Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine would be expected to constitute an external shock sufficient to cause a dramatic transformation of the defence policies of European countries. Political leaders have frequently referred to this critical event as a ‘wake-up call for Europe’. Yet, defence policy experts generally suggest that this perceived sense of urgency has not yet translated into a transformative development of European defence integration. Research indicates that defence policy remains primarily a matter of national importance. However, a comprehensive overview of the changes in the EU member states’ and European NATO allies’ national defence policies after February 2022 has not yet been compiled. This article aims to address this gap in empirical knowledge by triangulating the results of expert interviews with document analysis to assess changes in European defence policies on three dimensions: (1) European defence budgets and equipment investments, (2) the objectives of European defence policies and (3) defence cooperation among European states. Subsequently, it builds on literature on Foreign Policy Change and NATO burden-sharing to develop a theoretical framework aimed at explaining the (varying) impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on European defence policies.

This paper will analyse how European security priorities have been interacting since 1945 between military and economic security and between geographical boundaries defined by EU and NATO memberships. While the military challenge to security today is not the same as before, it cannot be understood without considering its origins in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nor can today’s economic challenges be understood without appreciating the growth and resilience of the EU’s
economic institutions.
The Iron Curtain created a stable military division between Soviet Europe with Moscow as its hegemon and North Atlantic Europe with Washington as its hegemon. The fall of the Berlin Wall destroyed the Iron Curtain and reduced the priority European states gave to military security while the United States has increasingly titled to the Pacific. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has again made military security a high priority and undermined Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of Russia as part of Europe.
European economic institutions have evolved from a six-country European Coal and Steel Community created so Germany would never again control the economic materials to threaten a European war. The European Economic Community has evolved into a 27-member European Union with trade and monetary powers to provide security in the global economy and a population larger than all but two of the world’s countries. Its High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security promotes a security policy of strategic autonomy. However, the rejection of a European Defence Force by the French National Assembly in 1954 means that the EU must continue to rely on NATO and Washington for its military security.
The conclusion will examine thee security priorities created by the war in Ukraine and the polarisation of American politics. Will the EU and its member states be prepared to fund the reconstruction of Ukraine so it can function in a Single Europe Market? Will the EU reform its institutions to accommodate five times the ECSC’s number of members? Will the White House continue to regard it in America’s national interest to defend any NATO member subject to Russian aggression?
The paper will draw on many decades of comparative research in Brussels Washington, and Moscow and a book in preparation.

On 28 March 2022, EU Home Affairs Ministers supported the mobilization of the EU Platform for Combating Serious and Organized Crime (EMPACT) to help EU Member States combat criminal networks and criminals exploiting the war in Ukraine. Some urgent actions have been introduced in the EU crime priorities, such as human trafficking, arms trafficking, money laundering and asset recovery, new psychoactive substances and synthetic drugs and high-risk criminal networks.

Organized crime has acquired new values in the context of the geopolitical, social and economic transformations that the states are currently facing, expanding their ramifications at the international level. Conflicts often create opportunities that lead to the increasing of the organized crime, amplifying the threat that criminal groups can pose to domestic security. The heightened dynamics of the international security environment and, in particular, the instability with the potential for contagion manifested in the Eastern neighborhood, potentiates the risks posed to European Union by cross-border organized crime. The need for an active, preventive and participative approach to the management of the common European security space is the optimal way to protect the national security of the EU member states against the threats of cross-border organized crime.

Therefore, the approach to such a subject is undoubtedly of particular interest not only in scientific terms, contributing to the presentation, analysis, clarification and comparison of the ways of preventing and countering organized crime, but also in practical terms, the intention being directed towards improving the fighting system against organized crime and to intensify internal and external cooperation.

The paper will evaluate the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The invasion has dramatically changed Europe’s security landscape, carrying major implications for both organizations and their relationship. After NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 and persisting frictions between the US and its European allies about burden-sharing, the war instilled a new sense of purpose into the transatlantic Alliance, placing renewed emphasis on its core functions of territorial defense and deterrence. However, the war was also a reality check for the EU, raising important questions about the future of the European security architecture, the Union’s role within it, and its relationship with NATO. The paper will answer some of these questions, providing an assessment of the impact of the war on the relationship between NATO and CSDP and discussing potential avenues for strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security and its coordination with NATO. More specifically, the paper will answer the following questions: what are the implications of the conflict in Ukraine on NATO and the CSDP? How did the war impact the EU’s aspiration to strategic autonomy? Will the conflict trigger more effective burden-sharing within NATO, as the US prepares for deepening systemic competition with China and tensions continue to rise sharply in the Middle East as a result of the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel and of the Israeli operation in Gaza? Is there a risk that undercurrents among EU members might endanger ongoing support for Ukraine and slow down efforts towards strengthening the EU’s role in transatlantic security? How will the result of the European elections and of the US presidential elections in 2024 impact upon these dynamics? The paper will argue that, while the war highlighted the urgency for a quantum leap in the EU’s security role towards European strategic responsibility, the outcome of this process is hardly secured.

This paper examines the evolving EU security and defence agency through a case study focus on the European Peace Facility (EPF). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine presents a critical juncture for Europe and has catalysed major foreign and security policy shifts both at the national and at the EU level. The use of the EPF to finance considerable military support, including lethal aid, to Ukraine under an EU umbrella has been described as a gamechanger for the EU. Situating the paper within the wider discussion on European strategic cultures and change thereof, this paper traces the decision-making concerning and the use of the EPF, focusing on the EU’s institutional and member states’ strategic narratives and choices concerning the instrument. The EPF reflects motion in the EU strategic agency, accelerated by the external shock as well as enabled by a more gradual change in the strategic narrative, itself a response to the changing strategic environment. Nevertheless, it also reflects persistent divergences in the member states’ national strategic cultures and their implications for the role attributed to the EU.