This paper provides a critical examination of the Eastern enlargement of the European Community (EC), with a specific focus on the Polish case. It challenges the conventional perspective influenced by Cold War logic and ethnocentric biases, disputing the idea that the enlargement merely shaped all Central and Eastern European countries together to conform to a Western model. Instead, we argue for a more nuanced view, suggesting a reciprocal influence. The study relies on archival documents from the Historical Archives of the European Union, the Archives of European Integration and the Archiwum Akt Nowych.

The first section explores the Polish motivations and approaches toward the integration. Initially economically driven in the '70s, Poland's engagement to EC took a political and ethical turn in the '80s, influenced by Solidarność, culminating in criticisms of the European economic model. Poland not only sought economic benefits but also intended to shape Europe according to its perspectives. Poland played a dynamic role in European integration, with nationalism, despite its limitations, acting as a driving force.

The second section focuses on the mutual challenges of the enlargement. Poland encountered issues related to the absence of fixed and equitable criteria among member and candidate countries. While, the EU grappled with redefining itself in a new international scenario, incorporating diverse cultures while strengthening its legal and institutional frameworks.

The paper concludes by examining current disputes between Poland and the EU, highlighting their similarity to past concerns within the Western Europe.

As a state vying for European Union (EU) membership, Serbia’s decision not to join the EU sanctions on Russia because of its behavior towards Ukraine can be seen as puzzling. Drawing from the theoretical framework developed by Phil Orchard and Antje Wiener (2024), this paper examines how Serbia has contested the EU sanctions and exposes the motivations behind these actions. Through a discourse analysis of the two main Serb tabloids (Srpski Telgraf and Informer) known for their political closeness to the ruling elites and in particular to President Vucic, this paper identifies Serbia’s main contestation strategies. In the first period starting from the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 until the full-scale aggression of Russia on Ukraine of 22 February 2022, Serbia engaged in “reactive” contestation, involving the refusal to accept the “us versus them” mentality underpinning any sanction regime. The adoption of sanctions would have gone against the very basis of Serbian foreign policy, which involves the pursuit of closer ties with both the EU and Russia. De facto, this kind of contestation has led Belgrade to side with Moscow. In the second period starting on 22 February 2022, Serbia not only maintained its reactive approach but also it made an effort to contest the EU sanctions regime through a “proactive” as well as an “interpretative” posture. With its proactive stance, Belgrade denounced the negative impact of sanctions on the target state and its population as well as on bystanders in neighboring states or in states closely integrated into global supply chains affected by secondary sanctions. In addition, Serbia engaged in forms of interpretative contestation emerging from its liminal position in the international system by contesting the asymmetry of a policy process making Belgrade the passive recipient of decisions taken in Brussels. Overall, this paper shows how Serbia has adopted multiple types of contestation simultaneously in order to preserve its balancing act in foreign policy: as a state with deep political, cultural and religious ties with Russia, Belgrade would like to advance towards EU accession without antagonizing or undermining its relationship with Moscow, which is also a key ally in its campaign against the recognition of Kosovo independence. Through the analysis of Serbia’s contestation, this paper contributes to the literature on EU sanctions and on the analysis of the foreign policy of states located in the EU periphery.

The aim of this presentation lies in shedding light on the motivations, strategies and discourses of the European Commission in advancing the implementation of the Eastward Enlargement of the EC/EU (a "reunification of Europe") in the nineties as a result of the transforming impulse of the end of the Cold War, seen both as a fundamental historical turning point and as a geopolitical game changer.
The main sources selected to elucidate the European Commission’s evolving positions and actions on these issues following the semantic and structural changes of 1989 come from: the Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) in Florence and the Archives of the DG Enlargement of the European Commission in Brussels. These sources also include a large set of Oral History interviews conducted with key decision-makers at the European institutions (former Presidents of the European Parliament, former DG Enlargement Directors, etc.) on the topic of the risks, opportunities and conclusions concerning the EC/EU's Eastward Enlargement process in the aftermath of 1989.
In short, this presentation will address how critical historical analysis and qualitative methods offer us a compass to chart intangible variables, such as the instilment of time perceptions in political communication strategies. These approaches can, indeed, enhance our understanding of myths and perceptions as a compelling power to build our own future(s) in conversation.