Over the past few years, Central Europe has garnered widespread recognition as a region
within the European Union that is thoroughly dominated by Eurosceptic sentiments (Kaeding
eta al. 2020; Hloušek and Kaniok 2020). The escalating conflicts between some governments and the European Commission, particularly regarding the rule of law and the development of democracy, notably in Poland and Hungary, along with prolonged opposition to the EU's energy transition and strong disagreement with the proposed structure of the Union's migration policy, have collectively contributed to the region earning a reputation as a
disruptive force within the EU (Csehi and Zgut 2021, Styczińska 2023).

The label of being a Eurosceptic heartland seems definitive at first glance, but the surprising aspect lies in closely observing what unfolds beneath this seemingly clear characterization. In several Central European countries, intriguing pro-European tendencies are observable, including governments with a pro-European orientation, as seen in countries like the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, etc. Additionally, there is a notable increase in the activities of civil society, reflecting a growing interest and engagement with European values.

These developments challenge the prevailing narrative of Euroscepticism in the region, highlighting a more nuanced and diverse landscape that includes elements of pro-European sentiment within both governmental and civil sectors. Nevertheless, it becomes evident that while Euroscepticism has been extensively explored in academic literature, Euro-optimistic approaches are seldom reflected upon. Thus, our panel aims not only to focus on the empirical examination of the Central European region but also to deepen and broaden the debate concerning the theoretical foundations of this concept.

By addressing this imbalance, our objective is to contribute to a more comprehensive
understanding of the multifaceted dynamics within Central Europe, shedding light on both
Eurosceptic and Euro-optimistic perspectives and enriching the scholarly discourse on the
region.

Central Eastern Europe represents the part of the European Union that can serve as a sort of political laboratory in many respects, such as democratic backsliding or illiberal democracy. The polycrisis of European integration augmented the argumentation potential of Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on Central Eastern European evidence, the paper argues that it is necessary to recontextualize the concepts of soft and hard Euroscepticism vis- à-vis the recent challenges of European integration as well as populist backlashes in domestic

politics. The paper argues, as well, that it is important to pay conceptual attention to the definition of pro-European positions and their variants, to shed conceptual light on the edge between soft Euroscepticism and critical pro-integration positions. A more profound conceptual treatment of “Euro-optimist” political stances can significantly contribute to better use of Euroscepticism as a heuristic and analytical tool in an ever-changing European Union.

Czechia and its political landscape have long been synonymous with Euroscepticism and populism, as extensively discussed in academic works like Kazharski (2019) and Mravcová and Havlík (2022). Surprisingly, during the COVID-19 crisis, based on research by Hloušek and Kaniok (2020), soft Euroscepticism either persisted or weakened in Czechia. Our article critically examines the strengthening of Eurooptimistic political parties, mostly after the last election in 2021. In a remarkable shift, Czechia's new government now comprises five political parties, each contributing to a multi-dimensional discourse on European integration. Since we

analyze political debates in the Chamber of Deputies together with speeches of members of the European Parliament, we will be able to detect the prevailing narratives regarding the EU agenda.

This paper aims to conceptualise Euro-optimism as a concept complementary to Euroscepticism. It does so to fill the gap in the rise of literature on Euroscepticism in the 2000s, which started with empirical cases studies, following comparative analyses and resulted in strong conceptualisation within Political Theory, Comparative Politics and IR. The findings on Euroscepticism have mostly been lined to populist strategies of political parties, yet this article will position itself at the state level of analysis within the Foreign Policy Analysis as an approach linking domestic politics and IR. The article will make use of the frames analysis of Euroscepticism (Pirro, Tagart & van Kessel, 2018) – encompassing four conceptual elements: socioeconomic, national sovereignty, cultural homogeneity, and supranational governance (or a combination of the above) – and apply it to Euro-optimist state-level positions. It will verify the value of this conceptual effort via a longitudinal case study of Slovenian state positions since the country’s independence.

Since its accession to the EU, Slovakia had been among the most Euro optimistic member countries, which was also reflected in the depth of Slovakia's integration into the EU (adoption of the Euro, cooperation on PESCO, the European Prosecutor's Office, etc). In recent years, however, we have witnessed the politization of the EU and the disappearance of political consensus on foreign policy orientation and the EU membership in Slovakia that has been mirrored to some extent also in popular perceptions. This paper uses a focus group methodology to grasp the positive perceptions harbored by individuals concerning European integration in Slovakia and examination of political parties’ positions towards the European integration. The paper detects prevailing narratives regarding the EU agenda and examines interplay between the popular and political discourse. The analysis documents remarkable shift from pre-accession accent on utilitarian benefits to more affective reasoning (European values, European identity) and discuss its consequences for popular support of the EU.