The paper examines the changes of the attitudes of Hungrian citizens towards various aspects of the European integration during the past two decades. Based on Eurobarometer surveys, it seems clear that the support of the European integration has remained more or less at same level in the recent years (actually since 2006) in Hungary. It raises the question whether the Eurosceptic rhetoric and communication of the current Hungarian government has not affected the attitudes of the voters. Naturally, there have been deviations over the years, but these changes were quite small. The real fall in the popularity of EU membership happened just before and right after the EU accession of the country. According to studies, this decrease was a consequence of the voters materialistic expectations regarding the EU membership. So the paper examines two important questions. What are the effects of the Eurosceptic communication of the government on the support of various aspects of the European integration? Is there a correlation between the support of the European integration and the (future) economic prospects of the voters?

Recent years have been challenging for European countries. The COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the energy crisis, and high inflation have all constituted major challenges for the entire European Union (EU). All these events have the potential to influence how citizens of European countries perceive the EU. Has there been a change? How much change? What explains the change? This paper will look at the case of Czechia and examine whether and how Czech citizens' attitudes toward the EU changed over the 2019-2024 time period. The paper will utilize unique longitudinal data from the Czech Household Panel Survey. The methodological advantages of longitudinal data allow observing change at the individual level of analysis. Also, studying determinants of over-time changes at the individual level allow for more confident conclusions about causality than if cross-sectional data are used. Overall, this paper will contribute to our understanding of Euroscepticism, which is especially relevant in the current time of the rising popularity of Eurosceptic political parties.

This article analyses the dynamics of Croatian citizen participation in European Citizen Initiatives (ECI), spotlighting the notably low engagement since Croatia joined the EU. In addition to establishing.a quantiative baselin on Croatian citizens' involvement in ECIs to date, the paper shares qualitative insights from focus group discussions with students of political science, journalism and European studies. Besides, the paper presents new perspectives from interviews with Croatian members of ECI organising committees and supporting organisations, providing an insider view of the challenges and opportunities in mobilizing citizen participation in ECIs. Through this comprehensive approach, the paper aims to unveil the multifaceted factors influencing Croatian citizens' participation in ECIs, contributing to the broader discourse on participatory democracy in the EU.

How do strong emotions against governing parties affect citizens’ judgments of the policy output? The concept of affective polarization is at the heart of this question and has been well-research in the context of American politics, we have evidence that it is also prominent within EU member states as well. The non-political implications of affective polarization, such as impact on friendship and the job market, have been widely studied, the policy implications have not been as extensively researched. The current literature suggests that it undermines democratic accountability: if perceptions of economic policies or probity in office are influenced by partisan animosity, then voters may fail to credit the successes of their opponents or may not punish mistakes and wrongdoing by their own side. This paper explores the extent to which partisan animosity provides strong cues affecting policy judgments. Using longitudinal and comparative individual data from eleven EU member states from a spread of different geographical groups we explore this question. Our findings contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms through which affective polarization can undermine democratic legitimacy and accountability.