public diplomacy transformation at the age of geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts and growing conflicts, with increased contestation, competition and fights, rather than collaboration and cooperation. Theoretically, we engage with the perceptual approach to EU foreign policy (Chaban and Elgström 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023), and advance its core concept of critical expectations gaps. Our discussion argues what this novel conceptualization implies, with a focus on the role of civil society in this new context.