This series of two panels look at third country cooperation with the EU in the field of foreign, security and defence policy. Analysing the dynamics of third countries’ relations with the EU from both an inside- out and an outside-in perspective, the panel addresses the perspective of the European Union itself, as well as those of third states. Particular concerns are to discuss to what extent we observe changes to the patterns of cooperation over time and across third countries, to specify what characterises these changes, as well as discuss how they may be theoretically accounted for. Addressing these concerns, panellists map both formal and informal dimensions of third country cooperation with the EU, as well as analyse the form and content of cooperative arrangements. Thus, exploring both theoretical and empirical aspects of third country cooperation, papers analyse 1) specific substantive issues and cases (Russia’s war in Ukraine, space policy), and 2) specific geographical areas/countries (United Kingdom, Norway, the US, Canada, Japan).

The focus of this piece is the shift in the preferences and the practices of the UK Government in its foreign, security and defence (FSDP) policy relationship with the EU.

Whilst broader UK-EU relations have been under significant strain, particularly prior to agreement of the Windsor Framework, the paper highlights how coordination concerning Ukraine following the Russian invasion has been positive and somewhat insulated from tensions elsewhere in the relationship.

The paper identifies, on the basis of interview material, that where there is bilateral UK-EU cooperation on matters concerning Ukraine, this has generally been ad hoc and driven by strong joint interest. This has not been sufficient to drive a formalised EU-UK agreement or institutionalised bilateral structures on matters concerning foreign, security or defence policy. Rather, the relationship can be characterised as circumscribed muddling through.

The further paper asserts, that Russia’s war on Ukraine has not necessarily led to a higher likelihood of any formalised relationship on foreign, defence or security policy between the UK and EU. The UK relationship has fallen in terms of EU priorities. Following difficult Brexit negotiations, there is also a continuing level of distrust and consequent low appetite for opening negotiations on complicated and sensitive issues, particularly in an area where the UK has rejected EU overtures in the past. Whilst there is a prevailing sense that more could be done, the expectation is that it must first be driven at political level by the UK.

The role of third countries in the EU’s response to Russia’s war of aggression can hardly be understated. Many accounts assume that third country influence on EU foreign policy boils down to hard bargaining or ‘divide and rule’ strategies, particularly when it comes to the United States. In this article, we seek to complement rational-choice oriented approaches by turning our attention to the generally overlooked patterns of informal cooperation and social learning between the EU and third states. Focusing on the Union’s response to Russia’s war, we set out to uncover informal cooperation dynamics between EU member states and third actors in order to asses whether (and how) social learning practices shaped threat perception in both the EU’s institutions and its member states – as well as their policy response. We expect that the more frequent the interaction, the greater the exposure between diplomats, and the more informal the modes of cooperation, the greater the chance that social learning might result in changes to the EU’s threat perception and policies. Evidence on these cooperation and social learning dynamics will be drawn from semi-structured interviews with national diplomats and EU officials. Specifically, the paper zooms in on some of the EU’s closest partners in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: the US, Canada, the UK, Japan, and Norway. Firmly inscribed in the constructivist tradition, the paper makes an important contribution to our current understanding of third country influence on EU foreign policy by shedding light on the critical role of social learning and informal patterns of cooperation.

In this paper I revisit the debate on the nature and core characteristics of the EU as a polity, through an analysis of the conditions for third country participation in EU security and defence policy. Drawing on collective goods theory, I examine why Norway, whose economic relations with the EU are regulated through the so-called EEA agreement, has failed to achieve agreements which provide a similar access to the EU’s policies on security and defence. Distinguishing between club goods, public goods and common goods, I analyse the EU’s justifications for the limits it sets for third country participation in security and defence cooperation. All three forms of goods are important in politics, yet they require different forms of political authority. Analysing EU justifications for the limits to Norwegian participation in security and defence through this threefold conceptual lense, I thus expect also to gain new insights into the prior question of the nature of the emerging EU polity.