The EU’s “de-risking” strategy has prompted staunch rejection from Beijing. Why does China discursively contest de-risking despite having been practising it by nearshoring or friendshoring supply chain and by diversifying economic partnerships? How does China reject de-risking and justify such contestations? It makes little sense when Beijing recognises a plethora of risks that its economy itself faces internationally. The main objective of this article is thus to demonstrate how China has come to de-risk its economy, and explains why it has unleashed an ostensibly contradictory anti-de-risking discourse. It also seeks to characterise how China contests de-risking by analysing speeches from Chinese officials in bilateral meetings with EU counterparts. Drawing upon the literature on norm antipreneur and role theory, I argue that the decoupling of Beijing’s de-risking deeds from its anti-de-risking words stems primarily from its perceived role conflict between being a “creative norm resister” and being a “competitive norm entrepreneur”. Specifically, China rejects the emerging norm of “de-risking” as a creative resister a) because it is a continuity of its tradition of saying "no" to non-autochthonous concepts, b) because it is a strategy to dissolve external concerns of its own decoupling and to protract de-risking from other actors; and c) because it is result of domestic opposition that benefits from the status-quo interdependence. In its contestations, China does not draw a conceptual difference between de-risking and decoupling, but instead invokes economic liberal principles to reject de-risking. As such, this article sheds light on how China positions itself in the geo-economic turn of the liberal international economic order.

There are multiple reasons for the current rise for the far-right populism in various European countries, like economic, social, cultural and political causes. It is difficult to say which is the most important one. On the other hand, the impact of the rise of far-right populism in Europe is not only to Europe, but also to the transatlantic relations, and even to EU-China relations. There will be elections for the European Parliament in 2024, the far-right political groups are expected to gain more seats. This change will have important implications for European politics, the European Parliament and even the EU's external relations. Eu-China relations is one of the most important bilateral relationships in the world. China have been paying close attention to the rise of far-right populism in the European political landscape in recent years, so as the Chinese scholars.
Based on the background of globalization and informationization, Chinese scholars have conducted a large number of studies on European far0right populism since the 21st century. Only by strengthening communication and understanding the true thoughts of both sides can we promote the stable development of EU-China relations. The author will systematically sort out and summarize the research on European right-wing populism by Chinese scholars. Through the Chinese perspective, academics can understand a more three-dimensional and comprehensive European right-wing populism.

European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron believe that for Europe and Africa to move forward there need to be a complete overhaul of the current partnership between Africa and Europe. President Macron therefore emphasised on the need to establish a genuine system of peace and prosperity to build investments in Africa that would lead to a ‘shared future’ between Europe and Africa with the aim of reforging economic and financial ‘new deal’ with Africa. While acknowledging that relations between Africa and Europe were “tired’. The tired nature of relationship between Africa and Europe has rendered African more vulnerable to protracted experiences of food security, armed conflict and migration. These challenges and more are compounded by today’s immediate global concerns of health and climate change. Consequently, Africa has increasingly developed negative sentiments against European presence in the continent and is ready to trade in Europe for Russia and China. Hence, the rise of coup d’états in notably Francophone Africa. Among the multiple reasons, Africa continually yearns for equal partnership, not paternalism in its relationship with Europe. Conversely, the emergence of China as a key trade partner in Africa has demonstrated a more equal partnership with the continent than what Europe has offered pre and post colonialism. This paper therefore seeks to answer the following questions: What is the future of Europe vis-à-vis the increasing presence of China in Africa? How can Europe create a more equal partnership with Africa after six-decades of a donor-recipient relationship? Why is there a need to fundamentally shift relations between Europe and Africa? Answers to these questions would be obtained through extensive literature review of secondary data that comprise of journal articles, government publications, websites, books and other relevant sources.