More than half of the world’s citizens will go to the polls in 2024 in a bonanza year for voting. The Republic of Ireland is part of the global wave with referendums scheduled for March and June, local and European Parliament elections in June and very heavy speculation that a general election will take place in early Autumn. European Parliament elections in Ireland exhibit classic second order effects. The close proximity of the European Parliament and the general election in 2024 creates the opportunity to investigate second order effects more effectively and this paper will begin that analysis. Irish voters have a strongly positive orientation towards the European Union as evidenced in decades of survey data from Eurobarometer. However, EU positivity is not reflected in widespread interest or concern about EU affairs and national issues predominate at European Parliament election campaigns. The research will consider the key issues considered by voters that influenced vote choice, locating the discussion within the framework of the European salience hypothesis (Hix and Marsh, 2007). The second part will consider the gains and losses of government and opposition parties and particular attention will be given to Eurosceptic non-party candidates that have been especially successful at recent European Parliament elections in Ireland. Non-party candidates have captured the populist vote and classifying their voter support base will be a central objective. Finally, the research will use survey data from the Electoral Commission collected before and after polling day.

One of the most interesting and promising developments in European Union (EU) party politics has been the establishment of European political foundations. Several European political foundations are active in Brussels and beyond, all of them affiliated to European political parties, so-called Europarties. However, very little is known as to how exactly these European political foundations perform their tasks, particularly in the run-up to and during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign. Therefore this paper analyses European political foundations empirically and comparatively, based on the study of primary resources and a number of semi-structured interviews, alongside existing research. The central questions concern the tasks European political foundations perform, such as manifesto writing. From a theoretical perspective, this article addresses the issue of the development of European political foundations within the wider debate on EU party politics, and offers a number of insights regarding the actual role of European political foundations in their relationship with Europarties.

National elections are scheduled in seven of the world’s most populated countries in 2024, with much media focus on the US Presidential Election in November. Less salient in terms of media coverage has been the European elections taking place across the 27 European Union (EU) member states in June. Against the backdrop of a predicted rise in the number of MEPs from the Radical Right, the paper examines the impact of this anticipated development in terms of its influence on the European Parliament (EP) and the EU more generally. The paper begins by tracing the share of the vote and number of seats gained by Radical Right Parties (RRPs) across the member states in the 2024 European elections in comparison with 2019. It then analyses the consequences of the result with regard to transnational group formation in the EP in the new parliamentary term. Finally, it examines the significance of the anticipated rise in support for the Radical Right in terms of its overall impact on the EU.

There are three dominant perspectives on left-wing parties and the EU. Analysts such as Martell et al. (2001), Lightfoot (2005), and Meyer & Rutherford (2012) argue that centre left parties are supportive of integration because of its internationalist dimension. Others suggest that left-wing support for the EU has cooled with the deepening neo-liberalisation of key aspects of the EU, notably the single currency (see for example Notermans 2001 and Holmes & Roder 2019). The work of March (2012) and March & Keith (2016) highlights more that the EU has become a demarcation issue on the left, with radical left parties using the Union as an issue to distinguish themselves from the centre-left.

While both the centre left and the radical left have struggled across most of Europe in recent years, Ireland offers a possible exception to this rule. Sinn Féin, once narrowly associated with nationalism, has become one of the main parties in Ireland, and opinion polls suggest it could well emerge as the largest party after the next general election (which must be held by February 2025, but which is widely predicted to happen in the autumn of 2024). With local and European elections also taking place, this provides an opportunity to assess the party.

With the party in a leading position in Irish politics now, it provides an opportunity to assess how a left-leaning nationalist party has approached the EU. Sinn Féin used to be regarded as a strongly nationalist and eurosceptic party, and is a member of the GUE group in the Parliament. However, it has steadily changed its stance as it has gained support, and in particular Brexit was an important moment in marking a shift from opposition to the EU to support.

This paper will analyse the development in Sinn Féin’s European policies in 2024, with a particular focus on the EP election. It will draw on an evaluation of party statements, speeches and policy documents, and will also conduct interviews with selected SF politicians.

The elections to the European parliament are important as a potential source of legitimacy and accountability for the EU. Yet, a persistent critique since the direct elections began in 1979 has been that this potential is not met because of the second-order nature of the EP elections. Studies have suggested that voters base their decisions on domestic politics, such as support for the incumbent party, rather than European issues (e.g., Schmitt, 2005; Hix and Marsh, 2011). Meanwhile, the second-order thesis has been increasingly questioned in recent times, in terms of how these elections are second-order to voters (Alt et al., 2023; Hobolt, 2014), but also whether they are second-order to politicians (Spoon, 2012; Braun et al., 2016). These mixed results show the need to further revisit the empirical claim that the EP elections are not sufficiently Europeanised to provide the necessary legitimacy to the European parliament. These debates also pinpoint the need for a continued theoretical discussion on what constitutes a second-order election in the European context.

For elections to fill their function, it is essential that voters are provided with sufficient information and that parties offer political alternatives. This paper follows up on this supply dimension to the EP elections and asks to what extent issues are seen as linked to European integration in the media and by political parties. Furthermore, it engages with the question of what is politicised in these campaigns, whether it is the polity or policy dimensions of the EU (e.g., Braun et al., 2016). Through the concept of ‘discursive issue-linkages’ (Graneng, forthcoming), the paper presents a novel theoretical approach to assessing these questions. It also contributes to our empirical knowledge through a combination of quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the 2024 EP election campaigns.