This contribution provides comparative descriptive and explanatory analyses of the framing of immigrants by representatives of political parties in two Central and Eastern European countries. Until recently most studies commonly did not differentiate framing of immigrants based on their background, be it region of origin, religion, ethnicity, race, or legal status. However, recent research indicates that the background of immigrants matters for their framing. At the same time, there is an apparent contrast between the approach in Central and Easter Europe evident in the mostly welcoming attitudes towards refugees from Ukraine and the rather negative public opinion towards refugees coming from the Middle East and North Africa especially, albeit not exclusively, in the period surrounding the so-called EU refugee crisis of 2015/2016. This apparent contrast in public attitudes towards immigrants from different backgrounds provides a good laboratory to assess how framing of immigrants differed in this region during the 2015-1026 refugee crisis and in the period following the Russian aggression against Ukraine of 2022. This contribution thus comparatively looks at differences of framing of immigrants and refugees in these two periods. Most studies also examine framing of immigrants in the traditional news media. To distinguish itself from this focus of most framing studies, this paper uses another source of data. It looks at how immigrants were framed in social media, namely Twitter. Specifically, it looks at how they were framed in Twitter posts of the leaders of all main political parties in three key receiving countries of Ukrainian refugees, namely Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland. The chapter samples these Twitter profiles all party leaders for four constructed weeks in the period covering the 2015-2016 refugee crisis as well as four weeks in the period surrounding the Russian aggression against Ukraine. After establishing descriptively and based on a content analysis the main frames being employed regarding immigrants and refugees in these two timeframes, the chapter moves on to accounting for the identified framing patterns. To do so it employs regression analysis and postulates possible determinants at the political party and individual levels as well as contextual covariates related to the background of immigrants.

Full membership in European welfare states is typically based on the fulfillment of one of three conditions: 1) citizenship, 2) regular employment, or 3) kinship/marriage to someone meeting conditions 1) or 2). A fourth possibility opening the door to European welfare states – albeit often only half-way – is the application for protection. The number of persons in this latter category of (partial) welfare-state membership has increased significantly in recent years across Europe, against the backdrop of various crises that force(d) people from different parts of the world to seek protection in countries other than those of their origin/previous residence.

This article examines how political actors in national governments have adapted welfare-state access for this group of persons under the impression of crises affecting both the respective states’ welfare and incorporation systems. Specifically, the article looks at political reactions in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and of Russia’s war against Ukraine; whilst also taking into consideration perceptions of national welfare states coming under strain based on various interconnected factors such as labour shortages, demographic change, globalisation, digitisation, and inflation (NB: the article does not study all these factors, but the arising perceptions among political actors of an already strained welfare state). In a comparative analysis of two ‘most different systems’, the article focuses on two European countries that entered the timeframe stipulated above under very different circumstances: namely, Germany and Sweden. These two countries differ not only in their respective traditional welfare (social democrat vs. conservative-corporatist) and incorporation (liberal vs. restrictive) regimes, but also in their governmental composition: in Sweden, a right-wing coalition with the support of the far-right Sweden Democrats took over from a long-serving Social Democrats-led government in 2022. In Germany, a new coalition of social democrat, green and liberal parties ended the 16-year rule of a government led by the conservative Christian Democrats.

Via a narrative analysis of draft legislation concerning forced migrants’ welfare-state access from the period 2020-2023, this article seeks to answer the question: How did the German and Swedish governments construct and adapt welfare-state membership of forced migrants under the impression of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine? The analysis is expected to reveal an unexpectedly similar political construction of membership in both examined countries. This, in turn, produces important insights on how crises, and resulting crisis management, leave a lasting mark on the regulation of different categories of welfare-state membership.

However counterintuitive it may sound, there is little evidence that more development in the developing countries necessarily translates into less migration to the developed countries, and the vast literature on the relationship between socio-economic development and migration is inconclusive at best. Despite the lack of conclusive evidence, the European Union (EU) has increasingly focused on development cooperation and trade policy as a means of addressing irregular migration. As a result, a narrative of the migration-development nexus was embraced in the concept of ‘addressing the root causes of irregular migration’, which soon after became a fundamental assumption underlying numerous EU policy initiatives. In this context, the EU has linked migration, development, and trade in its approach to developing countries (i.e. the trade-development-migration nexus – hereafter, T-D-M nexus), and trade has been framed as part of crisis solutions in the EU's external migration policy. This paper aims to map and synthesise various narratives that have unfolded over time around the EU's T-D-M nexus, and to juxtapose them with policy outcomes. The study examines the T-D-M nexus from 1995 to 2022 using Narrative Policy Analysis. It draws on material concerning, among others, the European Commission’s Knowledge Centre on Migration and Democracy, selected Association Agreements, Team Europe Initiatives, and the negotiations of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with the countries of the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. While exploring the gap between research and policy-making, the findings have the potential to contribute to the understanding of the mechanisms linking policy narratives and policy outcomes in the EU's T-D-M nexus.

In light of the results of the recent CEAS reform this paper offers new insights on how current tendencies in EU asylum policy, like unlawful implementation in the Member States or externalisation efforts, show spillover effects on the EU’s position on the global stage (foreign affairs), its internal functioning (rule of law backsliding), and Member States’ ability to compete in the global economy (labour migration).

Much of the critique of the CEAS reform, agreed in December 2023, has focussed on the questionable prospects for success the reform can provide for either the practical challenges of people seeking protection in the EU or the political conflicts between Member States regarding European asylum policy. In our contribution, we would like to add to the debate three pivotal and often overlooked implications for other areas that current tendencies in EU asylum policy impact. First, we look into foreign policy and cooperation with third countries, including development cooperation, to scrutinise the EU’s credibility as a regulatory superpower that promotes adhering to a rules-based order. Second, we examine rule of law backsliding not only regarding refugee protection, but also in terms of CEAS provisions (e.g. relocation, transfers), policy implementation within Member States (e.g. Hungary), and illegal, yet normalised practices at EU borders (e.g. pushbacks). Third, we illuminate the implications for regular (skilled) migration to the EU against the backdrop of increasing demand for migrant workers. By employing rigorous policy and legal analysis, we demonstrate the detrimental spillover effects that current tendencies in EU asylum policy have on other crucial EU policy objectives.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, with roughly 85% of their population comprised of non-citizen foreigners, present a unique opportunity to understand immigrant integration. Migrants from the European Union, in particular, live and work in staggering numbers across the GCC. Yet, scholars know very little about how these European fare on the ground. Existing paradigms rooted in the study of immigration in Western contexts fall short in capturing the nuances of integration trajectories within exclusionary and ethnocratic regimes like the Gulf, often dismissing immigrant inclusion as an impossibility. However, despite the strict kafala sponsorship system and nationality-based migration hierarchies that undoubtedly constrain migrant life, inclusion does occur. Immigrants in the Gulf carve out dynamic social relationships, become deeply embedded in economic activities, forge meaningful political identities, and articulate a sense of belonging that suggests scholars must rethink the notion of immigrant inclusion altogether. Based on 35 in-depth interviews with migrants from the U.K and continental Europe in the State of Qatar, this research finds that immigrant inclusion occurs primarily vis-à-vis the diaspora community itself and is shaped by two dynamics. First, the sheer size, diversity, and interconnectedness of the broader diaspora community in Qatar helps migrants avoid the traditional pitfalls of excessive co-ethnic network dependence and isolation. Through regular interaction with the international community, European migrants acquire valuable cultural and migrant capital that facilitates meaningful economic and social mobility despite restrictive state policies and institutions. These effects were seen both within Qatar, but also in the context of return migration. Second, through their experiences in Qatar, the European migrants in our sample emerged as valuable vehicles for the transmission of social remittances back to their home contexts. The interview data confirms that both processes represent unique sources of empowerment, belonging, and social mobility for migrants within highly exclusionary integration contexts. This research makes two significant contributions to the overall field of European migration studies: it advances our rudimentary knowledge about European emigration to highly exclusionary regimes, and it highlights the importance of studying Europe as a sending, rather than just a receiving context for migration.