In a world characterised by the return of war to the European continent since February 2022 and Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, Franco-German military cooperation has been put to the test more than ever. Indeed, the classic image of France and Germany as the driving force behind European defence and military cooperation that has emerged regularly since the end of the Cold War seems to have become more than just a recurring source of discussion. The latest developments around the SCAF project or the European Air Shield Initiative (ESSI) launched by Germany without consultation between the two states in October 2022 have tended to fuel the idea that Franco-German military cooperation is far from being as fluid as the political rhetoric has tried for several decades to make out.
Yet these tensions between France and Germany, the original driving force behind European reconciliation, are nothing new. This paper will therefore draw on discursive institutionalism to analyse the strategic discourses developed by French and German governmental actors since February 2022 in order to understand how the rapid and far-reaching changes in German defence policy under the Zeitenwende are producing effects of dissonance between the strategic discourses and the operational means implemented by the two states, both in the military aid provided to Ukraine and in their way of conceiving European defence, between strategic autonomy and de facto dependence on NATO. This paper is empirically based on a field survey of around twenty-five qualitative interviews conducted in 2022-2023, nesides the content analysis of French and German strategic discourses and how they frame European defence in the context of the war in Ukraine.

How is the legislative footprint in the European Parliament performed? Legislative transparency is a prerequisite of EU democratic accountability and legitimacy, an antidote against corruption, and an essential ingredient of good governance. Moreover, transparency regarding legislators’ lobby contacts in EU policy-making has become a highly critical issue. Recent research has found that legislators’ policy leadership, ideological preferences, and cultural background influence their inclination to inform about their meetings with interest representatives. However, the question of to what extent and under what conditions the legislative footprint disclosing contacts between MEPs with policy-making positions and interest representatives is performed has hardly received any attention. This paper addresses this question and formulates hypotheses on the effects of MEPs’, interest groups’, and policy properties on the legislative footprint. Based on data on legislative acts in the EP during the 9th EP legislature, the analysis expects to reach a better understanding of the drivers of transparency in EU policy-making and make a contribution to research on transparency at the EU level.

The extremely fast evolution of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology has demonstrated its many uses and benefits, but also its potential harms. In the security area, AI intensified two trends that may hinder the ethical approach: the technologisation of security (Ceyhan 2008; Muller 2009) and the narrative of riskification (Corry 2012; Judge & Maltby, 2017) in an environment characterized as complex, unpredictable, ambiguous and competitive. Acknowledging the high potentiality of this disruptive technology, but also the risks, the European Union (EU) defined as one of its priorities to put forward a European approach to AI. The declared goal is to reach a leading position, both technologically and ethically, by developing an "ecosystem of excellence" and a unique "ecosystem of trust" that complies with EU's values and people's fundamental rights. Focusing on the EU's security governance task of protection (Kirchner & Sperling 2007), we aim to analyse the process that opened the way for the new AI regulatory framework devised at the supranational level. Specifically, we are interested in the policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon 1984; 2003) of the European Commission and the strategies used by the institution in this process, in the timeframe that ranges from 2018 (the first EU's Strategy for AI) to 2023 (the provisional agreement on the AI Act). Additionally, we aim to assess if the recently agreed AI Act is prone to enable the EU to ensure the protection of people based on an effective, trustworthy, humancentric AI. The research will be guided by two interrelated questions: How has the Commission shaped the European coordinated approach to AI in the security domain? Does the AI Act prevent the riskification and the technologisation of security?

The proposal for Trento UACES Annual Conference is aimed at the European Union (EU) as an international player in global governance. The study is related to the large number of coordinating meetings organized by the EU delegation in New York. These diplomatic meetings are set at the highest level in order to reach common positions harmonised between the 27 representatives of the EU Member States at the United Nations headquarters.In other words, maximising harmonisation between EU practices in Brussels and UN practices in New York. The research question to answer and to test beyond such practices, is to what extent the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty has improved the cohesion among the EU Member States (MS) within this EU-UN dichotomy. Particularly in the voting procedures for United Nations Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly as a multilateral forum on various issues.

For the scientific validity of this empirical analysis, it is necessary to take into account all the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This basically means testing the determination which calls for a roll-call vote (adopted by a vote). Practically speaking, an average of 90 resolutions per year multiplied by each of the 27 Member States' positions. For such an analytical exercise, it is assumed that there are also four variables at play: the results of a "yes" or "no" vote, as well as "abstain" or "absent". In this regard, the proposed study has its own timely concerns and therefore will merge current literature and available empirical findings on the matter.

Regarding the limitations of the behavior of the EU's Member States within the United Nations Security Council, this is a differentiated regime where the EU, as an actor, in practice, does not have a seat in this forum, and where voting dynamics by individual EU states can lead to very different results. However, it will be necessary to address certain points in connection with the UNSC in the conclusions of this study.

This study examines the complicated relationship between social networks and liberal ideologies, focusing on Hungary, Poland and Romania. It assumes that social networks are essential in political formation and narratives. This research investigates the effects of these platforms on the presence of liberal ideologies in these nations.

The research examines social media use in these countries during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign. It explores how Facebook has been used to promote anti-liberal sentiment, gather support and influence public opinion. The study examines the nature of content, communication tactics and user engagement on these platforms, assessing their potential as tools for political propaganda.

A crucial part of this study is examining populist and Eurosceptic rhetoric. It assesses how these narratives shape public opinion about liberal values and European institutions and their influence on civic engagement and the democratic process.

In conclusion, the study reflects on how these findings might influence the trajectory of liberal ideologies in Europe. Integrating Social Network Analysis (SNA) with theoretical exploration provides an interpretative view of the interaction between technology, politics and ideology, particularly in discussions about the future of democracy and liberal thought in Europe.